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The private sector in Saudi Arabia has the features of a dual labour market – it relies heavily 
on foreign labour, comprising around 90% of its employment, with regulated pay differences 
between nationals and foreigners. In 2011, the Saudi Ministry of Labor introduced the 
‘Nitaqat’ program, which imposes an industry quota of national employment on private 
firms. The policy’s main aim is to raise the employment levels of nationals in the private 
sector. With strict sanctions imposed on non-compliant firms, the policy has a high 
compliance rate, but imposes significant costs on firms.  
Using a dataset from the Ministry of Labor covering the whole population of firms subject to 
Nitaqat, this thesis uses an econometric approach to study the impact of Nitaqat on Saudi 
employment, foreign employment and the exit rate of firms. This builds on existing literature 
by analysing the policy using a difference-in-differences approach. The results suggest that 
the policy has improved Saudization (the ratio of Saudis to total employment), but at a 
significant cost to firms, since it raised exit rates and reduced total employment in surviving 
firms. In addition, it undertakes a descriptive analysis of the economy before and after the 
policy implementation, using individual level data from 2009 to 2015. This studies the 
difference in earnings between Saudis and non-Saudis in relation to skill levels, industry of 
employment and region. However, there was not enough evidence to directly link the results 
to Nitaqat. Hence, a final analysis is based on a merge at industry level between the Nitaqat 
dataset and the Annual Establishment Survey to measure the impact of the policy on labour 
productivity. This uses both cross-sectional analysis and a fixed effects (FE) panel data 
approach to describe labour productivity before and after the Nitaqat policy over a ten-year 
period (2005-2015). The results suggest that the private sector has suffered from lower 
productivity in the short run; forcing the less productive firm to exit the market, while the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  1 
 Introduction 
Saudi Arabia is one of the top five countries for labour migration destinations in the 
world (Laczko and Appave, 2015). In 2009, Saudi Arabia was ranked as the second top 
remittance-sending country in the world, after the United States (Canuto and Rafha, 2011), 
with outward remittance reaching around USD 26 billion per year. One of the major 
challenges facing the labour market in Saudi Arabia is the low share of Saudis in the private 
sector, the private sector relies heavily on foreign labour, comprising around 90% of workers 
in the sector. Also Saudi Arabia also has one of the highest youth population growth rates in 
the world. Therefore, it became imperative to find a solution for employment of the growing 
youth population entering into the labour force. 
The idea of job nationalisation - ‘Saudization’ - has been re-occurring in the Saudi labour 
market since the 1990s when a 20% nationalisation quota was imposed on the private sector. 
However, these policies were unsuccessful, not only because they were overly ambitious, but 
also because the government did not enforce their implementation. In 2011, the government 
introduced a new approach to Saudization with its “Nitaqat” program. Nitaqat was no longer 
a blanket policy across the private sector but rather, it considered the average share of Saudis 
in different industries prior to the policy and imposed new nationalisation quotas accordingly. 
For example, as the construction sector had a low Saudization rate – under 3% - the new 
quota was increased to 5%. In other industries, such as finance, where the Saudization figures 
were higher, the aim was to increase the quota from 50% to 60%. Therefore, the quotas in 
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this new policy were more attainable across all industries and firm sizes1.  
Hertog (2012) identifies two main goals of labour market policies in Saudi Arabia: firstly, to 
provide employment to the entire national population, and secondly, to maximise 
productivity, thus improving economic growth. It is unclear how such a policy would impact 
on the labour market, as it is not necessarily true that employing nationals would result in 
increased productivity. In fact, it could have the opposite effect where efforts to raise national 
employment levels such as Nitaqat could result in reduced productivity levels. This thesis 
will analyse the Nitaqat policy in terms of its impacts on labour market as well as 
productivity.  
1.1       Research Aims 
The aims of this thesis are to first conduct a quantitative study to analyse the impact of the 
Nitaqat policy on the Saudization rate, employment growth, exit rates, and on the behaviour 
of the private sector in response to the policy -  using an original detailed dataset provided by 
the Ministry of Labor in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, to study individual level trends in earnings, 
which can proxy for labour productivity, before and after the implementation of Nitaqat in 
relation to skill levels using the General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) dataset. 
Finally, the research aims to link the Nitaqat policy to productivity and study how the policy 
has impacted total factor productivity on the industry level between 2011 and 2015. 
                                                 
1 A detailed quota table is included in the appendix of Chapter 2. 
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1.2       Motivation and Research Contributions 
The motivation for this research is to explore a new dataset produced by the Ministry of 
Labor in order to provide, for the first time, an analysis of the impact of Nitaqat policy on the 
labour market of Saudi Arabia and on productivity. Nitaqat is one of the world’s largest 
quota-based labour policies as it applies across the whole of the private sector (Peck, 2017). 
Countries where similar policies have been applied, such as affirmative action in the US, tend 
to target particular industries rather than all industries. With around 90% foreign employment 
in the private sector, the Nitaqat’s main aim is to raise the employment levels of Saudi 
nationals in the labour market. With strict sanctions imposed on non-compliant firms, the 
policy has a high compliance rate of 0.2 percentage points for every one percent increase in 
Saudization rate to reach the required quota per firm in 2012 (Peck, 2017). This thesis adopts 
an econometric approach to study the impact of Nitaqat on Saudi and foreign employment, as 
well as on firm behaviour and exit rates.  
Most of the existing literature on Saudization is limited to descriptive quantitative analysis 
and qualitative assessment of future government steps, with a lack of thorough statistical 
evaluation of these policies. This is mainly due to the lack of micro data in the country, which 
has made it difficult to evaluate these policies in order to provide a more in-depth analysis. 
Although this is one of the major limitations faced while conducting this thesis, it is also one 
of the main areas of contribution as we were able to acquire the original detailed dataset on 
the whole population of the private sector at the firm level from the Saudi Ministry of Labor 
on the Nitaqat program. This facilitated an econometric approach to evaluate the program, 
producing original results and conclusions. This research builds on the work of Peck (2017), 
who analysed the immediate impact of the Nitaqat policy on employment and the private 
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sector in 2012. The investigation of the policy after 2012 allows for an analysis of new data. 
The research most closely contributes to the literature on positive discrimination, such as 
affirmative action policies in the US, and other similar policies in different countries around 
the world. The thesis will also study the impact of Nitaqat policy on productivity which, to 
our knowledge, has never been done before.  
1.3       Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts, the first part will focus on presenting the social and 
economic context of the country and of Nitaqat and the second will present, analyse and 
discuss the results arising from the empirical investigation. Thus, Chapter 2 will provide the 
historical background of Saudi Arabia and discusses the details of the Nitaqat program. 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and also provides a 
discussion of the relevant literature from the region.  
The second part of the thesis contains the results from the empirical work, from Chapter 4 
through 6. Chapter 4 examines the impact of the Nitaqat policy on the Saudi labour market, 
using the Nitaqat dataset provided by the Ministry of Labor. The chapter starts by analysing 
the trends in the dataset using some descriptive statistics to illustrate firm behaviour in the 
private sector. It then studies the impact of Nitaqat using a difference-in-differences 
technique to measure the causal relationship of the policy on the labour market. In particular, 
the econometric approach examines the impact on Saudization rates, employment rates, and 
exit rates of firms from 2012 to 2015. With the dual nature of the Saudi labour market, the 
chapter also considers the different effects on Saudis and non-Saudis in the private sector.  
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Chapter 5 is a detailed analysis of Earnings in the Saudi private sector labour market, using 
original data. It studies the nature of the market before and after the Nitaqat policy 
implementation. It uses the GOSI dataset to analyse trends of nationality difference, gender, 
skills, and industry on hourly wages from 2009 to 2015.  
Chapter 6 starts by conducting a growth accounting exercise, using national accounts and the 
Labour Force Survey, to analyse trends of productivity before and after the implementation of 
Nitaqat. The chapter then utilises an econometric approach using a production function 
framework to analyse the trend of output per worker before and after the Nitaqat policy using 
the Annual Establishment Survey. Then, it merges the Nitaqat dataset and the Annual 
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 Labour Markets in Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi economy can be depicted as a classic rentier economy model,  characterised by 
governments who seek rent from natural resources instead of basing their income on taxation, 
and who distribute income amongst the population as they see fit (Ramady, 2005). An 
economic rent is received usually by owning natural resources. Therefore, in a general sense 
a rent exists in all economies, although to different degrees. For an economy to be called 
rentier, it must fulfil several requirements. First, a rentier economy occurs when the rents are 
predominant in the economy. Second, since it is assumed that rentier economies are 
unproductive, the economy relies on sizeable external rents. Third, in rentier states, usually 
the beneficiary group of this rent is small in comparison to the people involved in its’ 
distribution and utilization. Fourth, in a rentier state the government is usually the recipient of 
the rent (Beblawi, 1987).  
Moreover, according to Beblawi (1987) a rentier state leads to a rentier mentality. In 
conventional economies, the norm is that individuals receive rewards based on a process of a 
“long, systematic and organized” production circuit. In a rentier economy this is not the case 
- the reward has little relation to the work or time invested and more likely an isolated fact 
based on chance. In the context of the GCC2 countries, the economy is mainly dependent on 
external rent through oil revenues. Therefore, this mentality has resulted in a unique labour 
market. A welfare system has developed where the government is responsible for providing 
all basic goods and services such as education, health and jobs, as a way of distributing 
                                                 
2 Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar. 
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wealth to the population. Therein lies the root of the problems that the Saudi labour market 
faces since public sector jobs, with short working hours and job security, are very attractive 
(Maroun et al., 2008, Al-Kibsi et al., 2015). However, this is not a sustainable solution for 
wealth distribution. Instead of investing in economic diversification and development, the 
government created jobs to accommodate the growing labour force resulting in high levels of 
bureaucracy, job redundancy, low productivity and significant high costs. As a result of this 
system the private sector has benefited by hiring foreign labour at lower costs, with longer 
working hours, and low labour restrictive regulations for foreigners (Maroun et al., 2008).  
With the growing population the government started facing a high unemployment rate since 
the public sector was saturated and could not accommodate an ever-growing population 
entering the labour market. Foreign labour reached a high of 90% of private sector 
employment (SAMA, 2016). The following section will give a brief historical background of 
the Saudi economy, and in particular of its labour market, and how it reached its current 
situation. 
2.1       Historical Background: Saudi Arabia 
The first major oil discovery in Saudi Arabia was in 1939 (MOP, 1980). However, the 
Second World War limited the development of oil production in Saudi Arabia. In 1945, total 
revenues of Saudi Arabia were less than USD 4 million per year. In 1949, oil revenues started 
to contribute to the economy, reaching USD 85 million, which allowed the government to 
start investing in infrastructure and development projects; such as railways, modern sea ports, 
schools and colleges. By 1952, 20,000 students were enrolled in formal education at all 
levels. This was the first oil boom; the production of oil had increased from 1m barrels per 
Chapter 2 Labour Markets in Saudi Arabia  8 
year in 1939, to 60 million barrels in 1947, to 200m barrels in 1951 (MOP, 1980). Between 
1953 and 1970, GDP growth averaged 9.5% in real prices. Although the prices were more or 
less constant, the demand on oil had increased significantly during that period, and 
production increased at a rate of 9.2% per annum reaching 481m barrels in 1960 (MOP, 
1980).  
The physical infrastructure of roads and houses was developed at accelerated rates during that 
time, which also saw increasing development of the health and education sectors. The 
revenues from the oil boom allowed for the opening of new schools and universities as 
education attainment levels at the time were low for Saudis. In 1975, the economy was 
undergoing substantial transformation and development that required a significant and instant 
increase in the demand for labour, that could not be sufficiently met by the national supply of 
labour alone. The government had to make a decision to either slowdown these projects due 
to insufficient manpower or allow foreign labour to assist with the development process. The 
latter was chosen, and the labour force increased by 41% over a five-year period (MOP, 
1980). Furthermore, at the time, the nationals typically entered the labour force at age 12. 
With the development of the education and training sector, and the availability of resources 
of foreign labour, Saudis were able to stay longer in the education system. Their share of the 
national labour force declined from 72% in 1975 to 57% in 1980 across both the public and 
private sectors (MOP, 1980). This was the result of two factors; the continuing inflow of the 
foreign labour force, and the decline in the growth of the national workforce as Saudis were 
encouraged to stay in the education system for longer. The growth of the foreign labour force 
between 1975 and 1980 was 16.5% per annum, compared with a 2.4% annual growth rate for 
the Saudi labour force (MOP, 1980). The government started creating public sector jobs for 
the Saudi labour force as a way of distributing some of the oil wealth, with job security, 
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higher pay and lower working hours than the private sector (Ramady, 2010, Chaudhry, 1997). 
Meanwhile, the private sector had access to foreign labour that expected lower wages, as well 
as being better equipped with better skills for market needs (JP Morgan, 2015). Furthermore, 
the trend continued, culminating in 90% of the private sector labour force being comprised of 
foreign labour 1980.  
However, during the 1980s, the economy went into a recession with the crash of oil prices 
and the government turned to public debt to cover its high expenses and subsequently 
unemployment rates increased. In 1993, the government started its Saudization efforts and 
put pressure on the private sector to reduce foreign labour and hire Saudi nationals (MOEP, 
2000). Inward migration reached its lowest point in 1992 as shown in Figure 2.1, illustrating 
the growth trend of inward migration over time. 
 
Figure 2.1: Migration inflows to Saudi Arabia over time (World Bank, 2015) 
With the oil prices recovering in the early 2000s, growth in inward migration increased again, 
at a steady rate. Foreign workers tended to send their income back home, resulting in a high 
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level in the world. As of 2015, it is the 4th top country in hosting the largest number of 
migrants (Laczko and Appave, 2015). According to (Laczko and Appave, 2015), Saudi 
Arabia is the fourth largest host country of immigrants after the United States, Germany and 
Russia, with 10m immigrants. It supersedes other developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada, France and Australia. In order, the top five countries of origin of 
immigrants in Saudi Arabia are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and the Philippines 
(UNICEF, 2014). 
As mentioned, the public sector was the target of most national job seekers and the inflow of 
migrant workers was taken up by the private sector. However, the situation was unsustainable 
as the public sector could no longer sustain the massive payroll of the labour force, given the 
considerable growth in the Saudi population where the youth unemployment rate reached 
30% in 2011 (see Figure 2.2) as (World Bank, 2015). Since the 1990s there had been a 
realisation of the importance of investment in local human capital, and promotion of 
nationalisation programs in the private sector. However, these efforts were ineffective as they 
placed unreasonable targets on the private sector with minimal consequences for non-
compliant firms. However this changed with the introduction of the Nitaqat policy. 
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment, youth total. Percentage of total labor force 
ages 15-24, modeled ILO estimate (World Bank,2015). 
A McKinsey & Co. survey found that 57% of graduates take between three months and a 
year to find their first job in Saudi Arabia. This is longer than many countries in the survey, 
such as the US, Germany, Turkey and India (Laczko and Appave, 2015). This is supported by 
the social structure in Saudi Arabia, since parents continue to finance their children’s needs 
until they find employment, allowing recent graduates freedom to be selective in their job 
choices. 
Another challenge in the Saudi labour market is the low female participation rate. Saudi 
Arabia is ranked 141 of 144 countries for female workforce participation (JP Morgan, 2015) 
and it is the lowest amongst its close neighbours. The rate of female youth unemployment is 
60%, compared to 17% among males. The reason behind the low participation in the labour 
market, according to the JP Morgan (2015) report, is a combination of social and practical 
challenges. Firstly, taking into account the social aspect, it is expected that women prioritise 
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Additionally, according to the study, wives are expected to make sacrifices in order to benefit 
their husbands’ careers. Moreover, with women not allowed to drive, and without a proper 
infrastructure for public transportation, private transportation can cost up to 50-70% of their 
monthly income, especially for women only earning minimum wages. However, in line with 
the Saudi Arabian Vision 20303, on September 26th 2017, a royal decree was issued lifting the 
ban on women driving, which will take effect in June, 2018 (Gardner, 2017). This is a 
historic moment for female empowerment in Saudi Arabia, and it will be interesting to study 
the effect of women driving on female employment in Saudi Arabia in the future. According 
to many academics, such as Fattah (2017), allowing women to drive could have a 
considerable economic impact. This is because women will have access to more jobs as 
transportation will be a less significant impediment for women working. Fattah (2017) 
estimates that this could result in annual GDP growth increases of 0.4% to 0.9% over the next 
20 years, which is expected to reach around USD 90 billion by 2030 . Fattah also highlights 
the challenges that fall on the private sector to create enough jobs to accommodate the 
massive increase in supply of local female workers. Women driving will be a major 
contributor to higher female employment in the Saudi labour market, and in terms of the 
Nitaqat, we assume that the private sector will also benefit as the supply of women entering 
the workforce will increase. Therefore, the challenge of hiring women will decline, resulting 
in more Saudization and an increase in Saudi employment.  
Meanwhile, the government has shown interest in feminizing jobs since 2011. A royal decree 
was announced in 2011 to provide specific jobs for women only, such as segments of the 
                                                 
3 Vision 2030 is an economic transformation plan to improve economic development of Saudi Arabia and 
reduce oil-dependency by 2030. 
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retail industry, manufacturing and pharmaceutical industries. This had the effect of forcing 
the replacement of foreign workers by females in these industries because it was not allowed 
for males to hold these jobs anymore due to existing segregation policies in the country. The 
government also created centers supporting distance working. As shown in Figure 2.3, the 
number of jobs for Saudi females quadrupled from around 100,000 to 400,000 between 2011 
and 2013 (JP Morgan, 2015). 
 
Figure 2.3: Saudi women employed in the private sector  
According to Gurrib (2009), total unemployment stayed at around 10% from 2000 until 2009, 
while female employment jumped from 18% to 28% during the same period. Meanwhile, 
youth unemployment rates were considerably higher than total unemployment, starting at 
20% in 1999 and peaking at 30% in 2006, whereas total unemployment ranges between 8% 
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2.2       Nationalisation Programs in the Region 
 Old “Saudization” Policy 
Governments in the GCC4 region recognised the problems of unemployment and high foreign 
labour, and introduced  the first nationalisation programs in the private sectors in the 1990s, 
with the aim of reducing unemployment amongst nationals and dependence on foreign 
labour. However, up to the 2000s, these programs were narrow and largely unenforced.  
Saudi Arabia had two main stages of its nationalisation efforts: 1995-2010 and 2011 to date. 
The efforts towards “Saudization” in 1995-2010 were similar to those of other GCC 
countries. Industries were categorised (11 in total) with unreasonable targets requiring around 
30% Saudi workers for almost all industries. These targets were impossible to meet on a large 
economic scale. However, efforts achieved some success in the Oil and Gas industries, as 
well as in the Financial Services industry (MOL, 2015c). 
 Nitaqat 
In 2011, “Nitaqat” was introduced by the Ministry of Labor. It had the same aims as previous 
nationalisation policies, namely to increase employment of Saudi nationals and decrease 
dependence on foreign workers. However, a fundamental difference was that Nitaqat 
                                                 
4 Gulf Cooperation Council: A political and economic union formed in 1981 by six countries: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar (http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx). 
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introduced a differentiation between industries with different quotas for different industries. 
Its targets were based on firm size, industry and current level of compliance for each firm in 
the program. Compliant firms were offered rewards and incentives, such as a larger number 
of visas for foreign workers, while non-compliant firms faced restrictions on visas and other 
government services, resulting in some firms exiting their respective markets. 
The reason behind the implementation of Nitaqat was to provide an effective, transparent 
policy using an automated tool to ensure fairness and equality (MOL, 2015c). One of the 
targets of the program is to encourage competition between the private sector in raising their 
nationalisation levels, thereby reducing unemployment and moving towards sustainable 
economic development.    
The new policy has categorised the industries into 50 industries (MOL, 2015c). Following 
this, size was taken into consideration where five sizes were allocated for each industry 
ranging downwards from giant to micro firms. The policy evaluates the performance of 
enterprises in four categories: Red, Yellow, Green, and Platinum. Each category represents 
the percentage of Saudi employees in the enterprise. Green and Platinum categories are 
rewarded for recruiting nationals, whereas Yellow and Red get restricted government 
services, to a point where they either need to adhere to the program and improve their colour 
band or face sanctions that could lead to adverse effects in the economy. The purpose of the 
program was to reduce the level of unemployment in the country, through motivating 
companies to employ nationals. In total this resulted in roughly 1,000 different quotas based 
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on industry, size, and colour categorisation of the firm5.   
As a result of the high compliance rate, by 2013 the Green band had a high percentage of 
firms so policymakers decided to raise the efficiency of the program and subcategorise the 
Green band into three further classes: Green High, Green Medium and Green Low. However, 
for reasons of consistency from 2011 to 2015, in this thesis we continue to treat it as one 
band. Furthermore, in 2013, micro firms with 10 employees or less were also included in the 
program, but in special categories, the Red Micro and the Green Micro bands. This required 
the Saudi business owner to register as an employee to comply with the quota and be 
included in the Green Micro band as compliant firms, with the condition that the business 
owner cannot be registered as an employee in another firm. 
The main difference between this policy and previous efforts towards nationalisation is the 
detailed quotas imposed in the program. As stated earlier, Saudization efforts previously 
required a minimum of 20-30% Saudization, regardless of industry or size. Many firms could 
not comply and there were minimal sanctions for non-compliance. This time, the policy took 
into account each industry and its size, which made compliance more realistic. For example, 
the construction industry is an unattractive job prospect for many Saudi men, and therefore 
has a high percentage of unskilled foreign workers. Hence, it was unlikely to be able to 
comply with a 20-25% Saudization quota, so a more reasonable Nitaqat quota of 5-7% was 
enforced for the firm to be compliant.  
 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 2.A 
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The Saudi government was aware that the private sector was the only viable solution to the 
rising unemployment in Saudi Arabia in the long run, despite the reluctance of the private 
sector especially considering the added costs they would face. With the introduction of 
Nitaqat, the government offered incentives for the private sector if it complied, since their 
reliance on foreign labour was very high. The majority of foreign workers at the time were 
unskilled, low wage-level workers, whereas Saudis were costlier to employ.  The policy is 
advanced and unparalleled in detail and scope, in addition to its strict implementation and 
monitoring6. Therefore, the program is a perfect case study to measure the effectiveness of 
such programs in combating unemployment.  
Nitaqat Stages 
The policy went through three stages (MOL, 2015b): 
Nitaqat One:  Focused on raising the Saudization rates through eliminating obstacles against 
hiring Saudis. One such obstacle is the higher wage of the Saudi national as most foreigners 
in the private sector are low-skilled, low-wage workers. Through the Human Resource 
Development Fund (HRDF) the Ministry offers to pay certain percentages of the wage of 
Saudis in compliant firms to lessen the sudden high cost on firms. This would last from two 
to five years. 
Nitaqat Two:  Focused on solving the problem of low wages of Saudis in the private sector. 
The policy introduced a minimum wage of 3,000 Saudi Riyal (800 USD) per month to count 
                                                 
6 Details of the sanctions and rewards are given in Appendix 2.A, Figures 2-4, 2-5,2-6,2-7.  
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the employee as one whole employee in the system. If their wage was less than 1,500 SAR 
(400 USD) per month (Sargent and Rodriguez, 2001) the employee will not be counted in the 
system at all. If the wage was between (1,500-2,999 SAR) (400-799 USD) per month, then 
they will be counted as half of one Saudi employee. Therefore, although the minimum wage 
is not mandatory for firms, in practice offering lower than 3,000 SAR would impact their 
Saudization quota. Meanwhile, the average wage of the foreign worker is around 1,500 SAR 
(400 USD) per month, which is half the cost of the Saudi worker. In 2012, the Ministry added 
an extra cost of 2,400 SAR per year (640 USD) on every foreign employee exceeding the 
number of Saudi employees. These charges were an effort to reduce the cost gap between 
Saudis and workers from overseas. This stage also focused on increasing the female 
participation rate in the labour market by loosening the strict regulations against female 
employment in the workplace. By the end of 2011, the Ministry of Labor added a 
requirement to specific industries, such as the retail industry, to employ more females.  
Nitaqat Three: In 2014, the addition of micro-sized firms, those that have ten employees or 
less, led the government to allow the Saudi business owner to register as an employee of the 
firm to adhere to the required quota. Another change in the third stage of Nitaqat was the 
ability of firms to pay the Ministry of Labor directly to raise their quota level. This was 
introduced due to the strict sanctions of the policy if the firm fell behind the required quota 
even by one Saudi employee. It allowed for a quick fix for firms to pay the Ministry to 
remove the sanctions and continue to operate in the market. These fees go to the Human 
Resource Development Fund (HRDF) that pays part of the wages of Saudi employees in 
compliant firms. However, it is still encouraged to hire Saudis instead of paying these fees, as 
they are higher than the wage of an employee in the long run. 
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Mechanism of Nitaqat 
The Nitaqat system relies on a 13-week moving average. This is the mechanism whereby a 
Saudi employee is added to the nationalisation count in the firm. The Saudization percentage 
is taken for the first week. For the second week, the program counts the average for the two 
weeks, and so on until it reaches the 13-week mark (MOL, 2015b). Therefore, the single 
Saudi employee will be counted as a third of an employee in the first month, two thirds of an 
employee in the second month and a full Saudi employee in the third month, which is when 
the system is updated. The reason behind this method is to ensure the actual employment of 
the Saudi citizen (Alonazy, 2012). Under Saudi labour laws, Saudi employees cannot be 
dismissed after three months; therefore, employers began to recruit them on temporary, 
probationary, 3-month contracts, which they had the option to renew or not. Firms found a 
way to side-step this rule, by increasing the numbers to meet the criteria by hiring and then 
firing immediately after. Thus, under the Nitaqat policy the Saudi worker is not fully 
included in the system under the firm until 13 weeks after the recruitment date.  
Saudis working in the private sector suffer as a result of low wages; therefore, the MOL 
decided to modify the calculation for Saudi employees, adding a wage variable into the 
equation in the first quarter of 2013. As explained earlier in the second stage of Nitaqat, if the 
wage is less than 1,500 SAR (400 USD) per month, the program will not count it as an 
additional hire. With 1,500 SAR, the employee will be counted as half a Saudi citizen, going 
up to 3,000 SAR for a full Saudi employee as counted in the Nitaqat system. That said, there 
is no direct penalty for not complying with the minimum wage, but the firm will not receive 
the benefits or incentives that follow the suggested minimum wage (Aljabreel, 2012). 
Alhumaidan (2014) explains the challenges the Ministry of Labor encountered to enforce a 
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minimum wage for Saudi employees, and to raise the level of competitiveness between them 
and workers from overseas. Some of the ways in which the MOL helped the private sector to 
accommodate the extra cost was by paying a certain percentage of the wage through the 
HRDF, which could reach up to 50%, for up to two years from recruitment, if the firm was in 
the Green colour. And for Platinum colour firms it could continue for up to three or five 
years. 
The policy also goes into detail on how to count “special cases” in the Saudi labour force in 
the Nitaqat equation. For example, Saudi students cannot be more than 10% of the total 
number of Saudis per firm. Moreover, workers with disabilities are counted as four Saudi 
employees, as a way to motivate firms into recruiting them, making them a productive part of 
society. If the number of disabled employees exceeds 10% of the total number, they will be 
counted as one Saudi employee rather than four. Furthermore, the ministry also takes into 
account the number of ex-convicts that were released in the previous two years. Because of 
their difficulties in finding jobs in the labour market, they are counted as two Saudi 
employees in an effort to encourage the private sector into recruiting them. After two years 
they will go back to being counted as a single employee again (Ramady, 2012). 
The policy works with entities rather than establishments: for example, if an establishment 
has two entities in different industries, such as transportation and retail, then the ministry 
would treat them as two separate entities regardless of their shared establishment name or 
number. However, if those entities were all within one industry then they would be treated as 
one. Every entity of the same size and industry is rated according to a quota measured by its 
ability to adhere to the Saudization quota. As mentioned earlier, for example, the construction 
industry has a quota range of 5-7%, whereas industries such as financial institutions or 
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petroleum have a range between 30-65%. Based on these quotas, the entity is ranked under 
one of the four colour categories: Red, Yellow, Green and Platinum. The lowest 
nationalisation percentage would be in the Red category; the Yellow category means that the 
entity has met some of the requirements, but still not the required quota. Entities meeting the 
minimum quota move to Green and Platinum  
Nitaqat Debates 
After creating the Nitaqat program, a major challenge was to ensure that both the private 
sector, as well as the labour force, benefitted from it. Saudization programs are argued to be 
profitable for the private sector in the long-term (Fakeeh, 2009) since the income the Saudi 
employee receives will be spent on the economy, instead of being sent as outward remittance, 
which encourages the economic cycle and hence, economic growth. 
Furthermore, with the current wage gap between Saudis and non-Saudis, it was vital to 
complement nationalisation efforts with higher productivity and a better education system 
(Fayad, 2012). Both private sector and foreign workers greeted the introduction of Nitaqat 
with panic and alarm, especially since the Ministry of Labor had issued a statement saying 
that half of private sector firms would be categorised as either Red or Yellow (Wahab, 2011). 
In 2013, the policy added a fee of (2,400 SAR) per foreign worker per year. The private 
sector filed lawsuits against the Ministry of Labor for the severe cost that Nitaqat has 
imposed on their firms. Although it has been argued that high unemployment can cause 
higher crime rates and low productivity, the private sector is the indicator of prosperity and 
productivity in an economy; and productivity increases by employing the best fit to the job 
which then allows for higher economic returns (Abu Talib, 2011). Alqusaibi (2008) argues 
that the Saudization process should not be imposed at the expense of productivity and 
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economic efficiency. Moreover, there is a necessity to improve education and training 
programs simultaneously7, to produce a qualified and competitive labour force, equipped to 
face the demands of the labour market.  
According to Faqeeh and Aljabreel (2012), the difference between old nationalisation policies 
and Nitaqat is that the latter has taken into consideration the needs of each industry and its 
size, and has introduced reasonable quotas accordingly. This makes the policy more 
attainable and applicable. “It is not our goal to hurt the private sector; the goal is to help it 
grow sustainably” (Faqeeh, 2012). Furthermore, the fact that the system is automated allows 
for more equality between firms in the private sector and adds a level of fair competitiveness.  
There are a number of reasons why the private sector had been reluctant to employ Saudis, 
the first of which was the higher labour cost. As indicated earlier, there is a considerable 
wage gap between Saudis and foreign workers, especially in low-skilled jobs. Secondly, 
cultural and social perceptions need to be taken into consideration. Many jobs are 
unacceptable to Saudi workers because of impacts on their marriage and other social 
relations, leading to employer / employee problems. Moreover, foreign workers are used to 
short-term contracts  (Ramady, 2013).  
Saudi employers and employees were used to a system of hiring and firing up until 2016, 
when the system changed. The old system prohibited the firing of any Saudi employee unless 
they refrain from attending work for 15 days consecutively (MOL, 2015a). If fired for other 
                                                 
7 In 2008, the government started an international scholarship for hundreds of thousands of Saudis to study 
abroad as an investment in human capital. 
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reasons, the firm may need to pay high settlements or fines. Hence, this is another reason the 
private sector favours employing foreigners.  
One of the major challenges the Ministry faced after the implementation of Nitaqat and the 
harsh quotas on the private sector is the emergence of “Phantom Employment”. This is where 
firms hire Saudis by name and social security numbers without them physically coming to 
work since the skills needed in the private sector are different from those supplied by the 
majority of the Saudi labour force. The MOL is aware of masked employment that results 
from Saudization; however, they have introduced sanctions for firms that have resorted to 
such measures to maintain their quotas. Sanctions could be in the form of a revocation of 
their permission to issue visas for more overseas workers, or fines of up to 25,000 SAR 
(6,666 USD) per employee (Althumairy, 2016). In addition, it is argued that the reward 
program defeats the purpose of the Nitaqat policy, as compliant firms are rewarded by the 
ability to purchase more work ‘Visas’ for foreign labour to come into the country. Offering 
more visas will not help solve the problem of the reliance on foreign labour. However, policy 
makers claim that compliant firms could also benefit from the foreign labour that already 
exists in the country, rather than bringing in new foreign workers. 
 The Impact of Nitaqat Policy in the Local Market 
Saudi Employment  
According to Alhumaidan (2012), the nationalisation of jobs in the private sector reached 
15.15% in 2013; up from 9.9% in 2009. The number of Saudi employees also rose, reaching 
1.5 million in 2013, in comparison with 681,500 prior to Nitaqat. As shown later in Chapter 4 
this was a one-off gain with flat employment growth thereafter. According to the annual 
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statistics of the Ministry of Labor in Saudi Arabia (2015), Saudi male employment increased 
right after the implementation of Nitaqat. We are interested in studying whether there was a 
lasting effect or just a one-time rise. 
Female Employment 
The challenge of employing women is to provide an environment that adheres to Saudi labour 
law, which allocates males and females to separate working places. Then, there was the need 
to provide a means of transportation or compensation for transportation costs, and that was a 
problem for many firms. Moreover, the segregation regulation in the manufacturing industry 
would have made it difficult to transfer knowledge from a currently male-dominated industry 
to accommodate female workers. The government has contributed to training females for the 
job market through the HRDF (Alhilali, 2011). 
The manufacturing industry is one of the biggest industries in the Saudi economy and 88% of 
jobs in the industry in 2011 were filled by foreign workers. This industry could be a major 
employer for women. Saudi females constituted around 3% of the workforce in the 
construction industry (120,000 females). Female employment has increased across many 
different industries, and over 477,000 female employees were registered with the General 
Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) by the third quarter of 2015. In heavy duty 
industries, women were performing managerial and administrative work as a way to increase 
the Saudization percentage for these firms (Althumairy, 2016). 
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Private Sector  
Firms faced increasing costs applying the Nitaqat program, and this resulted in a higher exit 
rate and declining total employment in the remaining firms, as analysed by Peck (2017). The 
main concern about quota-based labour policies is the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits. Previous research suggests ambiguous results about the efficiency of such policies 
(Holzer & Neumark, 2000).  Hence, it is vital to produce empirical evidence to measure the 
impact of such policies.  
As the national policy was applied to all firms in the private sector with ten or more 
employees, this makes it one of the largest quota programs in the world. The nature of the 
application with automated sanctions for non-compliant firms is also interesting to study 
further. Many challenges to the Saudi economy, and the private sector in particular, have 
been encountered since the implementation of Nitaqat, especially the falling oil prices after 
2015. Most industries recorded losses on the Saudi stock exchange in 2016, apart from the 
petrochemical, insurance, energy and communication industries. 37% of private sector 
companies have announced losses, and average firm profits declined by 46%. Only 17% of 
private sector firms recorded positive growth in 2016. Moreover, higher operating costs and a 
reduction in buying power in the country had a negative impact on the competitive advantage 
of Saudi firms, especially with the fall in energy subsidies and the rising cost of overseas 
workers. 
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2.3       Summary 
The Saudi labour market has unique features. The oil boom of the 1970s raised the demand 
for labour that local supply could not meet. High migration inflow was the immediate option 
to support the fast economic growth of the country. A dual labour market has become more 
evident in later years with nationals preferring to work in the public sector since it offers 
good pay and shorter working hours alongside high job security. Meanwhile, the private 
sector has resorted to employing the high immigration inflow as it mostly consists of low-
skilled, cheaper labour, working longer hours than their counterparts in the public sector. 
However, with time, the public sector could no longer continue hiring the consistently 
increasing national labour force, leading to high unemployment rates. To solve the ever-
increasing problem of national unemployment, the government issued several job 
nationalisation programs to encourage the private sector into hiring more nationals. These 
programs were very ambitious and not enforceable, hence having minimal effects on the 
private sector and employment. In 2011, the Nitaqat program was issued, with four colour 
bands representing the compliance rate of firms, using a quota-based system that is cross-
classified across industries and sizes. Nitaqat’s strict regulations and applicability to the 
private sector made its impact highly debatable. This research aims to study the effects of the 
Nitaqat policy on the labour market and productivity using an econometric approach.   
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2.A Appendix 
 
Figure 2.4: Platinum colour, definition, and rewards (MOL, 2015b). 
8 
                                                 
8 *Zakat is based on Islamic concepts; it is applicable to the ownership in a KSA company by nationals of KSA or other 
GCC countries. It is assessed at 2.5% of net wealth in a KSA company MOL 2015a. Labor Law Regulations. Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Ministry of Labor. 
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Figure 2.5: Green colour, definitions, and rewards (MOL, 2015b). 
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Figure 2.6: Yellow colour, definition, rewards and sanctions (MOL, 2015b). 
 
Figure 2.7: Red colour, definition, and sanctions (MOL, 2015b). 
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Table 2.1: Stakeholders and benefits of Nitaqat  (MOL, 2015b) 







Provision of more opportunities for Saudis, since the only way to comply is to recruit 
more Saudis.  
Reduction of the competitive advantage of foreign workers in obtaining jobs through 
adding extra cost on visas, hence reducing the cost gap between Saudis and foreigners by 
making overseas workers more expensive. 
Motivation of firms to invest in local human resources to find high value jobs acceptable 
to Saudi workers.  
Guarantee of the rights of employees through registering in the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA). 
Helping foreign workers to move to high compliance firms who provide a better working 
















The program uses reasonable evaluation criteria based on the current market, especially 
taking into consideration the industry and size of each firm. 
It facilitates employing foreign workers in compliant firms that fall under the Green and 
Platinum bands, through catering for existing foreign workers who already have local 
experience in the market.  
The enforced quotas are based on studies of Saudization percentages of firms similar in 
size and industry in the private sector, therefore providing equality in the program.      
Better government services for compliant firms. 
Increased transparency; as the program is automated, the rewards and sanctions are based 





The program promises to increase economic growth. It will not impose restrictions on 
compliant firms, which could help to promote firms and economic growth. 
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Table 2.2: Nationalisation quotas for Nitaqat based on industry, size and colour band 
(Translated from the Nitaqat Manual (MOL, 2015b)) 







Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 11% 12% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 1% 2% 5% 6% 12% 13% 19% 20% 26% 27% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 13% 14% 17% 18% 21% 22% 26% 27% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 11% 12% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 3% 4% 7% 8% 13% 14% 19% 20% 26% 27% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 5% 6% 9% 10% 15% 16% 21% 22% 26% 27% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 5% 6% 9% 10% 15% 16% 21% 22% 26% 27% 
3- Oil & Gas 
Extraction 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 24% 25% 39% 40% 54% 55% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 46% 47% 63% 64% 79% 80% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 51% 52% 68% 69% 84% 85% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 51% 52% 68% 69% 84% 85% 
4- Mines & 
Quarries 
Small 10 49 0% 2% 3% 4% 5% 12% 13% 20% 21% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 19% 20% 27% 28% 35% 36% 44% 45% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 
5- 
Manufacturing 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 7% 8% 13% 14% 19% 20% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 7% 8% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 34% 35% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 7% 8% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 34% 35% 
6- 
Petrochemical, 
Coal & Rubber 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 16% 17% 23% 24% 30% 31% 
Middle 50 499 0% 7% 8% 24% 25% 30% 31% 46% 47% 44% 45% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 19% 20% 44% 45% 56% 57% 68% 69% 79% 80% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 19% 20% 44% 45% 56% 57% 68% 69% 79% 80% 
7- Cement 
Industry 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 24% 25% 29% 30% 34% 35% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 7% 8% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 7% 8% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 
8- Electricity, 
Gas & Water 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 16% 17% 22% 23% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 14% 15% 30% 31% 47% 48% 63% 64% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 7% 8% 19% 20% 36% 37% 53% 54% 69% 70% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 9% 10% 14% 15% 20% 21% 
Middle 50 499 0% 1% 2% 5% 6% 8% 9% 11% 12% 15% 16% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 3% 4% 5% 6% 8% 9% 11% 12% 15% 16% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 11% 12% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 2% 3% 5% 6% 13% 13% 19% 20% 27% 28% 






0% 3% 4% 6% 7% 14% 15% 22% 23% 30% 31% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 3% 4% 6% 7% 14% 15% 22% 23% 30% 31% 
11- Wholesale 
&Retail Trade 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 15% 16% 21% 22% 26% 27% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 16% 17% 22% 23% 28% 29% 33% 34% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 23% 24% 27% 28% 31% 32% 34% 35% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 23% 24% 27% 28% 31% 32% 34% 35% 
12- Trade Gold 
& Jewellery 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 14% 15% 27% 28% 40% 41% 54% 55% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 32% 33% 45% 46% 59% 60% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 28% 29% 38% 39% 48% 49% 59% 60% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 28% 29% 38% 39% 48% 49% 59% 60% 
13- Pharmacies Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 6% 7% 10% 11% 14% 15% 19% 20% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 12% 13% 18% 19% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
14- Catering 
Services 
Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 11% 12% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 1% 2% 6% 7% 13% 14% 20% 21% 27% 28% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 15% 16% 20% 21% 25% 26% 30% 31% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 5% 6% 12% 13% 19% 20% 26% 27% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 17% 18% 24% 25% 31% 32% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 5% 6% 17% 18% 25% 26% 33% 34% 41% 42% 




Small 10 49 0% 0% 1% 4% 5% 9% 10% 14% 15% 19% 20% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 8% 9% 13% 14% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 19% 20% 29% 30% 39% 40% 




Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 11% 12% 19% 20% 27% 28% 34% 35% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 11% 12% 20% 21% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 11% 12% 22% 23% 33% 34% 44% 45% 





Small 10 49 0% 5% 6% 9% 10% 12% 13% 15% 16% 19% 20% 
Middle 50 499 0% 6% 7% 10% 11% 13% 14% 16% 17% 20% 21% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 7% 8% 11% 12% 14% 15% 17% 18% 21% 22% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 7% 8% 11% 12% 14% 15% 17% 18% 21% 22% 
19- Shipping Small 10 49 0% 5% 6% 17% 18% 33% 34% 49% 50% 64% 65% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 24% 25% 39% 40% 54% 55% 69% 70% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 24% 25% 41% 42% 58% 59% 74% 75% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 24% 25% 41% 42% 58% 59% 74% 75% 
20- Storage Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 7% 8% 14% 15% 21% 22% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 34% 35% 39% 40% 44% 45% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 34% 35% 39% 40% 44% 45% 
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21- Air 
Transport 
Small 10 49 0% 6% 7% 19% 20% 32% 33% 45% 46% 59% 60% 
Middle 50 499 0% 8% 9% 24% 25% 36% 37% 48% 49% 59% 60% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 




Small 10 49 0% 6% 7% 19% 20% 32% 33% 45% 46% 59% 60% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 42% 43% 55% 56% 69% 70% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 44% 45% 59% 60% 74% 75% 




Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 19% 20% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 19% 20% 31% 32% 43% 44% 54% 55% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 19% 20% 31% 32% 43% 44% 54% 55% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 4% 5% 19% 20% 31% 32% 43% 44% 54% 55% 
24- Financial 
Institutions 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 46% 47% 63% 64% 79% 80% 
Middle 50 499 0% 19% 20% 49% 50% 62% 63% 75% 76% 90% 90% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 49% 50% 64% 65% 72% 73% 80% 81% 90% 90% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 49% 50% 64% 65% 72% 73% 80% 81% 90% 90% 
25- Collection 
Offices & Real 
Estate Services 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 17% 18% 31% 32% 45% 46% 59% 60% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 17% 18% 31% 32% 45% 46% 59% 60% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 17% 18% 31% 32% 45% 46% 59% 60% 




Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 19% 20% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 11% 12% 20% 21% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 6% 7% 11% 12% 20% 21% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 6% 7% 11% 12% 20% 21% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
27- Social & 
Community 
Services 
Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 16% 17% 28% 29% 39% 40% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 16% 17% 32% 33% 48% 49% 64% 65% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 21% 22% 39% 40% 57% 58% 74% 75% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 21% 22% 39% 40% 57% 58% 74% 75% 
28- Offices & 
Public Services 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
29- Agents of 
Private 
Recruitment 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 29% 30% 49% 50% 69% 70% 89% 90% 
30- Personal 
Services 
Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 6% 7% 14% 15% 21% 22% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 12% 13% 29% 30% 46% 47% 64% 65% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 12% 13% 29% 30% 46% 47% 64% 65% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 12% 13% 20% 21% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 2% 3% 6% 7% 15% 16% 24% 25% 34% 35% 
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Large 500 299
9 
0% 6% 7% 8% 9% 12% 13% 16% 17% 19% 20% 




Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 9% 10% 17% 18% 25% 26% 34% 35% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 44% 45% 54% 55% 64% 65% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 44% 45% 54% 55% 64% 65% 
33- Laboratory Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 10% 11% 15% 16% 20% 21% 25% 26% 30% 31% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 11% 12% 16% 17% 21% 22% 26% 27% 31% 32% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 11% 12% 16% 17% 21% 22% 26% 27% 31% 32% 
34- Health 
Services 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 13% 14% 18% 19% 23% 24% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 15% 16% 20% 21% 25% 26% 29% 30% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 34% 35% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 34% 35% 
35- Institutes 
& Colleges 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 33% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
Middle 50 499 0% 11% 12% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
36- Private & 
Public Schools 
for Girls 
Small 10 49 0% 29% 30% 49% 50% 59% 60% 69% 70% 79% 80% 
Middle 50 499 0% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 69% 70% 79% 80% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 69% 70% 79% 80% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 39% 40% 49% 50% 59% 60% 69% 70% 79% 80% 
37- Private & 
Public Schools 
for Boys 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Middle 50 499 0% 14% 15% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
38- Foreign 
Schools 
Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 16% 17% 23% 24% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 6% 7% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 6% 7% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 6% 7% 14% 15% 19% 20% 24% 25% 29% 30% 
39- Security 
Guards 
Small 10 49 0% 49% 50% 74% 75% 77% 78% 80% 81% 84% 85% 
Middle 50 499 0% 50% 51% 75% 76% 78% 79% 81% 82% 85% 86% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 51% 52% 76% 77% 79% 80% 82% 83% 86% 87% 




Small 10 49 0% 49% 50% 74% 75% 77% 78% 80% 81% 84% 85% 
Middle 50 499 0% 50% 51% 75% 76% 79% 80% 82% 83% 85% 86% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 51% 52% 76% 77% 79% 80% 82% 83% 86% 87% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 51% 52% 76% 77% 79% 80% 82% 83% 86% 87% 
41- 
Kindergarten 
Small 10 49 0% 9% 10% 33% 34% 45% 46% 57% 58% 69% 70% 
Middle 50 499 0% 11% 12% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 34% 35% 46% 47% 58% 59% 69% 70% 
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42- Bread & 
bakery trade 
Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 
Middle 50 499 0% 3% 4% 6% 7% 9% 10% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 6% 7% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 19% 20% 




Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 7% 8% 14% 15% 21% 22% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 5% 6% 12% 13% 19% 20% 26% 27% 34% 35% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 5% 6% 14% 15% 21% 22% 28% 29% 34% 35% 




Small 10 49 0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 16% 17% 23% 24% 29% 30% 
Middle 50 499 0% 9% 10% 19% 20% 26% 27% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 14% 15% 29% 30% 34% 35% 39% 40% 44% 45% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 14% 15% 29% 30% 34% 35% 39% 40% 44% 45% 
45- Private & 
Public Schools 
for Boys & 
Girls 
Small 10 49 0% 14% 15% 29% 30% 36% 37% 43% 44% 49% 50% 
Middle 50 499 0% 19% 20% 29% 30% 36% 37% 43% 44% 49% 50% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 19% 20% 29% 30% 36% 37% 43% 44% 49% 50% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 19% 20% 29% 30% 36% 37% 43% 44% 49% 50% 
46- Fuel 
Stations 
Small 10 49 0% 1% 2% 4% 5% 11% 12% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 1% 2% 5% 6% 12% 13% 19% 20% 26% 28% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 3% 4% 6% 7% 14% 15% 22% 23% 30% 31% 




Small 10 49 0% 0% 1% 4% 5% 9% 10% 14% 15% 19% 20% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 8% 9% 13% 14% 18% 19% 24% 25% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 4% 5% 9% 10% 17% 18% 25% 26% 34% 35% 




Small 10 49 0% 0% 1% 3% 4% 10% 11% 17% 18% 24% 25% 
Middle 50 499 0% 1% 2% 5% 6% 12% 13% 19% 20% 25% 26% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 1% 2% 7% 8% 13% 14% 19% 20% 25% 26% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 1% 2% 7% 8% 13% 14% 19% 20% 25% 26% 
49- Clustered 
Entities 
Small 10 49 0% 3% 4% 9% 10% 19% 20% 29% 30% 39% 40% 
Middle 50 499 0% 4% 5% 16% 17% 24% 25% 32% 33% 39% 40% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 23% 24% 28% 29% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 23% 24% 28% 29% 33% 34% 39% 40% 
50- 
Accommodatio
n & Hotels 
Small 10 49 0% 5% 6% 11% 12% 19% 20% 27% 28% 36% 37% 
Middle 50 499 0% 7% 8% 19% 20% 29% 30% 39% 40% 49% 50% 
Large 500 299
9 
0% 9% 10% 24% 25% 33% 34% 42% 43% 52% 53% 
Mega 3000 - 0% 9% 10% 24% 25% 33% 34% 42% 43% 52% 53% 
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 Literature Review 
3.1       Introduction  
The discussion of the labour market in the previous chapter points to unique issues, all of 
which have been addressed in some respect in the labour economics literature. This thesis 
considers four strands of this literature on labour market issues – the theory of labour 
demand, dual labour markets and migration, policies that address market failures such as 
affirmative action and minimum wage, and consequences such as productivity.  
3.2       Labour Demand Theory 
Although supply and demand theory suggests that markets are at the wage equilibrium, it 
might not be the case in practice as there are a number of factors that can affect either the 
demand or the supply curves that may cause disequilibrium. Some of these factors could be 
market-related such as changing jobs, hiring and firing and training needs with temporary 
transitions. There are also non-market factors such as laws, customs and institutions that 
might limit the choices of both employers and employees. Such non-market factors usually 
result in increasing the wage above the market level, for example minimum wage and union 
laws. The existence of such laws would result in a decline in the demand and a surplus of 
supply which leads to unemployment. Having a wage that is above the equilibrium “above-
market” wage also hinders the growth of new jobs in the market, causing the unemployed to 
stay unemployed for longer (Borjas, 2003). 
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Basic labour demand theory assumes that firms seek to maximise profits. Hence, as long as 
an addition of one employee would produce a positive marginal product of labour (𝑀𝑃𝐿), 
firms will continue to hire more employees until this marginal revenue becomes equal to the 
marginal expense. With the increased costs on firms, resulting from the Nitaqat policy, a 
study of firm behaviour will be conducted in Chapter 4 in relation to labour demand theory. 
Figure 3.1 shows the change in demand when the wage on the employer increases. 
 
Figure 3.1: Policy effect in terms of demand theory (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012). 
At a state of perfect market, the optimum wage would be 𝑊0 indicating the wage at the 
equilibrium state that firms are willing to pay and the maximum supply (𝐿0) would accept. 
Basic supply and demand theory suggests that if there was an increase of cost to the 
employer, in this case, the Nitaqat policy, the cost to the employer is higher per employee 
raising 𝑊0 to 𝑊0 + 𝑋, where X represents the higher cost, a movement along the demand 
curve occurs from point A to point B, and the number of workers demanded will decline from 
𝐿0 to 𝐿1 resulting in lower employment levels (higher unemployment). 
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Frictional unemployment appears as a result of disequilibrium. That is when both the workers 
and job vacancies take time to be matched, this is mostly due to miscommunication (Borjas, 
2016). For example, the transmission of information of job vacancies and job seekers formed 
by the institutional structure of the economy or a mismatch between skill requirements of a 
job to the skills of the unemployed (Pissarides, 2011). Therefore, the existence of frictional 
unemployment does not raise alarm bells for policy makers, as it is usually short term, and 
can be reduced by providing better communication or platforms between job seekers and 
firms (Borjas, 2016). According to Pissarides (2011), unemployment is the outcome of a 
decentralised equilibrium. With these frictions appearing in the market, the concept of a 
matching function comes into place, where it captures features of frictions appearing in the 
labour market.  In relations to productivity, the scenario of frictionless markets allows the 
most productive jobs to survive, since competition drives the best match between wages in all 
jobs to the most productive, therefore productivity is maximised (Pissarides, 2011). 
In economies where workers do not have strong incentives to accept job offers, the friction in 
the markets appear more so than others. In the case of Saudi Arabia, these reasons lie under 
the social structure where the family supports the unemployed family member until they find 
an acceptable job. Therefore, Pissarides (2011) suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between higher friction and higher unemployment levels in an economy.  
To reduce market frictions, and increase employment levels, many policy makers introduce 
employment protection legislations. Pissarides (2011) discusses the difference between 
Southern European countries and Northern European countries in terms of restrictions on 
dismissals. As southern countries have more restrictions and a form of taxation on dismissal, 
the low productivity jobs will persist as firms would rather put up with lower productivity 
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than pay high fees for dismissal. This results in a lower average productivity yet reduces the 
firing rate, hence the flow to unemployment declines. However, because of higher stakes due 
to the dismissal tax, it becomes more difficult to hire workers, therefore the job creation also 
falls, keeping the current unemployment flow as it is. The Saudi labour law restricted the 
private sector from firing their Saudi employees for decades. Many bureaucratic restrictions 
were implemented to the point that it was virtually impossible to fire any Saudi employee. 
This had a major role in the private sector, with firms preferring to hire foreign workers over 
Saudi workers as they have less protection laws. After the introduction of Nitaqat, the 
dismissal laws were relaxed, allowing for easier firing of Saudis as a way to encourage their 
hiring. Overall, empirical studies have shown little impact of these protection laws on 
unemployment, however, they do suggest lower average productivity, and longer durations 
whether in employment or unemployment.  
Policies such as Nitaqat increase the hiring costs on firms. According to Hamermesh (1993), 
labour demand theory suggests that facing increased hiring cost, profit maximising firms will 
only hire workers if their marginal product is equal or higher than their marginal cost. This 
suggests that unemployment will remain constant for longer periods with higher adjustment 
costs, as firms become more hesitant to hire with the added costs. Policies aimed at 
increasing hiring costs will reduce profit opportunities, therefore, resulting in a lower market 
entry rate and higher exit rate with the lower profits. Such policies also increase the cost of an 
additional worker; therefore, firms would prefer to increase hours worked of existing workers 
to avoid the hiring cost, resulting in reduced productivity (Hamermesh,1993).  
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3.3       Dual Labour Market Theory 
Reich et al. (1973) define labour market segmentation as “the historical process whereby 
political-economic forces encourage the division of the labour market into separate 
submarkets, or segments, distinguished by different labour market characteristics and 
behavioural rules”. 
Labour market segmentation theory was developed in the early 1960s, and contradicts neo-
classical economic theory (Reich et al., 1973), which assumes an integrated labour market 
with open competition in demand and supply. In the neoclassical labour theory, differences 
across individuals are captured through higher marginal products for observed characteristics 
such as skill or level of education or through the theory of compensating wage differentials 
which suggests that people who are willing to accept riskier or dirtier jobs would receive 
higher wages than those who prefer taking safe and clean jobs. However, in the theory of 
labour market segmentation, the difference in labour compensation or wages has little to do 
with ability or the type of job but rather is a result of political and economic forces within the 
country. In this theory, labour market segmentation is usually divided into two markets, 
primary and secondary, hence it has come to be referred to as dual labour market theory.  
According to Dickens and Lang (1985), dual labour market theory has two main assumptions. 
The first is that there is a primary and a secondary market in terms of wages. In their model 
the secondary market consists of the low-wage labour with no returns to schooling and lack 
of training on the job. Secondly, the model assumes that there are barriers that are non-
economic that prevent secondary market workers into moving to the primary market. The 
secondary jobs are mainly low-wage, low-productivity, have poor working conditions, low 
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job security, and few opportunities to upgrade to primary jobs. Meanwhile, the primary jobs 
are highly paid, have good working conditions and more opportunities for career progression. 
  
A B 
Figure 3.2: Dickens and Lang (1985) formulation of different labour markets 
Figure 3.2, illustrates the operation of dual labour markets. Figure 3.2.A shows a hypothetical 
plot of human capital theory in a standard labour market where earnings and education are 
positively correlated. Figure 3.2.B shows a more accurate representation of a dual labour 
market. The primary market acts according to the human capital theory where investment in 
human capital such as education or experience results in an increase in wages. In contrast, the 
secondary market has a straight horizontal line which suggests that regardless of the level of 
education the individual might have, other factors such as ethnicity or gender can determine 
the wage level of the individual. 
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Figure 3.3: Log Wage and Skill according to Nationality: Source: GOSI 
The model of duality can be readily applied to the Saudi labour market. Figure 3.3 above 
shows the difference of the fitted line of log of wage in relation to skill between nationals and 
non-nationals in the GOSI data. Although Dickens and Lang (1985) conducted this analysis 
based on education level, it has been suggested by the providers of the GOSI data that the 
education variable is not necessarily accurate. Hence, for the purposes of this research it was 
decided to replace education with skill as an indicator of the level of education. The skill 
variable was developed using over two thousand different occupations provided by the GOSI 
dataset. Following the framework of Reijnders and deVries (2017), the occupations were 
aggregated into three skill levels; high, medium, and low. The figure suggests a duality in the 
Saudi labour market, where the primary sector consists of the Saudis, and the foreigners are 
mostly in the secondary sector. Although there is foreign high skilled labour in the primary 
sector, their share is negligible.  
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Rebitzer (1993) suggests that the description of the dual labour market in general does not 
justify why this duality has occurred. In the case of Saudi Arabia, duality in the market arose 
due to political and economic forces as mentioned by Reich et al. (1973) in their definition of 
labour market segmentation theory, such as the lack of strategic economic drivers of growth 
and employment; changing demographics; and structural economic imbalances (Ramady, 
2005). These economic forces have allowed the inward flow of migration during the 1970s 
and early 1980s where the oil prices were rising, and the economy was booming. The local 
manpower was not able to accommodate this growth. According to the third five-year 
development plan (MOP, 1980) the labour force has grown by around 41% between 1975 and 
1980 from 1.75 million to 2.47 million respectively, raising the levels of inward migration 
while at the same time developing the level of education in local human capital. As 
mentioned earlier, a segmented labour market involves different divisions within the market, 
either by gender, nationality, educational attainment, and so on. Each division functions in a 
different labour market, with different working environments, different career opportunities, 
different incomes and different institutions (Reich et al., 1973). 
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Note: (a) Duality of Saudi labour market. (b) Demand and supply of expatriate labour in Saudi Arabia by market 
segmentation 
Figure 3.4: Duality of Saudi Labour Market (Ramady, 2005) 
As explained by Ramady (2005), Figure 3.4 represents a snapshot of the wage segmentation 
in the Saudi labour market; showing the difference in demand and supply between Saudi and 
non-Saudi workers. In Figure 3.4a, the Ds and SpS are the demand and supply for Saudi 
labourers, whereas Df and SpF are the demand and supply for foreign labourers. There are 
vast differences in the wage structure between Saudis and foreigners. Furthermore, the wage 
structure between foreigners also differs in terms of skills, as indicated in Figure 3.4.b. It has 
three sections: section (b.A) shows that the supply of foreign labour is rather inelastic, since it 
represents the higher technical and managerial skills, which accounts for the higher wage 
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(𝑊1𝐹); these higher skilled foreign workers usually come from developed countries. In 
section (b.B), the curve shows a more elastic supply, with mid-level skilled workers, such as 
accountants or salesmen. This is a more competitive section in the Saudi labour force in terms 
of skill level. Thus, it is apparent that the wage is significantly lower than (𝑊1𝐹). These jobs 
are taken more by other non-Saudi Arab workers. In section (b.C), the supply curve is almost 
perfectly elastic, where the wage is very low and the skill level is low as well. This is usual in 
manual jobs, such as those done by construction workers. These positions are usually filled 
by South East Asians, such as Indians and Filipinos.  Any change in the labour supply would 
result in sharp movements in wage levels. Hence, Saudization policies should target job 
creation in section (B.b) for the moment, and, in the long run, section (b.A) with high-skilled 
knowledge-based jobs, for example in science and technology. 
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Figure 3.5: Duality of labour market in terms of industry size and sector (Al-Kibsi et al., 
2015). 
Moreover, Al-Kibsi et al. (2015) also confirm the existence of labour market duality in Saudi 
Arabia through the recorded patterns seen in Figure 3.5. It is evaluated that the upcoming 
demographic change could bring no less than 4.5 million new entrants into the labour market 
by 2030. That would almost double its size to over 10 million, if associated with above-trend 
increases in the female labour force. To absorb this high influx, Al-Kibsi et al. (2015) 
suggest that the labour market requires the creation of almost three times as many jobs for 
Saudis as the Kingdom created in the public sector during the 2003–13 oil boom.  
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These demographic changes come about in a country with a dual labour market divided 
between higher-paid Saudi workers, mainly in the public sector, and lower-paid foreign 
workers, predominantly in the private sector. The Kingdom has a relatively weak record of 
private-sector job creation for Saudi nationals, which will be a major challenge and also an 
opportunity, regardless of the future trajectory of oil prices. 
Moreover, Rebitzer (1993) also suggests that the elimination of a dual labour market cannot 
be done by natural forces, serious actions need to be taken to solve the problem. In the case of 
the United States, it was the affirmative action policies, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, it 
was the Saudization policies and more recently Nitaqat. Furthermore, with Nitaqat 
encouraging the employment of Saudis and reducing foreign share in the labour market, it 
represents a great chance to open the doors for more Saudi female participation in the labour 
market and reduce the gap between male and female employment. Since the duality in the 
Saudi labour market is between natives and foreigners, the next section will discuss migration 
theory and impacts on immigrants and natives. 
3.4       Migration 
The theory of human capital suggests that labour mobility is an investment, where migrants 
bear the extra costs in an earlier period to gain returns over the long run. Foreign-born 
migrants form 10%-20% of the population of Europe and North America (Hanson, 2009). In 
Saudi Arabia they comprise 30% of the total population (SAMA, 2016). Human capital 
theory suggests that migrants flow from poor income countries to countries with better 
opportunities in order to achieve long-term returns. 
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Figure 3.6: Demand, supply and elasticity change for low skilled jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2012). 
Figure 3.6 explains the demand and supply theory for “rough labourers”, i.e. those who take 
on undesirable jobs (Abrams and Abrams, 1975). Without foreign labour, the restricted 
supply of native labour would require the wage to be higher, and the level of labour set at 𝐿1. 
With the addition of foreign labour or migrant labour, the labour supply curve would shift 
outward and flatten, indicating the higher responsiveness level (higher elasticity) of 
immigrants, to changes in wages than the natives. This would result in wages declining from 
𝑊1 to 𝑊2 and labour increasing from 𝐿1 to 𝐿2, where there are a higher number of 
immigrants willing to accept jobs at a lower wage. In the meantime, 𝐿3 represents the number 
of native labourers willing to accept jobs at this lower wage level. This confirms the theory 
that immigration negatively affects native employment as these workers enter a competitive 
labour market (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012).  A question then arises of whether a policy to 
deport illegal immigrants would create the same number of jobs for native workers. The 
theory assumes that this is not the case, as deporting illegal immigrants would raise the 
number of workers from 𝐿3 to 𝐿1, raising the wage back up from 𝑊2 to 𝑊1 again. 
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Human capital theory suggests that within two types of labour, natives and immigrants, in a 
competitive model, the main estimation is that immigrants tend to reduce the employment of 
natives if they are both substitutable in the production process. This was seen in Western 
Europe in the 1980s and 1990s where there was little employment creation for natives while 
employment of immigrants grew substantially. Angrist and Kugler (2003) suggest that the 
more restrictive institutions that are put in place to protect native employment, such as wage 
rigidity, firing costs, and firm entry cost, the higher the negative impact felt on native 
employment.   
When analysing the effect of immigration of cheap labour on employers, employers are 
winning in the short run. As the cost of labour declines with additional cheap labour, the 
profits of employers increase. This increase will spill over into higher capital returns, which 
would act as a signal for a good investment, encouraging more people to enter the market as 
owners. Moreover, the rise in profits alongside the increased number of employers would 
eventually return to equilibrium. Immigration has increased the stock of capital and created 
more opportunities in the economy (Hanson, 2009). 
In the framework of labour demand and supply, the literature debates the effect of migration 
on native employment. Some argue that immigrants cannot be a perfect substitute for native 
workers mostly because natives are likely to have better communication skills which results 
in a comparative advantage in communication-intensive jobs. Meanwhile, immigrants appear 
to have an advantage in manual jobs (Moreno-Galbis and Tritah, 2016). 
Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016) argue that there is a lack of negative effects on natives’ 
labour market outcomes. Since immigrants are new to their host country; they lack the local 
labour market knowledge and other valuable assets, such as unemployment benefits that 
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would be offered to natives. This makes it urgent for immigrants to find a job resulting in 
lower bargaining power in terms of wages, making them more profitable to employers. 
Therefore, it is argued that even if immigrants are perfect substitutes for natives in the 
production process, immigrants form a positive externality. The variety of options between 
natives and immigrants in the labour market may account for the difference in wages between 
the two groups.  
In the case of the impact of immigration on the labour market and wages, Borjas (2003) 
suggests that the level of experience with a similar educational background does make a 
difference in the labour market and, experienced and less experienced workers do not form 
perfect substitutes. Moreover, he suggests that immigration reduces wages of substitute 
workers, estimating that a 10% rise in supply of workers would reduce wages by 3-4%.  
Since the duality in the Saudi labour market has to do mainly with foreign labour, it is 
essential to review the literature that links the dual labour market theory with migration. 
DeCoulon and Wolff (2004) highlight the different debates in the literature that link the two 
theories. The first is a static model developed by Carter (1999) where he examines the impact 
of illegal immigrants on employment, wages and natives’ welfare especially in the secondary 
sector. He argues that natives do gain from illegal migration at first, as natives can enter the 
primary labour market sector, where the model assumes rising demand. However, natives can 
be at a disadvantage in the long run, as the number of immigrants increase in the host country 
and they can later move into the primary job sector too. Furthermore, Carter (1999) continues 
to explain the model by identifying the difference between migrants and natives in his model, 
where empirically, migrants are assumed to be leaving the market after a short period. This is 
because illegal immigrants frequently go back to their home country, hence the existence of 
Chapter 3 Literature Review  51 
labour market segmentation. Carter (1999) finds that if illegal immigrants are scarce, then 
they would mostly occupy the secondary market consisting of low-wage jobs, leaving natives 
to be more involved in primary sector jobs that are characterised as a higher wage sector. 
This drives the notion that illegal immigrants help native workers. With the increase in 
migration, segmentation becomes more apparent. However, as migrants continue to increase, 
they reach a point of conversion where both natives and migrants compete for primary-sector 
jobs (Carter, 1999). Müller (2003a, 2003b) expands on this static model proposed by Carter 
(1999), to include dynamic adjustments, which allows the study of the impact of the legal 
migration on both natives and foreigners. Since foreigners are more likely to return to their 
home country, the results showed discriminatory behaviour in hiring depending on the 
probability of returning to the home country.  
However, De Coulon and Wolff (2004) state that these theoretical contributions have not 
been associated with empirical testing of dual labour market theory. There have only been a 
few studies that linked immigrants with dual labour markets, which is puzzling especially 
since immigrants usually take jobs with low wages and bad working conditions i.e. the 
secondary market jobs (De Coulon and Wolff, 2004). There has been some evidence of dual 
labour markets in developed countries such as Germany and Switzerland which have a 
“guest-worker” system. Dustmann (1993) concludes that German natives earn significantly 
higher wages than foreign workers, usually in the secondary market, with no evidence of 
convergence over time. Likewise, De Coulon et al. (2003) also find that immigrants in 
Switzerland earn significantly lower wages than native workers. This confirms the idea of 
dealing with immigrants as the secondary sector in a dual labour market framework. 
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Guest worker immigration policy in Switzerland is very similar to that in Saudi Arabia. It 
also exists in other countries such as Germany and Spain. The main idea of the guest worker 
is to enter the country for work purposes only, typically without their family, staying for a 
while and then eventually returning to their home country (De Coulon and Wolff, 2004). 
Müller (2003) finds that there are different behaviours toward immigrants and to natives in 
hiring, especially with regards to their probability of returning to their home countries. He 
suggests that in countries with few immigrants, the host country usually employs these 
immigrants in the secondary sector. As the number of immigrants grows, the segregation 
continues and becomes clearer as natives work in the primary sector and migrants work in the 
secondary sector. However, if the number of immigrants becomes large enough, larger firms 
will tend to hire some immigrants in the primary market, although they are likely to continue 
to be employed mostly in the secondary market.  
De Coulon and Wolff (2004) put forward several factors that prevent employers from hiring 
minorities into the primary sector. Firstly, that the wage of primary workers is not sufficient 
to prevent minorities from shirking9. Secondly, minority workers are likely to have liquidity 
constraints. Therefore, these minority workers will accept lower wages where they can start 
immediately rather than investing in their education or apprenticeship programs and 
expecting higher future returns. Thirdly, they argued the existence of statistical 
discrimination theories, as De Coulon and Wolff (2004) suggest that minority workers or 
immigrants are considered less productive than their native counterparts especially in regard 
                                                 
9 Shirkers are “workers who are not sufficiently motivated by their current wage and who consequently do not 
work as efficiently as they would if they were better paid” (De Coulon & Wolff, 2004). 
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to language skills. As Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) show, the inability to master the language 
of the host country acts as a signal to employers of being less productive. De Coulon and 
Wolff (2004) concluded that the low skilled migrants from Southern European countries such 
as Italy and Spain are found in the secondary sector, whereas the high skilled migrants from 
Western European countries are usually found in the primary sector. 
3.5       Affirmative Action Policy 
Affirmative action is defined as policies enforced by government agencies, employers or 
universities to overcome discrimination and improve the economic status of minorities and 
females (Holzer and Neumark, 2006). The phrase “affirmative action” was introduced in a set 
of executive orders by US presidents in the 1960s, targeting employment discrimination. 
However, there was controversy behind these policies in the US, as they contradicted “Equal 
Employment Opportunity” Laws and other regulations (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). They 
argue that differences between affirmative action and equal employment opportunity policies 
are apparent more in theory than in practice.  Affirmative action policies seem the most 
relevant to Nitaqat policy especially in terms of the labour market impact. Affirmative action 
law was enacted in 1965 in the US (Griffin, 1992), and targets federal contractors prohibiting 
discrimination in employment. The most serious penalty for non-compliance is the 
disbarment of future contracts (Griffin, 1992). It is the closest government program to 
Nitaqat. Therefore, it is interesting to see its impact on firms and compare the effect of the 
two programs. However, affirmative action policies extend beyond the United States. There 
have been similar policies such as the “Equality Act 2010” in the UK (Hepple, 2010), 
“Employment Equity” in Canada (Agocs and Burr, 1996), and the “Reservation” system also 
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referred to as affirmative action in India (Weisskopf, 2004). These policies, in basic terms, 
protect disadvantaged groups in the labour market from discrimination. Policies can take 
several forms, such as employment quotas, equal wage rights, or just an encouragement for 
equality across all races and gender.  
However, there has been some controversy around these policies and they have been 
criticised in the academic literature. As mentioned, the main purpose of these policies is to 
reduce or eliminate the existing discrimination in the labour market or education. Although 
they have the good intentions of lessening discrimination in the workplace, some argue that 
affirmative action policies can cause a reverse discrimination against more privileged groups, 
since it limits their opportunities. It has also been argued that workers should be hired based 
on their credentials and qualifications. Imposing affirmative action may force firms to hire 
less qualified people to meet the requirements which results in wasted opportunities in raising 
their profits or their productivity (Welch, 1976, Holzer and Neumark, 1999, Griffin, 1992). 
Furthermore, Griffin (1992) makes use of the Le Chatelier principle10 in his analysis – this 
clarifies how the direct impact of a change in a parameter can be amplified through the 
reaction in the system they are in, showing how small changes can have large impacts 
(Milgrom, 2006). Griffin (1992) found that treated firms under the affirmative action policy 
which are contractors have less elastic labour demand. The Le Chatelier principle suggests 
that imposing restrictions on the behaviour of an agent would have two results. First, the 
                                                 
10 The Le Chatelier principle, also known as “the equilibrium law”, is used in chemistry to measure the impact 
of a change in condition on a chemical equilibrium. Paul Samuelson (1947) introduced the same principle in the 
form of an application to demand theory, where under certain circumstances, if the consumption of the 
consumer is fixed for good X, the elasticity of the consumer’s demand will be reduced for any other product Y. 
In the event of the availability of multiple other goods, (X1ÆXn) should reduce the elasticity even further if 
each additional good was fixed (Milgrom, 2006). 
Chapter 3 Literature Review  55 
agent cannot advance with these restrictions and, second, the aptitude to react to changes by 
the agent in its environment will be reduced. Griffin (1992) suggests that the Le Chatelier 
principle can act as a good examining tool for government programs that limit the hiring 
decisions of firms.   
Moreover, affirmative action policy has affected labour demand in the US. Griffin (1992) 
indicates that binding hiring quotas will raise costs for firms causing lower elasticity in their 
demand for inputs, as well as increased difficulty in substituting between production inputs. 
Griffin (2012) estimated that affirmative action policies with binding minimum quotas would 
raise costs by 6.5%. This provides evidence for the hypothesis that affirmative action does 
restrict firm behaviour. Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) have found a significant effect of 
the affirmative action policy in the US in enhancing the representation of different minority 
labour groups with no effect to occupation. Leonard (1984) studies the effect of the 
affirmative action program in a later period, between 1974-1980, and suggests that the 
program had a vital role in improving employment levels and occupations for women and 
minorities.  
The model of Welch (1976) studies the impact of employment quotas on minorities. The 
model has two groups; the skilled minority and the skilled majority. The quota requires that 
for every hire of a majority skilled worker, there needs to be a quota (<1) minority worker 
hired in the same position. Moreover, Welch (1976) suggested “skill bumping” as a solution 
to the treated firms. Due to the lack of skilled minorities and the inability to hire skilled 
majority because of the quota restrictions, firms had no option but to hire unskilled and less 
qualified minorities to raise their quota. However, Welch (1976) suggests that affirmative 
action policy has resulted in less-skilled minorities being hired in more skilled jobs, leading 
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to higher costs of production, decreased performance measures in terms of cost and 
profitability, and loss in efficiency. He also suggests that earnings of the minority group 
would increase because of the policy, yet overall, such a quota model raises inefficiencies in 
the labour market. Holzer and Neumark (1999) evaluated Welch’s model, also finding that 
this model can result in skilled workers being hired less as the minority group of skilled 
workers cannot be met. Therefore, this results in higher costs of production thereby raising 
inefficiencies in the market (Holzer and Neumark, 1999). The model of Welch (1976) studies 
affirmative action policy in its most extreme case where it is treated as an employment quota 
escalating the affirmative action policy to the whole economy. Welch’s assumption resembles 
the Nitaqat policy. Therefore, this might give an early indication of the effect such policies 
could have in an economy. 
The strategy of ‘skill bumping’ was also applied to Nitaqat where, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
firms had resorted to “masked employment” where they hire Saudis with low wages and do 
not actually use them, so they either have nothing to do in the workplace or are even asked 
not to attend work but still receive a wage as they raise quotas.  Therefore, skill bumping 
(Welch, 1976) is akin to masked employment in the case where Saudis are hired not because 
of their qualifications but rather because they can easily help meet the quota. It appears that, 
although not supported or anticipated by the Nitaqat policy system, this is what firms resorted 
to, in order to minimise the impact of the policy and be allowed to hire more foreigners. 
However, after 2016, the Ministry of Labor, which oversees the implementation of Nitaqat, 
detected the problem of masked employment. In an attempt to stop this, it introduced a new 
regulation in the system where the firm can directly pay the MOL, where the payment 
upgrades the firm into the higher colour category, and the MOL uses this payment for the 
rewards of training and partial wage payments for compliant firms.  
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Welch (1976) also assumes that affirmative action policy results in productivity losses as 
workers are hired because of the policy rather than because of their qualifications. He argues 
that different employers engage in different types of discrimination. Employers who do not 
discriminate and would hire the minority group regardless of the presence of the quota, have 
a comparative advantage over others. However, with the existence of the quota system, the 
skilled minority need to be distributed among firms as a share of the skilled majority. This 
causes an increased level of discrimination which spills over to an increase in social costs.  
Furthermore, Welch (1976) suggests that in an economy-wide quota system with two groups, 
two consequences occur instantly. First, the aggregate employment drops, therefore there is a 
drop in aggregate output or productivity. As a result, average income of the majority group 
should fall accordingly to average out the income between minority and majority groups. 
Secondly, the total skilled to unskilled employment ratio alongside the productivity of skilled 
labour will rise relative to the productivity of unskilled labour.  
Leonard (1985) conducted an analysis on the affirmative action policy in the US, analyzing 
the policy’s targets and how it can become more effective. Leonard (1985) found that the 
compliance reviews were mostly conducted on large firms that do employ more minorities 
than others. Meanwhile, firms that do discriminate and have less minorities, if any, are not 
reviewed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). He further 
recommends that for the affirmative action policy to be effective and to fight discrimination 
properly, the reviews need to target firms that do have smaller percentages of minorities, 
while controlling for size, industry and region (Leonard, 1985). The Nitaqat policy did 
control for size and industry. A regional control was not necessary in Saudi Arabia as the 
system is centralised therefore region control is already given by the economy.  
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Leonard (1984) also studied the changes in employment percentages in firms between 1974 
and 1980 between the treated group, the contractors, and the control group, the non-
contractor firms. He concluded that although the proportion of minorities increased in treated 
firms, the majority employment declined, albeit at a very modest rate. For example, Leonard 
suggests that employment growth over the six-year period declined for white males 1.5%, to 
2.6%, and white female employment growth rose by a little over 2%. Meanwhile, 
employment of black males grew by 5% and black females by 10%. However, Smith and 
Welch (1984) argue that the effect of the affirmative action policy on employment was 
greater in the earlier period prior to 1974, although there was a weaker enforcement of the 
policy.  Furthermore, Leonard (1983) studied the laws of anti-discrimination in the US, and 
argued that these laws reduce productivity as employers need to employ less qualified people 
to perform a job. When measuring the ratio of productivity of minority to white males, or 
females to white males, Leonard (1983) finds that there is no significant evidence of declined 
productivity of minorities nor females in relation to their white male counterparts. 
Welch (1976) also measured the impact of affirmative action on the aggregate economy level 
and concluded that both aggregate employment and productivity had declined. Meanwhile, 
Holzer and Neumark (1999) analysed the flow of employment, and found that the proportion 
of white male employment had declined by between 10% to 15% to be redistributed between 
the minority group of blacks and females. However, studies that analysed the share of 
employment all show modest results mainly due to the weak enforcement of the policy. 
Leonard (1984) studied the effect using the production function and found that the policy has 
no negative impact on productivity in contractor firms. However, Holzer and Neumark 
(1999) argue that this finding is uninformative due to the highly aggregated level at which the 
analysis was completed. Meanwhile Welch (1976) concludes that there is an impact, notably 
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a decrease in productivity at the aggregate level.  
Holzer and Neumark (2006) reviewed the impact of affirmative action policy in employment, 
government procurement and university admissions. It was found that affirmative action 
policies do have an effect on targeted groups, such as minorities and females. For example, 
job distribution in fact shifted employment from white males towards minorities with lesser 
qualifications. Yet there was no evidence showing less labour market efficiency. As for 
universities, students who were admitted under the affirmative action policy showed higher 
dropout rates and weaker results. These policies resulted in positive externalities in low-
income communities, including; people with fewer qualifications being given the chance to 
receive better jobs in terms of income or status, and students being admitted to better schools 
and receive good education. 
Holzer and Neumark (1998) used a difference-in-differences approach to analyse the 
performance of the majority white male against the minority and female employees in firms 
between treated and control firms. They found that although the qualifications of minority 
groups are lower in the treated group of firms, their performance on-the-job does not appear 
to be affected by their lower qualifications11. The theoretical literature on labour economics 
suggests that due to the weak enforcement of the affirmative action policy, it has been 
difficult to provide conclusive results in determining whether the policy enhances or reduces 
efficiency. This thesis examines a similar policy, Nitaqat, with its strict rules and application 
to the whole economy.  
                                                 
11 Results exclude Hispanic males. 
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 Affirmative Action in Relation to Saudi Arabia 
Theoretical models have produced ambiguous projections in terms of the efficiency effects of 
these policies and the net effect, which depends on the type of discrimination modelled and 
the context of the labour market studied (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). Therefore, empirical 
evidence is vital. 
Peck (2017) sheds light on how the “Nitaqat” policy aims to combat some of the known 
symptoms of a resource curse, such as under-development of non-resource industries; high 
levels of unemployment; corruption and weak institutions; and political instability. These 
problems were noted during the time of the program application during the Arab Spring in 
2011. Although there were many causes for upheaval, unemployment was always the root 
cause. Therefore, the program could be a perfect case study to measure the effectiveness of 
such programs in combating unemployment. 
As the private sector in the country is young and fragile, a main concern arises as to whether 
it would be able to accommodate such a demanding policy (Looney, 2004, Ramady, 2013, 
Hertog, 2014). Peck (2017) raised important questions in her study, such as the degree of 
effectiveness in raising local nationalisation in the private sector and its costs. Peck (2017) 
conducted the first analysis on the Nitaqat dataset. She studied the immediate shock of the 
program upon its application. This thesis examines whether Peck’s results were just a one-
time shock to the economy, or whether they had a consistent, lasting effect. We have studied 
the program from the start of its application in July 2011 until October 2015. The results from 
2013 onwards are original. Moreover, we have added the impact of the Nitaqat program on 
females in the labour market, which has never been studied in the literature. 
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Peck (2017) used Regression Kink Design analysis (RKD) to measure the impact of the 
program at a certain point in time. It has had great costs and benefits to firms. To start; firm 
size was one of the major costs on firms. Peck suggests that Red and Yellow firms had a 
negative growth of 0.5% for every one percentage point below the cut-off quota. This 
indicates that the policy did in fact limit firm growth in the first 16-month period. Secondly, 
as suggested by the RKD results, Nitaqat has had a significant impact on firm exit. Red and 
Yellow firms have had an increase in their exit rates – depending on bandwidth choice - 
between 0.72 and 2.17% for every 1% distance below the cut-off. 
Peck (2017) suggests that the program has increased the exit rate from an expected 19% to 
28% with a growth rate of 50% from 2011. Although the policy was able to raise 
employment figures immediately it may have negative impacts on sustainable economic 
development. Peck further suggests that Nitaqat was successful in raising local employment 
levels, but the cost on firms was extremely significant. Additionally she also suggests that the 
program was responsible for an increase of 2.73% in the Saudization rate. The program was 
responsible for employing 73,000 Saudis in existing firms over a period of 16 months. New 
entrants had higher rates of Saudization, employing an additional 23,000 Saudis. With greater 
costs on existing firms, around 11,000 firms were forced to exit the market. Existing firms 
also showed a tendency to shrink their total number of employees, which reduced the total 
number of workers in the private sector by 418,000. 
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3.6       Productivity 
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A country’s ability 
to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise 
output per worker” (Paul Krugman, 1997), 
Productivity is “the effectiveness with which factors of production are converted into output” 
(Weil, 2009). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
manual defines it as a “ratio of a volume of measure of output to a volume measure of input 
use”. The definitions of productivity do agree on the general concept of what productivity is, 
however, there are different measures of it. Productivity measurement is important as it 
provides insights about technology, efficiency and real cost savings.  
How can productivity be increased at the macro, industry, and firm level? The Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) productivity handbook (ONS, 2007) suggests several ways in 
which productivity can be improved. On the macro level, improving efficiency is achieved by 
converting inputs into outputs across many different firms and industries. Raising 
productivity at the macro level could also be achieved through changing the mix of industries 
from lower to higher productivity. Meanwhile, on the industry level, raising productivity can 
be achieved through using inputs in a more efficient manner by current firms to produce 
higher output quantities or quality. Raising the exit rate of less productive firms and/or 
increasing the rate of entry of more productive firms can also increase productivity. The 
productivity within the firm can be raised through better management of inputs to produce 
output in the most efficient manner. 
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As mentioned, productivity is crucial to economic growth, and complementing this with 
higher employment produces the perfect combination of higher living standards, measured by 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The ONS (2007) suggests two ways in which 
GDP per capita can be increased. The first is raising employment levels or hours worked 
hence raising labour input. Second, holding everything constant, raising the output level of 
workers, i.e. increasing labour productivity.  
Total Factor Productivity is defined as “the residual contribution to output growth of an 
industry or economy after calculating the contribution from all its factor inputs” (ONS, 
2007).12  TFP is the residual of the production function; an increase in TFP indicates that 
inputs in the production function are being used more efficiently (Bosworth and Collins, 
2008). 
One of the reasons for the differences in productivity among countries is attributed to 
differences in efficiency. Efficiency is the “effectiveness with which factors of production 
and technology are combined to produce output”. The theory of inefficiency is not yet 
developed, however Weil (2009) describes five reasons why an economy could be inefficient: 
unproductive activities, not using capital or labour to their full potential, misallocation of 
factors among sectors, misallocation of factors among firms, and technology blocking. 
First, unproductive activities refers to a situation when economic resources are redirected to 
unproductive activities rather than productive ones meaning there is no economic value 
attached to them. One example is burglary, and the use of high security systems to prevent 
                                                 
12 TFP is used interchangeably with Multi-Factor productivity (MFP) in the literature (Hulten, 2001). 
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these thefts. If these illegal activities did not occur, then inputs spent on these activities could 
be used in more productive activities and raise the efficiency of the economy. Another 
example is rent seeking, which occurs when government policies create an artificial rent. An 
example is the Nitaqat policy change that occurred in 2016, when the Ministry of Labor 
started accepting payment from firms who were not fully compliant instead of raising actual 
Saudi employment; this is a form of unproductive activity as it defeats the original purpose of 
the program which was to increase the employment of nationals in the economy. 
The second form of inefficiency within an economy, according to Weil (2009), is when 
capital or labour are not used to their full potential. Capital inefficiency can come in the form 
of empty lands in the middle of the city that are not being used, or a factory that does not run 
to its full capacity. An example of labour not being used to its full potential is unemployment, 
or underemployment, where workers spend only part of their time producing output instead 
of the whole time given. In the case of Saudi Arabia, public sector jobs employ around 90% 
of Saudi workers, but for only six hours of work per day. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
public sector started hiring nationals as a way of distributing the oil wealth to the people. 
However, with the high population growth it could not maintain this model as high 
inefficiencies arose since many people were hired just for this purpose without the actual 
need for them. This has increased bureaucracy in the system as well as underemployment 
where the economy is not able to benefit fully from these individuals. 
The third form of inefficiency suggested by Weil (2009) is the misallocation of factors among 
sectors. That is when resources are used to produce the wrong good or service. For instance, 
in a competitive economy, wages are defined as being equal to the value of marginal product 
of labour. Reaching the optimal efficiency level in terms of labour allocation between two 
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sectors happens automatically due to two factors: labour is paid the value of marginal product 
in the form of wages, and this marginal product or wage is different in different sectors. 
Therefore, employees will have a high incentive to move from a low marginal product (MP) 
sector to a higher one. This would result in the higher marginal product sector offering lower 
wages since these employees already come from a lower wage sector, and the lower marginal 
product sector will raise their wages to keep those employees, so the movement will continue 
until the marginal product is equalised in the economy, hence maximising the quantity of 
outputs. However, Weil (2009) suggests that this might not always be the case for two 
reasons: barriers to mobility and wages and marginal products not being equal. Barriers to 
mobility between sectors might occur in many economies and result in the wage gap between 
sectors persisting. These barriers might include geographic isolation, and the existence of the 
minimum wage; with the minimum wage firms from the higher sector not being able to 
expand their payroll since doing so would require reducing the marginal product below the 
minimum wage. The other reason for misallocation of factors between sectors is that wages 
might not equal the marginal product of labour. If this occurs then a change in marginal 
product could not translate into a change in wage, meaning workers will lose their incentive 
to move from one sector to another. One situation where the marginal product might not 
equal wages is when the labour market is segmented so that more productive workers are 
unable to work in certain industries. In the Saudi Arabia example, the existence of the Nitaqat 
program in a segmented or a dual labour market means it is difficult for foreigners to move 
freely between jobs that could better fit their skills, hence increasing productivity. Moreover, 
the economy is moving towards a position where some industries, e.g. retail trading, are 
required to only hire Saudis, hence not allowing foreigners to work in them. This might 
reduce productivity as foreigners are mostly low skilled workers and receive lower wages 
than low skilled national workers, leading to the misallocation of resources and higher 
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inefficiency.  
The fourth form of inefficiency suggested by Weil (2009) is the misallocation of factors 
among firms. There are many reasons why efficiency or productivity varies between firms, as 
some might have inferior technologies or suffer from poor organisation or bad management. 
However, in an efficient economy, resources such as capital and labour will reallocate from 
less productive firms to more productive ones, raising the productivity of the economy. More 
productive firms are better at using their resources than less productive ones so their marginal 
profit is higher, leading to less productive firms losing money and eventually exiting the 
market. This leads to capital and labour of the exiting firms moving to more productive firms, 
therefore raising the productivity of the whole economy. The Nitaqat program might be 
beneficial to productivity if it means that exiting firms are less productive, and their resources 
are transferred to more productive firms who are able to absorb the extra costs of the 
program. This will be discussed later in Chapter 6. 
The final form of economic inefficiency in Weil’s the framework is the blocking of 
technology, which arises when a section of the population or workforce prevents the adoption 
and use of new technology. History is filled with examples of technology blocking. In Saudi 
Arabia, religious societies had banned many new technologies in the name of religion, such 
as the Telegram, as people were scared and not in favour of it at the beginning. Similarly, 
with the invention of the radio, news and information during that time were scarce and old 
and although the radio revolutionised the delivery of news, it was banned in Saudi Arabia for 
a while.  
In summary Weil (2009) argues that most of the variation in productivity among countries is 
explained by differences in efficiency. Moreover, he suggests that the most influential factor 
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of efficiency within an economy is the institutional structure. For the purposes of this study it 
is important to notice that Saudi institutions are unique and likely to affect efficiency. 
Growth Accounting 
The starting point for much of the empirical work measuring productivity is the neoclassical 
Solow growth model (Solow, 1956):  
Y = AF(K, L) 3-1) 
This model has exogenous technological progress (A) as the source of growth in output. In 
contrast, new growth theory models technical progress as endogenously determined. Solow’s 
model suggests that savings and population growth have a significant impact on income. 
However, Mankiw et al. (1992) argued that the model was incomplete and they expanded it 
to account for the accumulation of both human and physical capital. They warned that 
omitting human capital accumulation had resulted in bias in the Solow model, finding that 
human capital is highly correlated with both the saving rate and population growth and in 
particular, that it lowers the effect of both variables. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) argue 
there is vast evidence to support productivity being raised through human capital, implying 
that education is a vital tool to enhancing productivity, rather than just existing as a self-
fulfilling tool for individuals to increase their own returns. Moreover, Lucas (2002) argues 
that higher educational attainment results in higher productivity.  
One of the most commonly used methods in the literature to study productivity is growth 
accounting. This is a useful descriptive tool that is a good starting point to identify sources of 
growth in an economy, however it does not imply causality (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). 
It offers a good benchmark for economic performance analysis (Bosworth and Collins, 2008). 
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The growth accounting framework was developed by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and 
generalised in an input-output framework by Jorgenson et al. (1987). The framework is based 
on a production possibility frontier, where the industry gross output is a function of labour, 
capital, intermediate inputs and technology (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). The value-added 
production function is given by the following formula: 
𝒀𝒋 = 𝒇𝒋(𝑲𝒋, 𝑳𝒋, 𝑻) 3-2) 
Where Y is output, K is capital input, L is labour input, T indicates time, and j represents 
individual industries. The framework uses several assumptions; competitive factor markets, 
constant returns to scale and full input utilisation (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). The 
translog functional form for the production function is commonly assumed in the literature, 
leading to the Tornqvist index decomposition of output growth (Chambers, 1988), 
represented by: 
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝒀𝒋𝒕 = 𝒗𝒋𝒕
𝑲∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑲𝒋𝒕 + 𝒗𝒋𝒕
𝑳 ∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑳𝒋𝒕 + ∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒋𝒕
𝒀  3-3) 
where 𝑣𝑖 indicates the share of input 𝑖 in a two-period average in a nominal output expressed 
as follows:  
𝒗𝒋𝒕





 ; 𝒗𝒋𝒕𝑲 =  𝑷𝒋𝒕𝑲𝑲𝒋𝒕𝑷𝒋𝒕𝒀 𝒀𝒋𝒕  3-4) 
and the technological change term 𝐴𝑌 is the growth in output over time not accounted for by 
inputs. Imposing constant returns to scale implies 𝑣𝐿 + 𝑣𝐾 = 1. Aggregate input is 
commonly defined as a Tornqvist quantity index of individual input type as shown below: 
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∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑳𝒋𝒕 =  ∑ 𝒘𝒍,𝒋𝒕
𝑳
𝒍
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑳𝒍,𝒋𝒕 3-5) 
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑲𝒋𝒕 =  ∑ 𝒘𝒌,𝒋𝒕
𝑲
𝒌
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑲𝒌,𝒋𝒕 3-6) 
Where ∆ ln 𝐿𝑙,𝑗𝑡 denotes the growth of worked hours by type of labour 𝑙 using weights 𝑤𝑙,𝑗𝑡
𝐿  
representing the average share of a given period of each type in the value of labour 
compensation. The same is true for K. With the assumption that marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost, the weights act as an influence of price (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). In this 
thesis intermediate inputs are not separately identified, due to data limitations, so instead we 
use a value-added production function13.  
After setting out the basic growth accounting model, it is interesting to see an application to 
developing countries since most of the literature is mostly focused on developed countries. A 
good example would be the study conducted by Bosworth and Collins (2008) analysing the 
growth and productivity differences between China and India based on number of workers. 
Bosworth and Collins (2008) studied the growth of both economies over a 26-year period, 
1978 to 2004, corresponding with China’s economic reform period as well as India’s 
accelerated growth in the earlier part of the period. They found that the average annual 
growth of output for China was 9.3%, with labour productivity forming 7.3% and 
employment growth at 2%, while the TFP growth in China during the same period is 3.6%.  
                                                 
13 Since accounts for intra-industry deliveries are unavailable, the value-added model is restrictive. Therefore, it 
is assumed that production is separable in capital, labour, and technology (Jorgenson et al., 1987) 
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India’s annual output growth was noticeably lower, with an average of 5.4%, TFP growth 
was at 1.6%, summed with physical capital and education to form the labour productivity at 
3.3%. Then, labour productivity is added to the employment growth of 2% totalling the 5.4% 
output growth. Although India’s growth rate is lower than China’s, when they compared 
India’s growth during the studied period and the earlier two decades, they found an increase 
in growth by around 2% (Bosworth and Collins, 2008).  
When interpreting the results of growth accounting, one needs to bear in mind two important 
aspects. First, TFP captures the impact of many determinant factors of efficiency such as 
government policies and political unrest, alongside the measure of technological progress. 
Second, results often show the proximate sources of economic growth rather than 
fundamental causes (Bosworth and Collins, 2008). O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) identify 
several effects that TFP growth might capture. First is the organisational and institutional 
change, which might lead to biased results. For instance, a structural reform of a business to 
accelerate the production process would result in negative TFP in the short run due to the 
resources being allocated to the reform process; however, this should yield higher TFP in the 
long run. Second, the neo-classical theory assumes that marginal cost is equal to marginal 
revenue. Any deviation from this neo-classical assumption can be picked up by the TFP, such 
as the herd behaviour which occurred during the dot-com bubble. Since TFP is a residual 
measure, it can also measure further intangibles such as investments in research and 
development. Finally, TFP can also include some measurement errors such as 
underestimation or overestimation in both inputs or outputs.  
Labour input 
There are three main ways to measure labour input: actual hours worked, number of 
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employees, and number of jobs. The OECD Productivity Manual (Schreyer, 2001), alongside 
the ONS Productivity Handbook (ONS, 2007), agree that using “actual hours worked” is a 
better measure, as it takes into account the different working patterns in different countries or 
industries. In addition, hours worked reflects the fluctuation that might appear within firms in 
response to economic changes (ONS, 2007). The ONS Productivity Handbook (2007) also 
explains the importance of using number of workers as a measure of labour, explaining that 
number of workers reflects the overall employment rate. The advantage of using number of 
workers in the context of productivity measurement in Saudi Arabia is that number of 
workers provides better detail in terms of nationality in all the datasets that are used in this 
study. 
Furthermore, basic economic theory suggests that “workers’ real hourly compensation should 
grow in line with GDP per hour worked over the long run” (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013). 
This indicates that wage growth is expected to trend with productivity growth in the long run. 
Therefore, Chapter 5 will use Mincer’s wage equation (Mincer, 1974) to observe trends of 
earnings reflecting labour productivity. An earnings function is a function of individual wage 
rates regressed on a vector of personal, environmental, and market variables that influence 
the wage (Willis, 1986).  
Physical Capital 
Weil (2012) states that the growth theory consists of two main variables: physical and human 
capital. Physical capital is defined as an asset that is “fixed, tangible, durable, and 
reproducible”, excluding natural resource assets such as oil (Nehru et al., 1993). It essentially 
consists of any physical object that helps improve the worker’s ability and productivity. It 
refers to assets such as machines, buildings, transport equipment and infrastructure. Weil 
Chapter 3 Literature Review  72 
(2012) states that there are five features of capital; it must be produced; be productive; have 
limited use; earn a return; and depreciate in value.  
According to Pritchett (2000), one limitation with physical capital estimates is that they are 
often overestimated in developing countries. This is due to the overvaluation of mostly 
government projects because large percentages of those investments are expected to 
disappear along the way and sometimes projects may never come to fruition. This scenario is 
somewhat common in developing countries which affects the accuracy of productivity 
measures since the stock of capital and investments are overestimated.  
According to (Nehru et al., 1993) although physical capital is unanimously accepted as an 
important factor of economic growth, there is no universal academic consensus on what 
actually constitutes physical capital, and how it can be measured. Two methods have been 
developed: the evaluation of capital stock through surveys directly; and the indirect  perpetual 
inventory method (PIM). This thesis utilises the methodology of O’Mahony and Timmer 
(2009) for measuring physical capital using the PIM. Under the PIM model: 




(𝐾) indicates a weighted sum of previous investments, where weights are allocated by the 
relative efficiency of capital goods at different years. And (𝐾𝑖,𝑇) represents capital stock of a 
single asset type 𝑖 at time 𝑇, 𝜕𝑖,𝑡 is the efficiency of capital good 𝑖 at time  𝑡 in relation to the 
efficiency of a new capital good, 𝐼𝑖,𝑇−𝑡 denotes the investment at time 𝑇 − 𝑡. O’Mahony & 
Timmer (2009) assume that services by assets in different years are perfect substitutes to one 
another. Moreover, a geometric depreciation method is used, assuming a constant rate of 
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depreciation over time 𝛿𝑖, yet different for each type of asset, 𝜕𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝑡−1, where  
𝑲𝒊,𝑻 =  ∑(
∞
𝒕=𝟎
𝟏 − 𝜹𝒊)𝒕−𝟏𝑰𝒊,𝑻−𝒕 =  𝑲𝒊,𝑻−𝟏(𝟏 − 𝜹𝒊) + 𝑰𝒊,𝑻 3-8) 
An aggregation of the flow of capital services can be estimated using a translog quantity 
index with weights based on user costs of capital.  
The capital compensation in industry 𝑗, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, can 
be estimated as value added minus the labour compensation (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009).   
However, in this thesis information only exists for aggregate capital and not by type of asset. 
Therefore, we assume a single depreciation rate where δ=0.6. This is the assumption used in 
Bosworth and Collins (2008).  The same depreciation rate was also used by an IMF study on 
the GCC countries (Espinoza et al., 2013). 
3.7       Minimum Wage: Impacts on Employment and 
Productivity 
In the context of labour demand theory, the Nitaqat policy increases the cost on firms, similar 
to the minimum wage policy. Therefore, exploring the literature on the impact of minimum 
wages on employment and productivity gives some insight into the impact of such policies.  
When the minimum wage laws were first legislated in the United States under the Fair Labor 
Standard Act in 1938 (Card and Krueger, 1995), the major concern was that they would 
reduce employment levels, especially for the low skilled. The economic effect of minimum 
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wage policy is still highly debated within the literature (Machin et al., 2002). The orthodox 
economic theory of minimum wage impact, arising in the 1980s, suggests that minimum 
wage has negative effects on employment, albeit at a modest rate, where a 10% increase in 
minimum wage decreases employment by 1%-3% (Machin et al., 2002, Brown et al., 1982, 
Lemos, 2009). Meanwhile, more recent literature has argued that minimum wage has little if 
any effect on employment (Neumark and Wascher, 2007, Brown, 1999). Moreover, Machin 
(2002) conducted a study on the Care Homes sector in the UK. The UK is more relevant to 
the work of this thesis as the introduction of the minimum wage for the first time was in 
1999. This gives a better indicator on the results as opposed to the US where most studies 
analyse the rise in the existing minimum wage. Machin (2002) found that there was a 
reduction in hours and employment within the Care Homes sector. While the previously 
mentioned studies address policies in developed countries, a more relatable literature would 
be that studying developing countries. Lemos (2009) concluded that there was no evidence 
that the minimum wage reduces employment in Brazil, which contradicts the economic 
theory that raising minimum wage would result in higher unemployment. Jones (1987) 
studied the impact of minimum wage in an economy with a dual labour market framework14, 
and suggests several responses in the primary sector. First, current employees will have 
higher wages, however, hiring will become costlier and will therefore lead to an increase in 
unemployment. Secondly, both primary and secondary sectors will have lower employment 
levels. Thirdly, it will also force labour to become more productive to cover the higher costs 
which could mean secondary sector employment moving to the primary sector (Jones, 1987) 
because with higher wages, firms would prefer hiring more skilled, more productive workers, 
hence increasing employment in the primary sector. 
                                                 
14 The study was not based on a specific country 
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Although the minimum wage policy is similar to the Nitaqat policy, the literature gives 
ambiguous results to the minimum wage effect on labour markets. Rebitzer and Taylor 
(1995) suggests that every labour market is different, and these differences do affect the 
impact of such policies, therefore they recommend conducting empirical analysis targeted at 
the specifics of a certain labour market is the best approach. 
With the suggestion of recent literature that minimum wage policy has minimal evident 
impact on reduction in employment levels, and with the higher cost on firms, Forth and 
O'Mahony (2003) suggest that firms may have reacted by increasing their labour productivity 
levels to maintain profits after the added costs. Different attempts were made to raise 
productivity levels, such as greater use of new technology, increased on-the-job training, or 
changes made to the work organization. Forth and O’Mahony (2003) find that although some 
low-pay sectors have had accelerated labour productivity, this was not evident at the 
aggregate level.  
The literature suggests that minimum wage increases result in higher productivity both at the 
firm level and at the macro level. At the firm level, higher productivity must be achieved to 
stay in the market. Hence, firms might resort to more capital-intensive production 
technologies in order to reduce labour costs. They might also invest in training programs to 
improve existing employees’ productivity levels. According to Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene 
(2015), firms raise their productivity by increasing their TFP rather than reducing 
employment levels or substituting labour with capital. Croucher and Rizov (2012) found 
increased labour productivity in the UK’s low-pay industries as a consequence of the 
minimum wage introduction. This is even stronger in larger firms. Moreover, at the macro 
level, the introduction of the minimum wage leads to lower productive firms exiting the 
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market, therefore raising overall economic efficiency (Mayneris et al., 2014).  
To conclude, this chapter has analysed several strands of the relevant literature on issues of 
labour market, such as labour demand theory, dual labour market and migration. It has also 
studied the literature of policies that impose added costs on firms such as affirmative action 
and minimum wage, and their impacts on employment and productivity. The following 
chapter will analyse the Nitaqat policy more in depth.  
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 Nitaqat 
4.1       Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of the Nitaqat policy on various firm level outcomes in the 
private sector of Saudi Arabia. Using a unique administrative dataset developed by the Saudi 
Arabian Ministry of Labor (MOL), this chapter builds on the work by Peck (2017) to study 
the impact of the policy between 2012 and 2015, in terms of its effect on the Saudization rate, 
the firm exit rate, and employment levels for nationals and non-nationals, as well as on total 
employment and female employment.  
4.2       The Dataset 
This chapter uses the Nitaqat panel dataset that covers the entire Saudi private sector at the 
firm level since the start of the program in June 2011 until October 2015. The data covers all 
the population affected by the Nitaqat policy consisting of over 1,760,000 firms. The firm-
level data were initially collected using weekly observations, but these were then aggregated 
to the quarterly level in order to make the dataset more manageable. The data were further 
aggregated to annual intervals. The variables in the dataset are firm size, the industry and the 
region of the individual firm, and compliance colour. Furthermore, each firm had additional 
data on number of employees based on nationality and gender.  
The panel element of the data provides the opportunity to study the effect of the Nitaqat 
program at the individual firm level, taking into account all the firms that must comply with 
Chapter 4 Nitaqat  78 
it. Having panel data provides the opportunity to control for variations across firms and time 
(Arellano, 2003) . The ability to test the implications on a large number of data points (over 
24 million observations) increases the degrees of freedom and reduces collinearity between 
independent variables, which improves the efficiency of any regression estimates (Hurlin, 
2004). 
Moving on to definitions of the variables; the most important variable is the colour 
assignment variable based on the firm’s Saudization rate. There are five colours in the 
dataset; White, Red, Yellow, Green, and Platinum. The White firms are the share of firms that 
are excluded from the policy. The rest of the colours follow a rating system with the Red 
firms being the least compliant, the Yellow firms having a better compliance than Red but 
still below the quota, Green being the minimum compliance requirement by the policy, and 
Platinum having the highest Saudization rate. The Green quota is the quota we use, since it is 
the dividing quota between compliant and non-compliant firms. Although the quotas were not 
included in the Nitaqat dataset, we were able to find them in the Nitaqat policy manual15 
(MOL, 2015b). The quotas were then added to the dataset. In 2014, the Nitaqat policy was 
nuanced by further disaggregating the Green category into low, medium, and high Green 
firms. However, in order to maintain consistent data over time, this disaggregation is not 
exploited in this chapter.  
The firm size variable has five classifications based on number of employees; micro, small, 
medium, large and giant. The micro-sized firm have fewer than 10 employees, the small firm 
size definition consists of firms with between 10 and 49 employees, whereas medium firms 
                                                 
15 Table included in Chapter 2, Appendix 2.A, Table 2.2. 
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contain between 50 and 499 employees. Large firms have 500 to 2,999 employees and giant 
firms have 3,000 employees or more. The micro sized category has existed in the dataset 
since 2011, however, these firms were not included in the policy treatment until 2014. 
Furthermore, there were 50 different industry classifications covering the entire private 
sector.  
The Saudization quota requirement was based on a matrix of these three variables; industry 
by size by colour16. This means that within the same industry, the requirement quota changes 
by size of the firm. For example, in the manufacturing industry, the minimum quota 
requirement for small firms is an 8% Saudization rate, while giant firms in the manufacturing 
industry have a 20% Saudization rate quota. Additionally, the quota requirement also changes 
based on industries, for example the communication industry has a 20% quota for small 
firms, while the construction industry has only a 5% quota for the same size small firm 
category. The matrix was crucial for the policy to work, as it allows for industry and size 
variability which makes the quotas more attainable across the private sector. Leonard (1985) 
has suggested that controlling for size, industry and region is important when analysisng 
policies such as affirmative action. When looking at the policy in Saudi Arabia, the old 
Saudization policies did not consider these dimensions. However, the Nitaqat policy did 
control for size and industry. A regional control was not necessary in Saudi Arabia as the 
system is centralised; therefore, regional control is already included in the policy.  
The Saudi variable reports the number of Saudis in each firm, whilst the foreigner variable 
indicates the number of foreigners in each firm. The dataset also collects information on the 
                                                 
16 Table included in Chapter 2, Appendix 2.A, Table 2.2. 
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number of males and females in each firm. Part of the analysis performed in this chapter used 
the exit and entry rates of firms in each year. This was achieved by dividing the dataset into 
five sub-samples for each year. The current year was then merged with the previous year, and 
the exit and entrance variables were then generated.  
Before the implementation of the Nitaqat policy in 2011, the Saudi MOL did not hold such 
detailed data on firms or employment as the data was scattered between different 
governmental organisations. During the implementation of Nitaqat, the collection of data 
began on June 11th, 2011. The MOL resorted to the GOSI to gather information on Saudi 
employees, as every worker is required to register with them. Data of foreign labour was 
obtained from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The Saudi MOL collected detailed firm 
level data in order to track each individual firm’s performance and study the impact of the 
policy on the labour market. This has provided a good measurement tool to study Nitaqat as 
well as other policies and changes occurring in the labour market. Peck (2017) was the first to 
use the newly developed Nitaqat dataset on firms. The period of analysis studied by Peck 
(2017) ends in October 2012. Consequently, the data used in this chapter between November 
of 2012 and October of 2015 has not been analysed before, as well as the use of female data. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
This chapter starts with some descriptive statistics showing the different trends in the 
obtained dataset, before moving on to econometric analysis.  
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Table 4.1: Share of Firm movement between colours or exit across time* 
Starting colour                                                              Ending Colour 
 Red Yellow      Green Platinum Exited Total 
2011 2012 
White - - - - - - 
Red 13.11 5.92 22.87 0.85 30.10 72.84 
Yellow 0.63 1.10 5.17 0.13 5.54 12.57 
Green 0.61 0.94 7.55 0.55 3.79 13.44 
Platinum 0.02 0.03 0.34 0.50 0.27 1.15 
Total 14.37 7.99 35.92 2.02 39.69 100.00 
2012 2013 
White - - - - - - 
Red 2.33 1.60 13.68 0.58 28.98 47.16 
Yellow 0.63 0.73 5.81 0.16 8.91 16.25 
Green 0.69 0.94 18.82 1.16 12.24 33.85 
Platinum 0.03 0.06 1.27 0.90 0.49 2.75 
Total 3.67 3.32 39.58 2.80 50.63 100.00 
2013 2014 
White 30.61 0.00 49.51 0.00 8.79 88.91 
Red 0.19 0.06 0.42 0.03 2.03 2.73 
Yellow 0.04 0.07 0.51 0.02 0.85 1.49 
Green 0.13 0.21 3.24 0.19 2.51 6.28 
Platinum 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.13 0.23 0.60 
Total 30.99 0.34 53.90 0.36 14.40 100.00 
2014 2015 
White 15.92 0.00 65.71 0.00 6.52 88.16 
Red 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.47 0.85 
Yellow 0.01 0.04 0.48 0.02 0.39 0.94 
Green 0.04 0.18 6.43 0.38 2.47 9.52 
Platinum 0.00 0.01 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.53 
Total 16.09 0.27 73.15 0.45 10.03 100.00 
*The actual number of firms on which this table is based are included in Appendix 4.A, Table 4.8. 
Table 4.1 describes the movement of firms across colours and time. The columns represent 
the colours of the firms at the end of the previous year (t-1), while the rows represent the 
percentage of firms that moved by the end of the year. The White category contains micro 
sized firms with fewer than 10 employees. This category was excluded from the table in 2012 
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and 2013 as they were exempt from the policy at the time. They were then added in 2014 and 
2015. As explained in Chapter 2, Red and Yellow firms are the target of the Nitaqat policy 
since they represent lower Saudization rates that do not meet the minimum quota. Both Red 
and Yellow firms face sanctions if they stay in their categories and will be forced to either 
upgrade to the Green colour or to exit the market eventually. 
Table 4.1 further shows that in 2012 almost 23% of firms moved from Red to Green during 
the first year. Around 6% upgraded to the Yellow category, whilst 13% remained in the Red 
category and faced the sanctions of Nitaqat. The `Exited’ column indicates the percentage of 
firms that exited the market based on their initial colour. This shows that 30% of exiting 
firms were in the Red category. In 2012 the Red firms made up around 73% of total firms 
under the Nitaqat policy. However, Nitaqat also targeted Yellow firms and they formed 
almost 13% of total firms in 2012. The table shows that 5.5% of firms that were in the 
Yellow category had to exit the market in 2012. Yellow and Red firms had an exit rate of 
44% and 41%, respectively. When we look at the movement of Yellow firms in 2012, around 
5% were able to upgrade to the Green category while 1% remained in the Yellow band. The 
Green group showed the highest increase of firms at around 36%. This is not surprising given 
the goal of the policy was to move firms to at least the Green colour. The table shows high 
compliance rates for firms since firms from both colours tend to upgrade. Moreover, an exit 
rate of 40% suggests that the sanctions may have been too harsh and that firms could not 
survive if they did not comply. 
In the second year of the policy, 2013, the pattern looks very similar. It is interesting to see 
that by the end of the year the Red and Yellow groups contain only 3% of total firms each. 
This reflects how effective and fast this policy was in forcing the non-compliant firms into 
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the minimum requirement. The share of total firms in the minimum requirement group 
(Green) continued to rise reaching around 40% in 2013. Also interesting, the exit rate of the 
Green band also increased by around 8% when compared to the previous year (12.24% 
compared to 3.79%). This could suggest that firms which upgraded to Green status in the first 
year, struggled to meet the extra costs in terms of higher wages for Saudis, even though they 
were not facing sanctions. This could indicate that firms could not endure the higher costs 
indefinitely. The exit rate increased by 10% in 2013 to reach almost 51% of total firms, 
suggesting that the majority of firms exited the market. The trends indicate that there are 
major changes in the private sector, and exit rates are at alarmingly high rates. Further 
econometric analysis is required to fully attribute these trends to the Nitaqat policy. 
In 2014, the Nitaqat policy started the implementation of stage three of the program17 by 
adding the micro sized firms to the treatment group. The number of firms adhering to the 
policy grew almost seven-fold, from around 260,000 firms in 2012, to over 1.7 million in 
2014. The coverage incorporates the entire private sector at this point. The policy has allowed 
the Saudi business owners of micro sized firms to register as Saudi employees to help achieve 
the quota, provided that they are not registered already as an employee in another firm. This 
is important as shown in Table (4.1), since in 2014 over 30% of firms were added to the Red 
category, which may indicate that the owner of the firm was registered as an employee 
somewhere else and could not be upgraded to Green status. Table 4.1 also shows that almost 
50% of firms were compliant and moved to the Green category. Around 9% of firms that 
exited were from the White category, whilst total exits decreased significantly from 51% in 
2013 to 14% in 2014. These two combined observations suggest that firms were adjusting to 
                                                 
17 Discussed in Chapter 2 
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the policy. By 2014, 54% of all firms were in the Green group. 
Finally, in 2015, 15% of firms that were in the White category had moved to the Green 
category, indicating that 73% of private sector firms were Green in 2013. The exit rates 
declined to 10%, the lowest since the start of the policy. The raw data suggest that the Nitaqat 
policy had a high impact on the composition of the labour market, but further econometric 
analysis is needed to rule out any other potential drivers. 
One of the main aims of the Nitaqat policy is to increase the Saudization rate in the private 
sector. Hence, it is important to look at the trend of Saudi employment growth and 
Saudization in the dataset in order to evaluate the success of the policy.  
Table 4.2: Number of Saudi employees and percentage growth. 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of Saudis 
339,359 784,591 945,310 1,038,856 1,142,170 
Growth of Saudis  131.20 20.48 9.90 9.94 
Table 4.2 provides the number of Saudi employees and the annual percentage growth 
between 2011 and 2015. The largest increase in Saudi employment occurred in the first year, 
with 131.20% growth in the number of Saudi employees. In the following year, the growth 
was much lower at 20.50% and it declined further (although remaining positive) reaching less 
than half the value in 2014 and 2015. However, the total growth across the whole 4-year 
period was 236.57%, which is almost twice the size of that which occurred in the first year. 
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of Saudis to Total Employment per Quarter 
Figure 4.1 denotes the growth in Saudization per quarter, where Saudization is the proportion 
of total employment that are Saudi nationals. This shows a positive growth trend over each 
quarter between the second quarter of 2011 and the final quarter of 2015. At the start of the 
program in 2011, Saudis comprised of only 9.69% of total private sector employment. After 
16 months of Nitaqat implementation, the growth of Saudi employment seemed to stop. By 
the fourth quarter of 2012 Saudization had reached 19%. After 2012, there was some growth 
but this was at a decreasing rate. There was 20% Saudi employment in the private sector in 
2015. Figure 4.1 suggests that the growth of Saudi employment happened within the first 12 
to 16 months of the policy implementation, with little growth after that. However, further 
investigation is needed to determine whether the program was the cause of these changes or 
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 Strategic Downsizing 
 
Figure 4.2. Relationship of number of firms and size July 2011 and October 2012 
 
Figure 4.3. Relationship of number of firms and size July 2011 and October 2015 
Peck (2017) found that there was a trend of strategic downsizing amongst firms to either less 
than ten employees or smaller size categories to adhere to lower quota requirements. Figures 
4.2 and 4.3 plot the size and number of firms in the small-sized category which is between 10 
to 49 employees represented by the two red vertical lines. One way in which firms could 
minimise the impact of Nitaqat was by either reducing their size to below the ten-employee 
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cut-off in order to become exempt from the Nitaqat policy, or to downsize to the lower size 
category where they are held at a lower quota requirement. It appears that firm size did not 
change radically from the original pattern in 2011. Figure 4.5 suggests that firms in October 
2015 decreased in size, on average. The dotted line suggests an increase in small-sized firms. 
The gap between the two lines is increasing indicating growth in the number of firms that are 
downsizing to the smaller size category in order to achieve a smaller quota requirement. 
 Exit rates by Firm Size and Colour 
 
Figure 4.4: Exit rates by firm size and colour 
2012 
 
Figure 4.5. Exit rates by firm size and colour 
2015 
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 contain the exit rates for firm size by colour in 2012 and 2015. 
There is a clear negative relationship between exit rates and firm size, since the exit rate is 
higher in smaller-size firms than it is with larger firms, in both 2012 and 2015. Comparing 
the two figures also shows an increase in the exit rates in 2015 compared to 2012, with 
Yellow and Red, firms (represented by the orange dots) exhibiting higher exit rates than the 
Green ones. This suggests a larger impact of the policy on the treated firms. 
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4.3       Methodology 
The main aim of this section is to determine the causal effect of Nitaqat on employment and 
firms. The methodology used draws upon Peck’s (2017) difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology. However, due to differences in the two datasets, the results presented here, 
which use the same time period as Peck (2017), are close but not exactly the same. Peck 
(2017) uses data collected from the MOL and GOSI, which is then aggregated into one 
dataset. The dataset used for this chapter is a more comprehensive and aggregated dataset 
from the MOL alone.  
Peck (2017) uses a DID approach to compare the relative transformation of Red, Yellow and 
Green firms within the same industry and size. This section builds on Peck (2017) by 
studying the impact of Nitaqat five years after its implementation using the DID 
methodology18.  
DID is frequently used for evaluating natural experiments such as the effect of a policy 
introduction. The approach usually uses observations from before and- after the 
implementation of the policy. However, due to a lack of data before the policy 
implementation, we will use the base year ‘2011’. This is when the data was first collected 
although the policy had not been implemented. This will be compared with the ‘after’ period. 
This is considered to be the first difference. The second difference compares the treated 
group with an untreated group. These two differences are then compared to provide DID 
                                                 
18 Peck (2017) also used a “Regression Kink Design” approach to estimate the impact of the program on 
employment, the value of the firm, its size and exit rate. We will not be using this approach in this study as it 
only measures a one-off impact effect and this thesis focusses on changes over time. 
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(Bertrand et al., 2004). The DID approach is based on an OLS regression framework. The 
DID also requires that there are parallel trends in the treatment and control groups. This 
means that, if the treated variable was never treated, it will follow a parallel trend with the 
control group. In this particular application the treatment and control group were the same 
before the policy since the allocations of firms into colour groups only appeared with the 
introduction of the policy. This is shown in Figure 4.6 below. 
 















Pre Pre Policy Introduction Post
Red Yellow Green
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The Difference-in-differences model presented by Peck (2017) uses the following 
specification: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠 =  𝑦1𝐷(𝑅𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑗𝑠 +  𝑦2𝐷(𝑌𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤)𝑖𝑗𝑠 +  𝛼𝑗𝑠 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠   4-1) 
Where: 
𝑖 = Individual firm 
j = Individual Industry 
𝑠 = Size category 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠= The change in outcome variables; Saudization; employment; and exit 
rate, per individual firm per industry per size. 
𝐷(𝑅𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑗𝑠= Dummy of the first treatment group; Red firms, per individual firm per 
industry per size, measured against the Green firms as the control 
group. 
𝐷(𝑌𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤)𝑖𝑗𝑠 = Dummy of the second treatment group; Yellow firms, per individual 
firm per industry per size, measured against the Green firms as the 
control group. 
However, this chapter will use the Difference-in-Differences model (4-2) that is presented by 
Angrist and Pischke (2008), Specification (4-2) compares the treated firms in the Red and 
Yellow categories to all firms in the Green colour band, conditional on industry and firm size 
using the following equation: 
∆𝛶𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑠 +  𝛾𝑇𝐶𝑗𝑠 + 𝜆𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝐶𝑗𝑠. 𝑑𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  4-2) 
Where: 
∆𝛶𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = the change in outcome variable per individual firm, industry and size at 
time t. 
𝛾𝑇𝐶𝑗𝑠= the treatment colour group ‘Red’ and ‘Yellow’ measured against the 
control group ‘Green’, i.e. 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑑 − 𝛾𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛, 𝛾𝑌𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝛾𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛. 
𝜆𝑑𝑡 = the time trend, measuring the after period ‘t’ representing the years 
2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, against the before, in this case it is constant 
at the 2011 base year, i.e. 𝜆11 −  𝜆12,..,  𝜆11 − 𝜆15. 
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(𝑇𝐶𝑗𝑠. 𝑑𝑡) = the interaction variable where the previous two variables are subtracted 
(𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑑 − 𝛾𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛) – (𝜆11 −  𝜆12) to produce the difference-in-differences 
results. 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 =  the error term. 
It is important to note that the model is measured against the Green firms as the control 
group. 
Furthermore, eight outcome variables (∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠) will be used in this section of this chapter; 
Saudization rate, Saudi Percentage, Saudi Employee, Foreign Percentage, Foreign 
Employee, Total Employee Percentage, Total Employees, and Exit Rate. The Saudization is 
defined as the growth percentage of Saudis in relation to total employment in an individual 
firm. It is the main target of the policy. Saudi Percentage is the growth of the Saudi employee 
percentage in a given firm. Saudi Employee is the growth of the actual number of Saudi 
employees in a firm. Foreign Percentage is the growth of the foreign employee percentage in 
a given firm. Foreign Employee is the growth of the actual number of foreign employees in a 
firm. Total Employee Percentage is the growth of the total employee percentage in a given 
firm. Total Employees is the growth of the actual number of total employees in a firm. And 
lastly, the Exit Rate is the percentage growth of firms exiting the labour market.  
Peck (2017) studies the program until 2012. The aim of this chapter therefore, is to 
investigate the longer-term effects by including data up to 2015. This will allow us to 
examine the impact of the policy on a range of economic outcomes four years after its 
implementation, and determine whether the effect was a one-time shock? Or has it had a 
lasting impact over time?   
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4.4       Results and Analysis 
This section will start by first presenting the results of the specifications discussed in the 
methodology before conducting several robustness checks to verify the results. Lastly, it will 
attempt to analyse the impact of Nitaqat on female employment in Saudi Arabia.  
Table 4.3 uses the DID approach using equation 4-2 with base year of 2011. Results are 
presented below. 
Table 4.3: DID results using base year 2011, equation 4-2) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudization     
D(Red) 
8.27*** 10.24*** 10.16*** 10.43*** 
(0.56) (0.857) (0.837) (0.79) 
D(Yellow) 
4.85*** 5.89*** 5.67*** 5.93*** 
(0.42) (0.478) (0.485) (0.50) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Saudi Employees     
D(Red) 
1.10** 0.53 0.26 0.17 
(0.378) (0.35) (0.394) (0.527) 
D(Yellow) 
0.96** 0.50 0.33 0.63 
(0.312) (0.306) (0.349) (0.514) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Foreign Percentage 
    
D(Red) 
-15.34** -38.74*** -42.79*** -44.59*** 
(0.045) (0.070) (0.0612) (0.059) 
D(Yellow) 
-12.76** -35.53*** -42.06*** -44.17*** 
(0.04) (0.106) (0.096) (0.102) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Foreign Employees     
D(Red) 
-5.10*** -13.40** -16.16** -18.00* 
(1.4) (4.4) (5.812) (7.07) 
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D(Yellow) 
-2.77*** -8.85*** -11.51** -9.92* 
(0.71) (2.57) (4.01) (3.77) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Total Employment 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) 
-14.51*** -38.27*** -41.22*** -42.54*** 
(0.034) (0.064) (0.0635) (0.066) 
D(Yellow) 
-9.13* -33.21** -33.88*** -34.38* 
(0.039) (0.105) (0.99) (0.108) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Total Employees     
D(Red) 
-4.00*** -12.86** -16.13** -17.83** 
(1.21) (4.463) (6.01) (7.256) 
D(Yellow) 
-1.82** -8.34*** -11.47*** -9.29** 
(0.61) (2.51) (4.12) (3.792) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Exit Rate     
D(Red) 
10.10*** 17.24*** 15.94*** 14.95*** 
(1.052) (1.40) (1.312) (1.25) 
D(Yellow) 
14.71*** 17.10*** 16.19*** 14.63*** 
(1.42) (1.78) (1.68) (1.60) 
N 257,182 257,182 257,182 257,182 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis  
Data Source: Nitaqat Dataset, MOL 
*It is important to note that the coefficients presented in table 4.3 represent the difference-in-differences result 
of the interaction term in equation 4-2. Moreover, the coefficients of the treatment groups, Red and Yellow, are 
relative to changes in the control group, the Greens. 
Saudization 
The first outcome variable analysed is the Saudization rate, which is the share of Saudis to 
the total employment per firm. This refers to equation 4-2 and the results are presented in the 
first panel of Table 4.3. The coefficients measure the change in Saudization since the 
beginning of the program. All the results are highly significant at the 99% level. In 2012, 
there was an increase of 8.27% in Saudization rates as a consequence of the policy for Red 
firms. The coefficient continues to rise reaching over 10% for the following three years. In 
general, the change is positive and converging to a constant level for both the Red and 
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Yellow firms.  
The policy had a lower impact on the Saudization levels of Yellow firms. The change was 
4.85% in the first year, rising by one percentage point in 2013. It then ranges from 5% to 6%. 
The Saudization levels seem to experience a shock in the first year, but then they remain 
fairly constant in later years. This could suggest that the policy needs to be amended if it is to 
achieve any longer-term impact, as seen in 2013, where the different levels of Green were 
introduced to raise the quota level higher.        
Saudis 
The results for equation 4-2, when Yijst captures Saudi employment, are presented in the 
second panel of Table 4.3. For Red firms, the effect of the policy on Saudi employees was 
statistically significant at the 95% level in the first year of application since the table shows a 
1.10 increase in Saudi employees per firm. The table also shows a positive increase of around 
one Saudi employee for Yellow firms. However, in later years, the effects of the policy are 
not statistically significant. This suggests that the policy provided an instant shock whereby it 
forced firms to employ Saudis right away. However, the policy had less impact on Saudi 
employment as time went on. This is probably due to the adjustment of the firms to the policy 
as suggested by Peck (2017) and confirmed earlier in this chapter (Figure 4.3). Firms appear 
to be shrinking in size by laying-off foreign workers to achieve the higher quotas. This is also 
supported by the summary statistics of the Saudi variable discussed earlier (Table 4.1), where 
it showed the growth in Saudi employment was around 131% in 2012, yet it has dropped 
sharply in the following years reaching 20% in 2013, and 9% in 2014 and 2015. This 
provides further evidence that the policy was highly effective in 2012, yet with time, the 
effect seems to decline. 
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Foreigners 
a.      Foreigners’ Percentage Change  
The results for equation 4-2, when Yijst captures the change in foreign (non-Saudi) employees 
are presented in the third panel of Table 4.3. The coefficients quantify the change in the 
foreign (non-Saudi) employee percentage in the Saudi labour market after the policy 
implementation. With foreigners forming around 90% of the private sector prior to 2011, the 
impact was highly significant. Using the base year of 2011, the initial impact was a decrease 
of 15.34% in foreign employees in the Red firms in the first year. The policy continues to 
affect the change in foreign (non-Saudi) employees and the coefficients jump to more than 
double in 2013 with -38.74% and even -44.59% in 2015.  As for the Yellow firms, the impact 
follows a similar trend starting with a 12.76% decrease in foreign employment in 2012. The 
coefficients continue to rise reaching a fall of 44.17% in foreign employment in 2015. It is 
the largest effect of all the outcome variables studied.  
b.      Foreigners’ Employees Change 
The fourth panel of Table 4.3 presents the results for equation 4-2, when Yijst captures the 
employee change of foreigners in the economy. The results show huge effects for the policy. 
For Red firms, the fall is around 5 employees fewer in 2012 than in 2011. This decrease 
continues and reaches 13 employees fewer, before continuing to decline to 18 employees 
fewer, relative to 2011. The results for Red firms seem to be highly significant in the first 
year but then the significance level decreases with time. Standard errors also increase over 
time with less efficiency in the estimates. The coefficients for the Yellow firms follow a 
similar pattern. However, in 2015, the change declines by around 10 employees compared to 
the previous year of 11 foreign employees fewer per Yellow firm. This suggests that the 
impact of the policy declines over time for Yellow firms.  
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Total Employment 
The fifth and sixth panels of Table 4.3 present the results for equation 4-2, when Yijst 
measures total employment in terms of percentage as well as levels. Total employment 
consists of both Saudis and foreigners. Since 90% of Saudi employment in the private sector 
is foreign, the trends are similar to those observed in the panels three and four. The results 
indicate a significant decline in employment levels from -14.5% in 2012 to -42.5% in 2015. 
As the Nitaqat policy imposes wage costs on private sector firms it can be thought of as 
having a similar effect as the imposition of a minimum wage.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
literature on minimum wage effect is inconclusive. Classical labour demand theory suggests 
that a higher cost, such as an imposition of minimum wage, results in reduced employment 
levels (Brown et al., 1982; Machin, 2002). Whilst more recent studies such as (Card and 
Krueger, 1994; Neumark andWascher, 2007; Lemos, 2009) find no evidence of a negative 
employment effect for minimum wages. The results of this chapter support the classical 
labour demand theory suggesting a decline in employment levels, however, in this case the 
decrease in employment levels is significantly higher than those observed in the literature.  
Exit Rates 
The final panel in Table 4.3 presents the results for equation 4-2, when Yijst measures the 
percentage of firms exiting the market. In the first instance, we use 2011 as the base year and 
measure the impact relative to the following years.  
In 2012, one year after the policy was introduced, there is a 10.10% increase in Red firms 
exiting the market. This is statistically significant at the 99% level. Hence, the results suggest 
the policy had a major impact on firms in the Red category. The exit rate continues to rise, 
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reaching its highest level of 17.24% in 2013. It then starts to decrease slightly in following 
years to reach 14.95% in 2015.  
The coefficients for Yellow firms are generally larger.  In 2012, the policy led to a 14.71% 
increase in exit rate of Yellow firms relative to a 1% increase in the exit rate of Green band 
firms. The policy is also highly significant for Yellow firms. The exit rate of yellow firms 
continued to increase reaching 17.10% in 2013 which is the maximum level. It then starts to 
decline in the next two years reaching 14.63% in 2015. This implies that both Red and 
Yellow firms were affected by the policy, but also that the effect was temporary. This might 
suggest that firms were able to adjust to better colour ratings, as well as gaining the ability to 
adjust to the policy with time which has decreased the exit rate. 
Overall Trend: Difference-in-Differences with base year 2011 
Although Saudization is increased over time, the results suggest that this is due to the 
significant decline in foreign employment rather than the rise of Saudi employment. This is 
supported by the insignificant effect of the policy on Saudi employment after 2012. Foreign 
employment in the private sector formed 90% of total employment in 2011, which was 
reduced as a result of the policy falling to 81% in 2015. This is supported by the findings on 
reduction of total employment; where it followed a parallel trend with foreign employment.  
 Robustness Check: Change in Treatment Groups 
The main assumption of DID is the parallel trend of the treated and control groups prior to 
the policy introduction. The fact that treated and control were one variable before the policy 
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implementation supports this assumption (Figure 4.6). 
Furthermore, to check the robustness of our methodology, we conducted a placebo DID 
analysis where Green firms well above the cut-off quota were added to the treatment group in 
the second model to allow for a fair analysis of the program; leaving Green firms with five or 
less Saudi employees above the cut-off as the control group. Therefore, Green firms with 
more than five Saudi employees above the cut-off were added in the second specification as a 
treatment group. 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠 =  𝛼𝑗𝑠
′ + 𝛾1′  𝐷(𝑅𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑗𝑠 +  𝛾2′   𝐷(𝑌𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤)𝑖𝑗𝑠 +  𝛾3′   𝐷(𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 > 5)𝑖𝑗𝑠 +   𝜖𝑗𝑠
′         4-3 
Again Yijs is the range of outcome variables summarised in the methodology section by firm 
𝑖, industry, 𝑗, and size, 𝑠. Each outcome variable is presented in Table 4.4 showing how the 
results change over time by estimating separate regressions each year and by colour 
separately. All regressions include fixed effects of industries by size. The results use 2011 as 
the base, which is the year that the Nitaqat program started.  
Table 4.4: DID results using base year 2011, equation 4-3 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudization     
D(Red) 8.16*** 10.07*** 10.01*** 10.26*** 
(0.54) (0.836) (0.819) (0.77) 
D(Yellow) 4.71*** 5.67 *** 5.46*** 5.57 *** 
(0.41) (0.455) (0.474) (0.49) 
D(Green>5) -3.12*** -3.91*** -3.51** -3.63** 
(0.77) (0.988) (1.087) (1.04) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Saudi Percentage     
D(Red) 75.67** 85.69** 80.56* 95.94** 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.32) (0.35) 
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D(Yellow) 21.38* 22.82* 24.55 33.42* 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
D(Green>5) -73.58*** -96.10*** -98.77** -108.28*** 
(0.15) (0.26) (0.32) (0.30) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Saudi Employees     
D(Red) 0.80** 0.567* 0.229* 0.26 
(0.253) (0.325) (0.368) (0.502) 
D(Yellow) 0.58** 0.543 0.296 0.75 
(0.194) (0.387) (0.499) (0.604) 
D(Green>5) -8.34* 0.746 4.543 1.86 
(3.44) (2.879) (3.696) (3.57) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Foreign Percentage     
D(Red) -15.50** -39.03*** -41.44*** -42.11*** 
(0.045) (0.070) (0.064) (0.067) 
D(Yellow) -12.96** -35.90*** -40.33*** -41.00*** 
(0.041) (0.106) (0.101) (0.107) 
D(Green>5) -3.88 -6.14 28.03 49.32 
(0.035) (0.086) (0.269) (0.571) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Foreign Employees     
D(Red) -4.12*** -10.09** -11.66* -12.19* 
(1.12) (3.349) (4.481) (5.52) 
D(Yellow) -1.57 -4.65 -5.68 -2.41 
(0.96) (3.286) (4.729) (5.67) 
D(Green>5) -26.87* 74.44* 100.7* 123.90* 
(12.63) (38.07) (49.1) (64.67) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Total Employment 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) -15.54*** -41.56*** -45.46*** -47.07*** 
(0.034) (0.073) (0.086) (0.087) 
D(Yellow) -10.42* -37.41*** -39.38*** -40.25*** 
(0.041) (0.111) (0.114) (0.116) 
D(Green>5) -24.30*** -68.81 -87.82 -90.01 
(0.069) (0.422) (0.686) (0.617) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Total Employees     
D(Red) -3.33** -9.52** -11.43** -11.92** 
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(1.04) (3.43) (4.676) (5.82) 
D(Yellow) -0.99 -4.11 -5.386 -1.66 
(0.97) (3.49) (5.05) (6.06) 
D(Green>5) 18.54 75.19* 105.24* 125.76 
(11.27) (39.17) (50.78) (65.37) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Exit Rate     
D(Red) 9.92*** 16.95*** 15.718*** 14.65*** 
(1.084) (1.48) (1.379) (1.33) 
D(Yellow) 14.49*** 16.76*** 15.93*** 14.28*** 
(1.48) (1.89) (1.773) (1.73) 
D(Green>5) -6.62** -10.43*** -7.91** -10.79*** 
(2.423) (2.83) (3.36) (2.79) 
N 257182 257182 257182 257182 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis  
Data Source: Nitaqat Dataset, MOL 
 
The results shown in Table 4.4 support the results presented in Table 4.4.1 since the overall 
trends observed are the same. They show a statistically significant positive relationship 
between the Nitaqat policy and Saudization rate, with a higher effect on exit rates, for both 
Red and Yellow firms.  
Moreover, the addition of the Green firms with more than five Saudi employees shows a 
trend opposite to expectations, since these firms are receiving benefits instead of sanctions. In 
these firms the number of foreign and total employment is rising demonstrating that the 
country was enjoying economic growth at the time of the policy and an increase in the 
demand for foreign labour. Exit rates were negatively affected by the policy for the Green 
band and this is further proof of how the policy is affecting Red and Yellow firms. 
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 Robustness Checks: Lagged OLS Regression 
In order to further test the validity of our results, one more specification was estimated, using 
equation 4-2 however changing the base year from 2011, to (t-1) instead. The aim here is to 
measure the effect of the policy on entrants and exiting firms, as well as the year-on-year 
change. 
Table 4.5: DID results using base year (t-1), equation 4-2 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudization     
D(Red) 8.27*** 10.44*** 8.93*** 9.25*** 
(0.56) (0.615) (0.401) (0.525) 
D(Yellow) 4.85*** 5.02*** 5.305*** 6.22*** 
(0.42) (0.336) (0.264) (0.346) 
N 154,616 85,244 90,955 133,027 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Saudi Percentage     
D(Red) 81.37** 14.95* -4.41 -14.63*** 
(0.26) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
D(Yellow) 29.05** 43.17*** -7.67 9.15** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) 
N 34,205 44,449 66,483 108,135 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Saudi Employees     
D(Red) 1.10** -0.17 -0.66* -0.40** 
(0.378) (0.23) (0.30) (0.11) 
D(Yellow) 0.96** 0.23 -0.65* -0.12 
(0.312) (0.56) (0.38) (0.14) 
N 154,616 85,244 90,955 133,027 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Foreign 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) -15.34** -29.62*** -29.84*** -14.29*** 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.054) (0.019) 
D(Yellow) -12.76** -37.47** -27.99*** -11.33** 
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(0.04) (0.125) (0.061) (0.037) 
N 126,726 77,898 82,804 124,233 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Foreign 
Employees 
    
D(Red) -5.10*** -14.19** -15.16** -5.51* 
(1.4) (4.53) (5.566) (2.24) 
D(Yellow) -2.77*** -15.46** -10.08* -3.37* 
(0.71) (4.51) (4.30) (1.40) 
N 154,616 85,244 90,955 133,027 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Employment 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) -14.51*** -28.19*** -30.97*** -18.42*** 
(0.034) (0.046) (0.053) (0.028) 
D(Yellow) -9.13* -32.32* -28.69*** 1.00 
(0.039) (0.129) (0.067) (0.151) 
N 128,339 78,772 83,921 125,827 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Employees     
D(Red) -4.00*** -14.37** -15.83** -5.904* 
(1.21) (4.71) (5.85) (2.32) 
D(Yellow) -1.82** -15.23** -10.73* -3.49* 
(0.61) (4.63) (4.62) (1.51) 
N 154,616 85,244 90955 133,027 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Exit Rate     
D(Red) 10.10*** 21.30*** 29.09*** 25.75*** 
(1.052) (2.04) (2.4) (4.08) 
D(Yellow) 14.71*** 16.91*** 15.09*** 12.88*** 
(1.42) (2.5) (1.75) (1.22) 
N 257,182 175,910 186,916 188,646 
Base Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis  
Data Source: Nitaqat Dataset, MOL 
 
As the previous year is used as the base category, the sample size for each sample after 2011 
falls over time as more firms leave the sample, either by exiting the market completely or 
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through upgrading their colour status. Moreover, the effect of the policy continues to increase 
over time for all of the outcome variables. This suggests that the policy has a lasting impact, 
as the trend is still highly significant and increasing in Saudization and exit rates, whilst 
reducing foreign employment and total employment. However, by 2015, the policy begins to 
have less of an effect. The results are still highly significant but with the inclusion of micro 
sized firms in 2015, the results were declining for most variables. 
Looking at different variables individually; the DID analysis of 2011 as the base year shows 
either a positive or a negative linear growth, except for the exit rate variable in 2015. This 
showed a fall. Other than that, all variables followed the same trend. The (t-1) model gives a 
clearer picture of the annual change. Most variables, except for Saudization, peaked in 2014, 
suggesting that the policy has continued to impact the market up until that year. In 2015, the 
figures decline to almost half the effect. This could be a result of several factors; firstly, in 
2014 the policy changed to include all micro firms (less than 10 employees). Hence, the 
results were only observable in 2015 because both (t-1) and (t) had the micro firms. Another 
possible factor is that after four years of the policy, as results have shown a constant effect of 
the program, new entrants as well as existing firms adjusted to the program. Therefore, the 
change was less in 2015. Furthermore, the economic recession occurred in the economy in 
2015. Since the implementation of the policy the economy was growing and so the private 
sector was able to accommodate the higher costs. However, with oil prices crashing in 2015, 
as well as the country going into conflict in Yemen, the government has stopped a majority of 
its public spending, shocking the economy with austerity measures leading to a recession. 
This could have diluted the effect of the Nitaqat policy. 
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Saudization 
The Saudization rate refers to the number of Saudis in the private sector. Equation 4-2 now 
measures the effect of the policy on Saudization in both the Red and Yellow firms in relation 
to the Green band in Table 4.5. Here, the Red and Yellow firms are the treated groups and the 
Green firms are the control. The results in Table 4.5 show that the policy is highly significant 
for Saudization with a 99% level of confidence. Red firms appear to be more affected by the 
policy than the Yellow group, with Saudization increasing by 8.27% in 2012 with a steady 
increase in the policy in 2013 with 10.44% reaching 8.93% and 9.25% for 2014 and 2015 
respectively. Hence, it is safe to say that in 2012, every 1% increase in Saudization for the 
Green firms there was an 8.27% increase for Red firms and 4.85% increase for Yellow firms. 
In 2015, a 1% increase in Saudization in Green firms is reflected in increases of 9.25% in 
Red firms and 6.22% in Yellow firms. Saudization has experienced a still and steady impact 
since the application of the program. The effect of the policy is positive and highly significant 
and maintained at a steady rate. 
Foreigners’ Percentage Change (t-1) 
The fourth panel in Table 4.5 refers to equation 4-2 when Yijst measures the foreign 
percentage change. In 2012, the impact of the policy suggests that foreign employment 
declined by 15.34% for Red firms. Then the effect almost doubled in 2013 and 2014 reaching 
nearly -30%. However, the coefficient in 2015 drops to half at -14.29%. This shows that the 
policy was mostly effective on foreign employment changes during the first four years after 
the implementation. During the fifth year, the decline seems to increase significantly, which 
could mean that the economy was not able to maintain pace with the policy by laying off 
their foreign workers.  
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Looking at the Yellow firms, they exhibit a similar trend to that of the Red firms. However, 
2013 shows a much larger impact with the decline in growth reaching 37.47% less foreign 
employment. The figures are high, however, similar to the Red firms, the decline in foreign 
employment decreases since then reaching 11.33% less foreign employment. This could 
indicate that the policy had a declining impact over time.  
Exit Rates 
The final panel in Table 4.5 refers to equation 4-2 when Yijst measures the exit rate. With (t-1) 
as a base year, the results show that between 2012 and 2013 the change in exit rate doubled 
for Red firms, from 10.10% to 21.30%, with a significance level of 99%, indicating that for 
every 1% increase in the exit rate in the Green band there is a 21.30% increase in the exit rate 
for Red firms in 2013. Moreover, the coefficient on the exit rate continued to rise reaching its 
peak at 29.09% in Red firms in 2014. During 2015 however, the effect of the exit rate 
declined slightly, so that for every 1% increase in exit rate in the Green band there was a 
25.75% increase in the exit rate for Red firms. This could suggest that the private sector was 
finally adjusting to the Nitaqat policy even though the size of this effect can still be 
considered large. However the 3.34% decline in one year gives an optimistic outlook for the 
following years. The decline in 2015 also occurs for Yellow firms with a slightly lower 
decrease. Nonetheless, this is a positive sign that the private sector has begun to adjust to the 
policy.  
Looking at the policy effect on Yellow firms, in general it seems to have a lower impact than 
for Red firms. 2012 is the exception, since the initial impact was higher than that for the Red 
firms. Yet, the increase in the coefficient is far less than that for Red firms, reaching its peak 
in 2013 with a 16.91% exit rate in firms with a positive yet declining impact in the following 
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years reaching its lowest in 2015 at 12.88%. The effect on Red firms appears larger than it 
was for Yellow firms. This is probably due to the stricter sanctions on the firms in the Red 
category which explains the higher exit rates.  
Furthermore, when comparing the use of different base years in Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 on 
the change of exit rates, the results are higher in Red firms across years with a different trend. 
In the 2011 base year specification (Table 4.3) the growth in the exit rate peaks in 2013 at 
17.24% which is far less than the peak in Table 4.5 in 2014 at 29.09%. Moreover, the trend 
seems to be decreasing from 2013 onwards in the 2011 model whereas the exit rate continues 
to increase with high growth until 2015 where it slightly decreases. As for Yellow firms, the 
rates are closer in both tables (4.3 and 4.5) and the trend is similar.  
 Robustness Check with Change in Treatment and Lags  
As a final robustness check, we again used (t-1) as a base year for specification 4-3, where 
also included the third Green treatment group.  
Table 4.6: Robustness check using base year (t-1), equation  4-3. 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudization     
D(Red) 8.16*** 10.34*** 8.89*** 9.23*** 
(0.54) (0.61) (0.41) (0.525) 
D(Yellow) 4.71*** 4.87*** 5.24*** 6.17*** 
(0.41) (0.31) (0.275) (0.36) 
D(Green>5) -3.12*** -2.40** -1.13** -1.14*** 
(0.77) (0.69) (0.36) (0.25) 
N 154616 85244 90955 133027 
Saudi Percentage     
D(Red) 75.67** 11.12 -5.97* -15.87*** 
(0.25) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) 
D(Yellow) 21.38* 35.56*** -10.89* 5.98 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) 
D(Green>5) -73.58*** -62.95*** -41.96** -60.79* 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.27) 
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N 34205 44449 66483 108135 
Saudi Employees     
D(Red) 0.80** -0.18 -0.60* -0.45*** 
(0.253) (0.199) (0.26) (0.12) 
D(Yellow) 0.58** 0.23 -0.54 -0.22 
(0.194) (0.464) (0.34) (0.17) 
D(Green>5) -8.34* -0.05 2.01 -3.01* 
(3.44) (2.62) (1.42) (1.66) 
N 154616 85244 90955 133027 
Foreign 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) -15.50** -29.81*** -30.22*** -15.03*** 
(0.045) (0.41) (0.057) (0.21) 
D(Yellow) -12.96** -37.73** -28.63*** -12.94** 
(0.041) (0.18) (0.067) (0.042) 
D(Green>5) -3.88 -3.95 -10.68 -40.94 
(0.035) (0.27) (0.27) (0.305) 
N 126726 77898 82804 124233 
Foreign 
Employees 
    
D(Red) -4.12*** -12.00** -13.62** -5.43* 
(1.12) (3.41) (4.76) (2.17) 
D(Yellow) -1.57 -12.39*** -7.52* -3.198* 
(0.96) (3.13) (3.28) (1.27) 
D(Green>5) -26.87* 51.15*** 48.13*** 4.96 
(12.63) (16.48) (13.40) (7.27) 
N 154616 85244 90955 133027 
Total Employment 
Percentage 
    
D(Red) -15.54*** -32.05*** -33.57*** -23.92*** 
(0.034) (0.054) (0.064) (0.044) 
D(Yellow) -10.42* -37.83** -33.14*** -10.91 
(0.041) (0.121) (0.083) (0.10) 
D(Green>5) -24.30*** -83.49* -75.41 -301.36 
(0.069) (0.377) (0.466) (2.20) 
N 128339 78772 83921 125827 
Total Employees     
D(Red) -3.33** -12.18** -14.25** -5.87* 
(1.04) (3.56) (4.99) (2.26) 
D(Yellow) -0.99 -12.16*** -8.067* -3.42* 
(0.97) (3.23) (3.54) (1.41) 
D(Green>5) 18.54 51.11** 50.14** 1.95 
(11.27) (17.67) (14.20) (8.76) 
N 154616 85244 90955 133027 
Exit Rate     
D(Red) 9.92*** 21.41*** 29.08*** 25.76*** 
(1.084) (2.01) (2.4) (4.08) 
D(Yellow) 14.49*** 17.05*** 15.08*** 12.90*** 
(1.48) (2.48) (1.72) (1.19) 
D(Green>5) -6.62** 3.91* -0.31 0.82 
(2.423) (1.95) (2.19) (1.31) 
N 257182 175910 186916 188646 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis  
Data Source: Nitaqat Dataset, MOL 
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Overall, the results in Table 4.6. using specification 4-3 follow the same trend as results from 
specification 4.2 of (t-1) from Table 4.5. It is interesting to see that the coefficient on the 
percentage change of Saudi employees is also significant, suggesting a rise of 75% in the 
second panel of Table 4.6 and a rise of 80% in Saudi employment coefficients in Table 4.5 
for the Red firms in 2012.  The Yellow firms also increase coefficients by 21% in Table 4.6 
and 29% in Table 4.5 in comparison to a 1% rise in Saudi employment coefficients of Green 
firms in 2012. However, in the following year, 2013, the growth in the Saudi employment 
coefficient drops considerably to around 11% and 14% in Tables 4.6 and 4.5 respectively. 
This downward trend continues to reach negative growth in 2014 and 2015 for both Red and 
Yellow firms. This confirms our previous results for Saudi employment. Additionally, the 
coefficients for the Green firms follow an opposite trend for all of the variables studied 
confirming the fact that these firms are receiving benefits and behaving in the opposite 
direction to the Red and Yellow firms.    
Females 
Furthermore, since the dataset includes some gender data, the following section attempts to 
include the effect of the policy on female employment. The specification attempts to analyse 
the results on female employment in Red and Yellow firms against the Green firms. 
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The following table will use DID using base year (2011), equation 4-4. 
Table 4.7: Female Employment 
Females 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Red -0.922*** -1.13*** -1.24*** -1.17*** 
(0.13) (0.21) (0.24) (0.29) 
Yellow 0.496** 1.16*** 1.33*** 1.86*** 
(0.19) (0.29) (0.35) (0.42) 
N 154,616 96,704 82,763 74,559 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis  
Data Source: Nitaqat Dataset, MOL 
 
Table 4.7 represents the impact of the Nitaqat program on female employment over time, 
based on the year of 2011. It appears that the policy had a significant effect, as it is significant 
at the 99% level. Moreover, Yellow firms had a positive impact on females, with each two-
employee increase in the Green firms, around one employee increased in the Yellow firms in 
2012. There continued a steady increase in the following years reaching around two female 
employees per Yellow firm in 2015. Meanwhile, the Red firms present a negative trend. It is 
expected that the policy is associated with negative female employment in firms in the Red 
band, as they are mostly small in size, and fall far behind the quota. Therefore, they cannot 
accommodate the higher costs associated with recruiting female workers, such as separate 
working sections for males and females. It is also apparent that the numbers of Red and 
Yellow firms are decreasing with each passing year. This shows the great impact of the 
policy, since a decreasing number might indicate that firms have exited the market or have 
complied with the policy and were qualified to move up to the Green category. 
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4.5       Analysis of Results in Relation to the Literature 
Peck (2017) conducted the first analysis on the Nitaqat dataset that is used in this chapter. 
She studied the immediate shock of the program after its application. This thesis examines 
whether her results were just a one-time shock to the economy, or whether they had a 
consistent, lasting effect. We have studied the program from the start of its application in July 
2011 until October 2015 and therefore this section of the thesis makes a unique contribution 
to the existing literature. We have also analysed the impact of the Nitaqat program on 
females in the labour market, which has never been studied in the existing published 
literature. The results of this chapter confirm the results of Peck (2017) for 2012. However, 
our further analysis over time has shown that the policy did not continue to a significant 
impact on Saudi employment. The effects on Saudization, foreign and total employment, as 
well as exit rates all continued to be significant over time. With Saudization and exit rate 
coefficients both demonstrating a steady trend, while foreign and total employment 
coefficients continued to have a significantly declining trend over time. 
In terms of the effect of the policy, the Le Chatelier principle (Griffin,1992) is supported 
here. The principle suggests that imposing restrictions on the behaviour of an agent, in this 
case, the firms, has two main results: First, the agent cannot advance with these restrictions as 
supported by the higher exit rate of firms as a result of the Nitaqat policy. And, second, the 
aptitude to react to changes by the agent in its environment will be reduced. This is also seen 
in the remaining firms’ behaviour, with the higher cost on firms, their behaviour is restricted 
by having less elastic labour demand, resulting in declining employment levels. Moreover, 
the findings of this chapter also support the findings of Leonard (1984) and Holzer and 
Neumar (1999) as these authors suggest that policies, such as affirmative actions, resulted in 
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rising employment levels of women and minorities and declining employment levels in the 
majority group. In the case of Nitaqat, the Saudi employment share in the private sector has 
increased from around 10% in 2011 to almost 20% by 2015. However, foreign employment, 
as well as total employment have both declined immensely overall. Both studies (Leonard, 
1984; Holzer and Neumar, 1999) claim that the results are modest due to weak enforcement 
of affirmative action policy. However, with the strong enforcement of the Nitaqat policy, the 
effects are very severe on the private sector. 
Smith and Welch (1984) argue that the effect of the affirmative action policy on employment 
was greater in the earlier periods although there was weaker enforcement of the policy in the 
previous period. This is also consistent with results from this thesis, which show the highest 
impact of the Nitaqat policy was in the first year of its application. The difference here 
between the two policies is that affirmative action was enforced weakly and therefore the 
results took longer to appear whereas the Nitaqat policy had strict sanctions such that the 
results were apparent almost right away. 
Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen (2016) discuss the impact of increased labour costs on 
firms in France once they reach 50 workers in size. Such costs include creating a health and 
safety committee, appointing a union representative, reporting workers’ information to the 
Ministry of Labour, etc. Hence, it was found that most firms around the threshold would 
choose to lie just below it to avoid the extra cost. This has resulted in having low employment 
in more productive firms due to their choice to stay below the threshold which makes the 
workers as the losers in this policy, as they must pay these extra costs themselves in these 
smaller firms. A similar effect was found in the Saudi labour market as Nitaqat required 
different thresholds for each colour, where each colour has its benefits and sanctions as firms 
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are faced with a percentage quota that they must achieve. Our results showed that firms chose 
to lay-off their foreign workers as a rapid response to the policy, hence reducing their sizes to 
achieve the smaller quota in the smaller size category and avoid sanctions.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, labour demand theory is also relevant as it imposes costs on firms. 
The example of minimum wage effect literature is divided between the classical theory, 
proposing that minimum wage causes a decline in employment levels (Brown et al., 1982; 
Machin, 2002) and more recent studies (such as Card and Krueger, 1994; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2007; Lemos, 2009), which find no evidence of any impact of minimum wage on 
employment. Findings from this research are more supportive of the classical labour demand 
theory, suggesting a decline in employment levels. However, in the case of Nitaqat, the 
decrease in employment levels was significantly higher than those that were observed as a 
consequence of minimum wages. 
4.6       Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results in this chapter demonstrate that the Nitaqat program has met its 
primary goal by increasing Saudization. However, this has come at a significant cost to firms 
since it has increased exit rates and reduced total employment in the surviving firms. 
However, Saudization has improved and this is highly significant, ranging at around 10% 
growth in the proportion of Saudis in the employment population annually since the 
implementation of Nitaqat. Saudization has been the main goal of this policy; therefore, at 
face value, the greater Saudization is, the more successful the policy appears to be. Deeper 
investigation demonstrates that this is not straightforward. After analysing the growth of the 
number of Saudi employees per firm in the treated groups, the policy was only effective in 
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2012, which is the first year of implementation. The later years showed the policy to be 
effective in increasing Saudi employment. Given that the Saudization rate consists of Saudis 
and foreigners, an analysis of the foreign employee variable was undertaken. Since foreign 
employment makes up around 90% of the private sector labour force, it is sensible to assume 
that changes in the foreign employment variable would impact the composition of the labour 
market more so than that for Saudis. The results show that foreign employment was 
negatively affected by the policy and consequently the total employment was also negatively 
affected. These findings are contrary to the main aim of the policy, which was to raise Saudi 
employment whilst not incurring any costs on the private sector. Moreover, it appears that the 
impact of the Nitaqat policy still had a major effect on the Saudi economy five years after its 
implementation. The policy had a major impact up until 2014, but its affects started to decline 
from 2015 onwards. There were changes that occurred in the policy in 2016 and these include 
the option for firms to buy its quota from the MOL directly without having to hire more 
Saudis. Therefore, higher costs on firms will persist and this could continue to increase the 
exit rate through higher costs to firms. This could be considered as an employment tax on 
firms. However, other outcomes, such as the increase in Saudi employment and the decline of 
foreign employment, are likely to be affected by the policy over time. 
Overall, the Nitaqat policy was successful in raising the employment of nationals in 2012, as 
well as decreasing the employment of foreign labour. However, one further question arises 
from this analysis to investigate to what extent these changes affected the quality and 
productivity of firms. Consequently, an analysis of the impact of the policy on productivity 
will be undertaken in Chapter 6. 
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Nitaqat increased the exit rate of firms in the private sector, raising another question as to 
whether this is a cost that needs to be paid to achieve sustainable economic development. It 
can also simply be an added cost that burdens the private sector and reduces its competitive 
advantage. According to the IMF (2012), in order to assure the continuation of labour 
demand, there needs to be high economic growth in the region. However, with the austerity 
measures that were implemented in 2015 and 2016, this became very difficult, since the 
economy had entered into a recession. This resulted in the private sector laying off large 
portions of its current workforce and downsizing to accommodate this. Consequently, there 
were further challenges to the Nitaqat policy. The MOL announced in 2016 that, for the 
private sector to achieve its required quota of employment, they could pay the amount to the 
MOL instead of resorting to masked employment. This defeated the main purpose of the 
program. Therefore, this study is unique, as it follows the effect of the policy since its 
implementation in 2011 up until the fourth quarter of 2015. With the austerity measures in 
2016, the program changed its focus. Therefore, the quota requirement is now acting as a 
form of taxation on the private sector. It will be interesting to study the impact of higher taxes 
on firm sustainability and employment in future research.   
In the long run, the government should invest in developing new employment opportunities 
for the increasing youth population in the country, rather than replacing foreign workers with 
local ones. The best path for the government to achieve economic growth and sustainability 
would be through investing in human capital through education and training programs. 
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4.A Appendix 
Table 4.8. Firm movement between colours or exit across time, in actual numbers. 
Starting colour                                                              Ending Colour 
July 2011 
October 2012  
Red Yellow Green Platinum Exited Total 
White - - - - - - 
Red 34,099 15,398 59,485 2,204 78,317 189,526 
Yellow 1,651 2,868 13,438 334 14,401 32,693 
Green 1,585 2,455 19,641 1,433 9,848 34,963 
Platinum 53 69 884 1,294 699 2,999 
Total 37,388 20,790 93,448 5,265 103,265 260,156 
July 2012   October 2013    
White - - - - - - 
Red 4,206 2,885 24,743 1,048 52,408 85,300 
Yellow 1,136 1,327 10,505 294 16,123 29,390 
Green 1,251 1,692 34,042 2,097 22,135 61,220 
Platinum 50 102 2,290 1,632 895 4,969 
Total 6,643 6,006 71,580 5,071 91,561 180,861 
July 2013   October 2014    
White 545,217 1 881,987 - 156,516 1,583,753 
Red 3,418 1,118 7,447 486 36,186 48,656 
Yellow 781 1,173 9,111 319 15,082 26,466 
Green 2,325 3,681 57,698 3,392 44,693 111,794 
Platinum 300 171 3,820 2,281 4,113 10,685 
Total 552,041 6,144 960,063 6,478 256,590 1,781,354 
July 2014   October 2015    
White 265,592 - 1,095,908 - 108,731 1,470,267 
Red 1,907 614 3,442 392 7,888 14,244 
Yellow 165 745 8,053 272 6,469 15,706 
Green 680 3,064 107,288 6,401 41,262 158,696 
Platinum 25 102 5,365 443 2,944 8,879 
Total 268,369 4,525 1,220,056 7,508 167,294 1,667,792 
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Figure 4.7: Number of firm exit by colour and year 
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Figure 4.9: Number of firm exit by colour and year 
Figures 4.7 and 4.9. describe the exit patterns using number of firms exited across time, it 
also distinguishes between colours. The first year, 2012, indicates the highest number of firm 
exits were by Red firms, followed by the Yellow firms, then Green. In 2013, the number of 
firms exiting is still highest for Red firms, however by a smaller number than in 2012. The 
Red firms have a declining trend over the time period analysed, therefore it is assumed that 
the number of Red firms is declining over time.   
the figure gives an idea of the exit of firms in different colour bands across time. The highest 
exit rates overall are seen in 2012, however when looking at the exit rates for specific 
colours, the Red firms have their highest exit rates in 2012 and 2013, followed by the Yellow 
firms in 2012, and the Green firms in 2013. In 2014, Green firms showed higher exit rates 
with still having the Red firms following it. Meanwhile, in 2015, the Green exit rate is high 
above those of all other colours, which is probably because by this time many firms already 
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and high bands. It is suggested that the exit rate is mostly at the low level as sanctions were 
starting to hit these firms.  
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 Earnings in the Saudi Labour Market 
5.1       Introduction 
This chapter provides an original analysis of Earnings in the Saudi private sector labour 
market. It will study the nature of the market before and after the Nitaqat policy 
implementation. It will use the GOSI dataset to analyse trends of nationality difference, 
gender, skills, and industry on hourly wage.  
Within the framework of a dual labour market, the analysis in this chapter is divided between 
nationals and non-nationals. Section 5.2 describes the datasets used and some of the 
descriptive statistics, while Section 5.3 explains the methodology undertaken. Section 5.4 
discusses the results and analysis, and Section 5.5 presents a summary and conclusions.   
 Growth in Labour Productivity  
Table 5.1 presents the growth in labour productivity, defined as real GDP per hour worked, of 
the private sector with and without the oil industry. 
Table 5.1: Growth in Labour Productivity 
 (1) (2) 
Δln(Y/L) Private Sector including Oil 
industry 
Private sector excluding Oil 
industry 
2007 0.24 9.44 
2008 3.23 6.07 
2009 -6.14 2.87 
2010 -0.70 4.96 
2011 -7.80 -9.63 
2012 -0.55 -0.55 
2013 2.49 7.31 
2014 7.72 9.69 
2015 3.91 2.78 
Data Sources: SAMA, LFS 
Table 5.1 shows the growth in real GDP per hour worked. The hours worked variable was 
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taken from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and real GDP was taken from the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) (SAMA, 2016). The LFS was missing in 2010 therefore we have 
interpolated the hours worked and divided the GDP for 2010 over the estimated hours 
worked. Column (1) reports labour productivity growth including the oil industry, while 
column (2) reports the growth excluding the oil industry. Labour productivity growth in the 
total private sector seems to have been affected by the global financial crisis, reporting a 
negative growth of -6.14% in 2009, before showing signs of recovery in 2010. However, in 
2011 the growth drops reaching -7.8% after the implementation of Nitaqat, and remains 
negative in 2012. However, it appears to recover from 2013 to 2015. When we exclude the 
oil industry in column (2), the growth in labour productivity is positive from 2007 to 2010. 
There was a slight decline in the growth rate in 2009 but it was nevertheless still positive. In 
2011, a significant negative decline of labour productivity growth reaches almost -10% in the 
private sector. Although it might be the impact of the Nitaqat implementation, at this point 
we cannot assume causality between Nitaqat and the decline. The results of Chapter 4 
suggest that the implementation of Nitaqat seems to have had a bigger impact in the first two 
years, and with time, the private sector adjusted to the changes. Additionally, the labour 
demand theory suggests that with added costs on firms, productivity declines in the 
beginning, then it should increase with time so that firms can stay profitable and operate in 
the market. Section 5.4 will compare the differences between GDP per hour and Wage per 
Hour. 
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5.2       The Datasets19  
This chapter utilises three datasets; SAMA, LFS, and GOSI. SAMA is the central bank of 
Saudi Arabia. Extracting data from Saudi Arabia is very difficult; the data is scattered across 
different governmental bodies, including the national accounts. SAMA produces an annual 
statistical dataset at the aggregate level merging data from different ministries, such as the 
MOL, The General Authority of Statistics and the Ministry of Oil, alongside its own financial 
data. The use of GDP earlier in Section 5.1 is taken from SAMA. The second dataset used in 
this chapter is the LFS, which is where we take the Actual Hours Worked data from, at the 
industry level. 
The third and main dataset used in this chapter is the GOSI dataset which is a panel dataset at 
the individual level representing 10% of the population who are registered in the GOSI 
database. The dataset is very useful as every worker in the labour market is required to 
register with GOSI, therefore the dataset includes all employed individuals in the Saudi 
labour market. However, the sample dataset of GOSI that is used for this thesis covers only 
10% of that population. Furthermore, the sample received follows individuals using an 
identification number from 2009 to 2015, with individuals studied across time without entry 
or exit rates. The individuals also stay within the same industries across the studied time 
period. There are 1,037,602 individuals in the sample of private sector employees. GOSI is 
the national pension scheme therefore it is one of the best available individual level datasets 
in Saudi Arabia. However, due to the difficulty of extracting data from such organisations, 
                                                 
19 A summary table of datasets and variables used is found in the Appendix section 5.B 
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the data included only covers the years from 2009 until 2015. Ideally, we would have 
preferred to obtain earlier data to study a longer time trend however this request was denied.  
The GOSI dataset includes many variables; Age (given by date of birth), Nationality (national 
or non-national), Gender, Marital Status (married or unmarried), Industry and Subindustry, 
Education, Occupation, Region, and Wage. The Industry variable is constituted by the 10 
main industrial groups recognised at the macro level of the economy: Agriculture and fishing, 
commerce, community and social services, construction, utility represented by electricity, gas 
and water, finance, insurance and real estate, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, post and 
telecommunication and other activities. The Subindustry variable sub-categorises these main 
industries into fifty smaller ones. It would have been preferable to use fifty industries and 
make use of the detailed data provided, however due to the different datasets used in the 
study, the main industries were a better fit for consistency reasons. The Age variable was 
given by date of birth and therefore we were able to observe the annual age per individual 
across time.  
The Education variable is divided into ten categories; Illiterate, elementary, secondary, high 
school (tertiary), diploma, bachelors, masters, PhD, as well as Education verification in 
process, and N/A. Education is widely used as a measure of human capital. However, GOSI 
has instructed that using education as a variable is unreliable due to the lack of enforcement 
in reporting the education level by individuals as well as the follow up if there were any 
development in educational attainment by the individual. 
The Occupation variable consists of 2,026 different occupations; for simplicity reasons, the 
framework of Reijnders & de Vries (2007) was used to convert the occupations to skills; 
where we were able to aggregate the occupations from over 2,000 groups, into six. First is the 
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managerial group consisting of managers and legislators. Second is the professional group 
consisting of engineering, health, teaching and other professionals. Third, is the clerical group 
comprising of clerical support work. Fourth is production entailing craft workers and 
machine operators. Fifth is sales including sales workers and the last are services such as 
personal service workers. From this classification we were able to form the Skill variable with 
the first two groups of managerial and professionals forming the high skilled, third and fourth 
groups (clerical and production workers) forming the middle skilled workers, and the fifth 
and sixth groups (sales and services) categorised into the low skilled group20.  
Moving on to the Wage variable, this is given as average wage per month in Saudi Riyals, 
reported once a year. To be able to study the impact on productivity, Wage was divided by 
the number of weeks per month, to equalise the units as hours worked is taken on a weekly 
basis to develop the dependent variable of the model used in this chapter (Wage per Hour). 
However, the hours worked was not included in the dataset given by GOSI. It was found in 
the LFS, where it was also reported at the aggregated industry level.  
One of the limitations faced in this chapter is the different industry classifications in different 
datasets and years. In Saudi Arabia, the data is produced by different governmental bodies; 
for example, the dataset used in Chapter 4 “Nitaqat” is produced by the MOL, whereas the 
wage dataset used in this chapter is produced by GOSI and the macro data is produced by the 
General Authority for Statistics. This resulted in major differences at the industry level. 
Nitaqat has 86 industries, whereas the GOSI data has around 50. The LFS and the national 
accounts have only nine basic industries. Meanwhile the Establishment Survey has changed 
                                                 
20 The skill framework used by Reijnders & de Vries (2017) is listed in Appendix 5.A. 
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over time. From 2005 to 2009 it had 55 industries, however from 2010 to 2015 it further sub-
categorises them into 82 industries. This has had an effect on the analysis; where we have 
tried to utilise the extra information in the more detailed datasets, while still using the basic 
nine industries in the macro productivity measures. There seems to be a trend to unify all data 
sources through the General Authority of Statistics; however it is not yet reflected on the 
datasets. 
 GOSI Dataset Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 reports the number of observations and their share in the GOSI dataset based on 
Nationality for Saudis and non-Saudis. 
Table 5.2: GOSI Dataset Descriptive, Nationality 
Nationality N Share 
Saudis   230,523  22.22 
Non-Saudis  807,080  77.78  
Total  1,037,603  100.00  
One of our interests in this chapter is to observe the differences between Saudis and non-
Saudis, since the Nitaqat policy is targeting the ratio of Saudization. As shown above, the 
dataset comprises of 22% Saudis and 78% non-Saudis, which is not an accurate 
representation of the ratio of Saudis to foreigners in Saudi Arabia. However, GOSI data gives 
a better idea on Wage per Hour and change over time on the individual level that we do not 
see in other datasets used in this thesis.  
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Table 5.3 presents the Education variable in the dataset based on education category and 
Nationality. 
Table 5.3: GOSI Dataset Descriptive Statistics: Education differences between Saudis and 
non-Saudis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Education N (Saudis) Share N(Non-Saudis) Share 
Higher Education 23,265 10.90 29,290 3.63 
Middle Education 122,236 57.28 75,106 9.32 
Lower Education 67,890 31.81 701,797 87.05 
Total 213,391 100.00 806,193 100.00 
Although GOSI has instructed that the education variable is unreliable due to the lack of 
enforcement in reporting the education level by individuals, it is interesting to report the 
available data and possibly observe some trends. The table indicates that around 11% of 
Saudis have higher education represented by an undergraduate degree or above, while only 
3.63% of non-Saudis have higher education. The Saudis’ majority education level is in the 
middle education which is between a high school degree to a two-year diploma post-high 
school, forming 57.28% of Saudis while the middle education of foreigners is still low, 
representing around 9% of the non-Saudi population. The lower education category 
represents education below secondary level, which is the majority of non-Saudis forming 
87% of the non-Saudi workers, while Saudis have a lower rate at 32% of lower education 
holders. Although it was recommended not to use the education variable, based on this table, 
it is believed that the rates appear to give a reasonable representation of the labour market in 
Saudi Arabia, especially when compared to the skill level based on occupation divisions. 
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Table 5.4 reports the share of Skill Level based on Nationality, using the occupation cross 
classification as described above.  












Higher Skilled 38,563 16.74 71,541 8.87 
Medium Skilled 122,600 53.21 350,003 43.37 
Lower Skilled 69,241 30.05 385,416 47.76 
Total 230,404 100.00 806,960 100.00 
Table 5.4 indicates that the majority of Saudis are in the medium skilled category (53%) 
whereas the highly skilled category contains almost 17% of Saudi workers and the lower 
skilled category 30%. Meanwhile, for non-Saudis, the majority (48%) are in the lower skilled 
category followed by the medium skilled category at 43%, with the highly skilled accounting 
for only 9% of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. The percentages of each category of skill for 
both Saudis and non-Saudis are very similar to those of the education variable, except 
perhaps the division between middle and low for the non-Saudis. Given the issues with the 
education variable, we will use the skill variable in the analysis section later on.  
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Table 5.5 show the number of observations and their share based on the industry 
classification 
 
Table 5.5: GOSI Dataset Descriptive: Employment in different industries (Saudis and non-
Saudis) 
Industry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Saudis Share Non-Saudis Share 
1 Agriculture & Fishing 1,944 0.91 88,65 1.10 
2 Commerce 51,665 24.21 189,074 23.45 
3 Community services and Other Social services 27,948 13.10 47,091 5.84 
4 Construction 61,116 28.64 386,170 47.90 
5 Electricity, Gas and Water (utility) 4,120 1.93 6,211 0.77 
6 Finance, Insurance, Real estate and Business services 23,351 10.94 60,870 7.55 
7 Manufacturing industries 25,080 11.75 75,919 9.42 
8 Mining and Quarrying 9,288 4.35 7,951 0.99 
9 Other Activities 254 0.12 0 0.00 
10 Post and Telecommunications 8,625 4.04 24,041 2.98 
 Total 213,391 100.00 806,192 100.00 
The highest shares for both nationalities are in the commerce and construction industries, 
forming 24% and around 29% for Saudis and 23% and 48% for non-Saudis respectively. 
These industries are followed by manufacturing industry at around 12% and 9% for Saudis 
and non-Saudis, respectively. The finance industry is the fourth largest, based on number of 
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Table 5.6 shows mean wage per month based on Gender and Nationality.  
Table 5.6: GOSI Dataset Descriptive: Mean wage per month between males, females, Saudis, 
and non-Saudis 
                        





2009 Male 6186.734 1543.621 
 Female 3700.3 2037.679 
 
2010 Male 6215.276 1574.183 
 Female 3744.172 2103.797 
 
2011 Male 6012.727 1563.748 
 Female 3714.013 2156.173 
 
2012 Male 5959.21 1478.36 
 Female 3521.602 2182.898 
 
2013 Male 6273.463 1457.377 
 Female 3824.898 2357.655 
 
2014 Male 6565.727 1684.282 
 Female 4041.338 2834.132 
 
2015 Male 6773.635 1795.154 
 Female 4073.158 3139.199 
 
Mean Male 6773.635 1795.154 
Female 4073.158 3139.199 
Note: Currency is Saudi Riyal ($1USD = 3.75 SAR) 
It is apparent that although the wage level is increasing on average, it seems to follow a 
normal inflation trend. However, in 2012, the wages of all categories had fallen. This might 
indicate how the firms reacted to the introduction of the Nitaqat program. Moreover, it is 
interesting to observe the difference in wages between males and females in both Saudis and 
non-Saudis. In line with the literature on the gender gap which suggests that women earn 
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lower wages around the world, it seems that women in Saudi Arabia earn around 60% of the 
wages of males. What is interesting is that non-national females earn higher wages than non-
national males, where males earn between 60% to 70% of the foreign females’ wages. This 
might be due to the structure of the dual labour economy, as many of the foreign workers are 
low skilled labour whereas females would tend to work in slightly more skilled environments, 
for example as nurses, air stewardesses or nannies. Although it is an interesting observation, 
the ratio of females to males is very low, between 1-2% of the male foreigners. Therefore, the 
differences in earnings are likely to indicate differences in skill or occupation rather than 
females earning higher wages. 
5.3       Methodology 
This section is a descriptive analysis of the Saudi economy before and after the Nitaqat 
policy, studying the impact of different variables on Wage per Hour over time using an 
earnings function. An earnings function is a function of individual wage rates regressed on a 
vector of personal, environmental, and market variables that influence the wage (Willis, 
1986). Using the GOSI individual level data, Mincer (1947) wage equations were estimated 
by: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆 ∑ 𝑑𝑡 + ℰ𝑖𝑛𝑡  5-1) 
Where: 
𝑋 represents control variables such as Age, Gender, and Marital Status 
𝑆 represents the skill level, high and low skill studied against the medium skill 
category 
𝐼 represents Industry 
𝑑𝑡 is time dummy 
ℰ is the error term 
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𝑖 is individual level = 1,2,…n 
𝑛 Is Saudis and non-Saudis 
𝑡 refers to time = 2009, 2010, … 2015. 
The Nitaqat policy was introduced in mid-2011. Therefore, we aim to test Wage per Hour 
before and after the policy to see how it changes over time. Several variables were used as 
controls to the model such as Age, Gender, and Marital Status. Our focus is the effect of 
skills on Wage per Hour over time, as well as the impact on each industry.  
The logarithmic form was used on both Hourly Wage and the Age variables. Contrary to the 
usual Mincer specification, the log of Age was used since all ages are increasing by one year 
each time due to the use of the administrative data of GOSI where the same individuals are 
observed over time without entry or exit. Therefore, it is better to take the log and estimate 
the impact as percentage changes over time. The rest of the variables are categorical, 
therefore dummy variables were used. The first two variables have only one dummy; where 
the Gender dummy is 1 for females and 0 otherwise and the Marital Status dummy is equal 
to 1 if married and 0 otherwise. The Skill variable has two dummies which are High and Low 
skilled, measured against the “medium” category. As for the Industry, the omitted category is 
Agriculture.  
Basic economic theory suggests that “workers’ real hourly compensation should grow in line 
with GDP per hour worked over the long run”. This indicates that wage growth should be 
equal to productivity growth in the long run (Pessoa & Van Reenen, 2013). Therefore, we can 
loosely discuss the results in terms of productivity, assuming that labour productivity is equal 
to hourly wage. Moreover, due to the nature of the dual labour market, wages are different 
between both nationalities therefore this chapter studies nationalities separately.  
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The first specification uses a Fixed Effects (FE) panel, holding industries constant, to observe 
the trend of individual hourly wage before and after the implementation of Nitaqat, over a 
six-year period from 2009 to 2015. Where the subscript ‘n’ will be used to refer to 
Nationality, represented by the following equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2 ∑ 𝑑𝑡 + ℰ𝑖𝑛𝑡  5-2) 
The specification will be conducted separately for each nationality, allowing for a better 
analysis by studying the impact of the Age and time dummies using an FE panel. 
This is followed by the second specification, that uses a cross-sectional analysis over time. It 
allows for observation of change across time to observe the differences before and after the 
Nitaqat policy.  
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐷(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3𝐷(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡) +
𝛽4𝐷(𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽5𝐷(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡) + ℰ𝑖𝑛𝑡  
     5-3) 
Equation 5-3 will allow the study of the effect of the dummy variables such as Gender, Skill, 
and Industry on Hourly Wage over time.  Although we cannot confirm a causal effect of the 
Nitaqat policy at this point on the change of trend, as Chapter 4 suggests, it did have major 
consequences on the private sector. Hence, it is interesting to study the trend of the Wage per 
Hour before and after the policy implementation.  
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The third specification will be used where the model will be applied on individual industries 
represented by the subscript ‘j’.   
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐷(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡)
+ 𝛽3𝐷(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐷(𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡) + ℰ𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑡 5-4) 
It will focus on the most important industries and study the relationship of the control and 
skill variables on hourly wage over time within those industries; this was also conducted 
separately for Saudis and non-Saudis. The industries chosen are agriculture, commerce, 
construction, financial services, manufacturing, and the oil industry. Agriculture was chosen 
because it was the industry that was compared against in the earlier specifications therefore it 
was interesting to see how it operated before and after the policy. The commerce, 
construction, financial, and manufacturing industries represent the biggest industries in terms 
of number of workers, and the oil industry was also chosen because it is the biggest in terms 
of capital. 
Moreover, many economists face the problem of endogeneity in such models. Endogeneity 
usually occurs when the independent variables “X” are determined by unobserved variables 
that also influence the dependent variable “Y” but can also occur due to unobserved 
measurement error in X or Y or both (Maluccio, 1998). With the use of administrative data, 
there was a limitation of finding good instrumental variables in the dataset, such as test 
scores, to address endogeneity issues. Endogeneity of education in the function of wage is 
often ignored in the literature of developing economies (Maluccio, 1998). Results with 
endogeneity could produce biased results. However, due to data limitations, we could not 
treat the endogeneity in the model. 
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5.4       Results 
 Panel 
With the duality of the labour market, and the data availability of both Saudis and non-
Saudis, Table 5.7 presents the first specification using an FE Panel (Equation 5.2) and was 
studied separately for each nationality, to allow for a good comparison between Saudis and 
non-Saudis in trends of hourly wage before and after the policy due to the duality of the 
labour market. 
Table 5.7: FE Panel Regression on Saudis and Non-Saudis 
 Nationality 


































N 162,305 1,218,980 
𝑅2 0.5384 0.2175 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
 
Table 5.7 reports growth in hourly wage from specification 5-2, using the log of Age variable 
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as a control, as explained above. The time dummies were used to observe the trend of hourly 
wage over time using an industry FE Panel at the individual level. Column (1) reports the 
results for Saudis, and column (2) for non-Saudis.   
The Age shows high significance where a 1% increase in Age increases hourly wage by 0.05 
percentage point for Saudis, although the effect is smaller for non-Saudis where hourly wage 
would rise by 0.05% with a 1% increase in Age. These results are expected to be positive, as 
the literature suggests that wage usually increases with Age and because Age is also 
correlated with experience and the more experience an individual has, the better their 
productivity is. 
The time dummies are all compared against 2009 and there seems to be increasingly negative 
growth for Saudis between 2010 to 2012. From 2013, hourly wage for Saudis indicates 
significant positive results, reaching around 0.16% in 2015. Meanwhile, it is interesting to 
observe that the foreigners in column (2) have a positive trend from 2010 to 2015. However, 
the growth rate seemed constant in 2010 to 2012, and after 2013, the growth increased at a 
higher rate to reach 0.30% in 2015. The results suggest the productivity is rising for both 
nationalities from 2013 onwards, with foreigners indicating higher growth in productivity. 
Overall, this indicates that hourly wage did suffer during the implementation of Nitaqat in 
2011, however it started to recover from 2013 onwards.  
The theory suggests that growth in Wage per Hour and labour productivity growth will be 
equal in the long run. Table 5.1 reported GDP per hour worked, with negative growth in 2011 
and 2012, recovering in 2013 to 2015. Similarly, the results from Table 5.7 suggest that the 
growth in the hourly wage, controlling for other influences, parallels the trend of the Saudi 
workers. In contrast, foreigners in column (2) show a positive trend overall with a slightly 
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lower rate in 2011 and 2012, then higher rates from 2013 to 2015. Therefore, this still follows 
the same broad trend as for labour productivity in Table 5.7. The findings also support labour 
demand theory, such as the example of the impact of minimum wage policy on productivity. 
A policy such as Nitaqat, which imposes higher costs on firms, would reduce productivity 
growth in the short run but should increase it in the long term. However, this does not suggest 
the Nitaqat was the cause for the decline as it cannot be confirmed with this analysis. 
 Cross-Sectional Analysis over Time 
The FE panel in the results above imposed the constraint that the impact of dummy variables 
such as Skill, Gender, and Industry could not be observed. Therefore, we next show results 
year-on-year using equation 5-3 to study the trend across time, distinguishing between Saudis 
and non-Saudis as there are major differences in terms of wages between the two groups 
owing to the duality of the market indicated by the subscript ‘n’ for nationality. The Gender 
dummy is 1 for females and 0 otherwise, Marital Status dummy refers to 1 if married and 0 
otherwise. The Skill dummy is categorised into three groups with high, medium, and low 
categories. The omitted group is the medium-skilled. The Industry variable is measured 
against the agriculture and forestry industry. Table 5.8 shows these cross-sectional results 
over time for Saudis. 
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Table 5.8: Cross-sectional results over time for Saudis 
Log (Wage per 
Hour) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Control Variables               
















































       
































































































































































N 84,611 84,611 84,611 84,611 84,611 84,611 84,611 
𝑅2 0.1848 0.1729 0.1430 0.1073 0.0642 0.0528 0.0504 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Industry numbers: 1. Agriculture and Forestry, 2. Commerce, 3. Community services and Other Social services, 
4. Construction, 5. Electricity, Gas and Water (utility), 6. Finance, Insurance, Real estate and Business services, 
7. Manufacturing industries, 8. Mining and Quarrying, 9. Post and Telecommunications. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
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Starting with the results for Saudis the control variables are all significant; the Age is highly 
and positively significant in 2009, but there is a declining trend over time reaching a negative 
relationship in 2015. As we are following the Age of the individual over time, the wage 
equation suggests that Age is positively correlated with Wage per Hour, however it reaches a 
peak as the worker grows older where the relationship starts to decline. This is in line with 
what is observed in the trend of Age in Saudis with Wage per Hour.  
The Gender variable is noteworthy. It represents the relationship of females against males 
regarding hourly wage, where the relationship seems constant with high significance at 
around -0.43% between 2009 and 2011, then in 2012 it increases to -0.31% before turning 
positively significant from 2013 to reach 0.26% in 2015. We assume that this might be 
another effect of the Nitaqat policy as the demand on females instantly increased with the 
implementation of the policy. National accounts suggest around 30% of females in the 
workforce are unemployed - therefore it was a quick substitute for foreign labour. The 
Marital Status was included as another control for the equation. 
The skill variable is categorised into three groups; high, medium, and low. The omitted group 
is the medium-skilled group. Results indicate that the highly skilled category have a 
significant positive trend across time, increasing from 0.07% higher hourly wage than the 
medium category in 2011, to 0.12% in 2012. It continues to rise, reaching almost 0.29% 
higher Wage per Hour than for medium skilled workers in 2015. This trend might suggest 
that there is an increasing demand for highly skilled Saudis. Meanwhile, there is a growing 
negative significant trend for the low skilled Saudis, which might indicate that the low skilled 
Saudis are still not able to compete with the low skilled foreign workers, even with the policy 
implementation. As seen in the descriptive statistics Table 5.6, the mean wage of foreigners is 
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around 1,500 Saudi Riyal per month whereas the minimum wage for the Saudi is 3,000 Saudi 
Riyal per month so therefore the low skilled Saudi is still twice the cost of a foreign worker. 
Furthermore, all industries are measured against the agriculture industry in this specification 
and are all significant in some way to the hourly wage. From the overall trend, we see that the 
most positively significant industries in relation to Wage per Hour for Saudis are mining and 
quarrying, which also includes the oil industry, the utility industry, and the financial services 
industry. However, the commerce and construction industries seem to have a negative 
relationship over time in relation to the agriculture industry. This might be because these two 
industries have the highest number of foreigners that could suggest that they are profoundly 
affected by the policy where the growth of wages even for Saudis are declining. Furthermore, 
the manufacturing sector starts to show mostly no significance from 2011 onwards. This 
might suggest that with the implementation of the policy, the manufacturing industry may 
have decided to invest more in physical capital rather than workers to improve their 
productivity. Further analysis is required to confirm that however, as the results only suggest 
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The following table also uses the specification 5-3, but this time ‘n’ indicates non-Saudis. 
Table 5.9: Cross-sectional results over time for non-Saudis 
Log (Wage per 
Hour) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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447,301 447,301 447,301 447,301 447,301 447,301 447,301 
𝑅2 0.1096 0.0914 0.0815 0.0813 0.0615 0.0469 0.0460 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Industry numbers: 1. Agriculture and Forestry, 2. Commerce, 3. Community services and Other Social services, 
4. Construction, 5. Electricity, Gas and Water (utility), 6. Finance, Insurance, Real estate and Business services, 
7. Manufacturing industries, 8. Mining and Quarrying, 9. Post and Telecommunications. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
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With the nature of the duality of the labour market in Saudi Arabia, the secondary market 
consisting of non-Saudis is a completely different case and therefore it was essential to 
separate Saudis and non-Saudis and study the results of each separately. As in the previous 
model, Age and Gender, are used as control variables. Age is positively related to Wage per 
Hour indicating that as Age increases, Wage per Hour also increases which supports the 
literature as greater age is generally considered to represent more experience. However, we 
can see from 2011 onwards that there is a significant declining trend with Age reaching -
0.25% in 2015. This might coincide with the layoff trend reaction of the private sector that 
we witnessed in the previous chapter, which might tell us that most of the foreign workers 
who were made redundant were in the older age category. Moreover, gender is significant 
and negatively related to Wage per Hour. However, in 2013 the negative trend starts to 
decline to reach positive figures for foreign females in 2015. Marital Status is omitted here 
due to the lack of data on foreign workers, as many low skilled foreign workers come to work 
in Saudi Arabia on a temporary basis and do not bring their families with them. 
Looking at the impact of skills on Wage per Hour, the higher skilled foreign workers are 
highly positively significant, and there seems to be an increasing trend over time. It is even 
higher than the impact of high skilled Saudi workers on the hourly wage. This might be 
further evidence of the segmented labour market. The wage system in the Saudi economy 
depends on the worker’s skill level as well as their nationality. The highly skilled foreign 
workers usually come from developed countries. Therefore, to attract them to come to the 
Saudi economy and benefit from their skills the equilibrium wage needs to be very high, 
sometimes up to three times the wage of a national. On the other hand, there is a vast supply 
of low skilled foreign workers. Therefore, their wage levels are very low at around one third 
that of the wage of a Saudi national. This is represented by the negative significance of low 
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skilled foreign labour to Wage per Hour in comparison to the middle-skilled foreign workers, 
reaching almost -0.12% in 2012. This also could be evidence that the laid-off foreign labour 
is mostly from the low skilled category. The negative trend starts to recover in 2013, reaching 
positive significance in 2015. This indicates the importance of low skilled foreign workers to 
the economy, while the low skilled Saudi workers still have a negative impact on Wage per 
Hour with -0.26% in 2015. 
Furthermore, looking at the impact of industries on Wage per Hour of foreigners, the overall 
trend shows a better relationship of industries on Wage per Hour on foreigners than Saudis. 
The construction industry is one of the most affected by Nitaqat as it has the largest 
percentage of low skilled foreign workers which has also affected the Wage per Hour of 
Saudis as they faced major cost increases and fines as the policy kept changing and becoming 
tighter. They were most hit with the annual fee of 2,400 SAR per foreign worker which was 
issued in 2013 to raise the cost of the foreign worker closer to the Saudi worker and eliminate 
the competitive advantage of the low skilled foreign worker accepting lower pay. This caused 
large cost increases in the private sector. All industries seem to be more significant with the 
non-Saudis specification which might be the case because the number of observations for 
non-Saudis are considerably larger than Saudis. The manufacturing industry is barely 
significant for Saudis across time but it shows a strong positive significance for foreigners. 
The telecommunications industry is quite interesting as it has a high percentage of Saudis and 
their quota is quite high, and we can see that Wage per Hour did decline in 2012; however, it 
increased from negative figures to positive ones with increasing growth until 2015. The 
industry trends look interesting; therefore, we will continue the analysis on individual 
industries across time in the next section. 
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 Cross-sectional Analysis over Time per Industry 
To further understand the before and after analysis, and since different industries had 
different results it was imperative to study the impact on Wage per Hour in individual 
industries (Equation 5-4) and study the difference between nationals and non-nationals. 
Because the previous specifications were testing industries based on the agriculture industry, 
it was best to start the analysis with this and observe how the different variables within these 
industries impacted hourly wage. The Marital Status is omitted in all non-Saudi 
specifications due to the missing data. The section will start by analysing the trends within six 
industries; agriculture and forestry, commerce, construction, financial services, 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying. 
Table 5.10: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the agriculture and forestry Industry 
Log (Wage per 
Hour) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.9434*** 0.8004*** 0.7569*** 0.7104*** 0.5153** 0.3197* -0.4245* 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.113) (0.131) (0.155) (0.170) (0.197) 
Gender -0.6221*** -0.5220*** -0.4173*** -0.3353** -0.0277 0.4077** 0.2366* 
 (0.090) (0.084) (0.092) (0.103) (0.117) (0.124) (0.139) 
Marital Status 0.1223 0.1147 -0.1414 0.0380 0.7944 -0.0734 -0.0757 
 (0.506) (0.472) (0.516) (0.577) (0.656) (0.696) (0.779) 
High Skilled 0.0902 0.3581** 0.2638* 0.3164* 0.4781** 0.7514*** 0.8331*** 
 (0.117) (0.109) (0.119) (0.133) (0.152) (0.161) (0.180) 
Low Skilled -0.0647 0.0259 0.0409 -0.0327 -0.0665 0.0039 -0.1811 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.085) (0.095) (0.108) (0.115) (0.129) 
N 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.1365 0.1237 0.0772 0.0516 0.0291 0.0468 0.0367 
Non-Saudis 
Log (Age) 0.8904*** 0.7349*** 0.5989*** 0.5400*** 0.3255*** 0.0650 -0.1802** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.049) (0.056) 
Gender 0.0120 0.1116 -0.0052 -0.0248 -0.1539 0.1201 -0.183 
 (0.228) (0.216) (0.197) (0.208) (0.233) (0.261) (0.294) 
Marital Status (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
        
High Skilled 0.3991*** 0.4050*** 0.3101*** 0.4429*** 0.4246*** 0.5778*** 0.5909*** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.045) (0.048) (0.054) (0.060) (0.068) 
Low Skilled 0.1494*** 0.1127*** 0.0267 -0.0481* -0.0333 0.0223 0.0136 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) 
N 5,075 5,075 5,075 5,075 5,075 5,075 5,075 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1203 0.0921 0.0676 0.0605 0.0255 0.0181 0.0162 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
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The agriculture industry was chosen because it was the industry that was compared against in 
the earlier specifications therefore it was interesting to see how it operated before and after 
the policy. Although this is just a sample of the actual industry, we can notice the difference 
in number of observations between nationals and non-nationals, with nationals representing 
around 15% of the working population in this industry. Meanwhile, looking at the other 
variables, Age seems to be highly and positively significant for both nationals and non-
nationals except for 2014, and although in 2013 it drops by 20% for both nationals for non-
nationals and turns insignificant in 2014, it returns to being negatively significant in 2015. 
This might show that as Age reaches a certain limit the relationship turns negative. 
Meanwhile, the gender variable in the agriculture industry is more interesting. Saudi women 
in this industry are negatively and significantly correlated with Wage per Hour, with a 
decline in 2012 from -0.42% to -0.34%. 2013 shows no significance, however 2014 and 2015 
are highly positively significant. This might be an indication of how females were substitutes 
for foreign workers. The delay in the positive relation could be that the immediate 
substitution was not feasible at first due to strict regulations on employment of women in the 
workplace such as separate physical places of work, however the MOL has eased these 
restrictions on female employment to increase their participation in the labour market. This 
seemed to be the most sensible solution. The non-Saudi model of gender shows no 
significance which is expected as the agriculture industry is mostly male-dominated, and 
there are few jobs if any for low skilled female foreign workers in that industry. 
Looking at the impact of skills, the high skilled Saudis are positively and significantly related 
to Wage per Hour across time, with a higher growth rate between 2013 and 2015. The high 
skill maybe corresponds with the significance of females which might suggest that the high 
skilled Saudis were females. The low skilled Saudis seemed to a have negative non-
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significant relationship to Wage per Hour. Meanwhile, high-skilled foreigners are 
significantly related to Wage per Hour across the time period. The low-skilled foreign 
workers show a positive significant relationship in 2009 and 2010. From 2011 forward, there 
seems to be insignificance of low-skilled workers on hourly wage. This might indicate that 
foreign low skilled workers were replaced by capital or firms just reduced in size and 
improved the productivity of remaining workers to counteract the extra costs. While 
potentially interesting, the small sample sizes for the agriculture industry means these results 
should be treated with caution. 
The industries chosen are agriculture, construction, financial services, manufacturing, and the 
oil industry. Agriculture was chosen because it was the industry that used as a basis for 
comparison in the earlier specifications and therefore it was interesting to see how it operated 
before and after the policy. The commerce, construction, financial, and manufacturing 
industries represent the biggest industries in term of number of workers, meanwhile, the oil 
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The following table uses Equation 5.4 on the commerce industry. 
Table 5.11: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the Commerce Industry 
Log (Wage per 
Hour) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.6289*** 0.5549*** 0.4872*** 0.5485*** 0.5091*** 0.2578*** -0.0523 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.035) 
Gender -0.4122*** -0.3985*** -0.3940*** -0.2983*** 0.1086*** 0.1918*** 0.4078*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.0023) 
Marital Status 0.1915*** 0.2024*** 0.0682 -0.1020* -0.1951* -0.0327 0.2172* 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.061) (0.076) (0.081) (0.90) 
High Skilled 0.0646*** 0.0599** 0.0641** 0.0844*** 0.1245*** 0.1780*** 0.2033*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) 
Low Skilled 0.0174 -0.0052 -0.0168 -0.0773*** -0.1875*** -0.1636*** -0.2110*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) 
N 20,354 20,354 20,354 20,354 20,354 20,354 20,354 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.0926 0.0803 0.0621 0.0494 0.0308 0.0178 0.0243 
 
Non-Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.7513*** 0.6369*** 0.5195*** 0.4529*** 0.2538*** 0.0165* -0.3261*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Gender - 0.1494*** -0.1630*** -0.1965*** -0.1768*** -0.1066** -0.0125 0.1254*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) 
Marital Status (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
       
High Skilled 0.2363*** 0.2892*** 0.3429*** 0.4398*** 0.4606*** 0.5212*** 0.5624*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Low Skilled -0.0236*** -0.0575*** -0.0743*** -0.0827*** -0.0523*** -0.0206* 0.0207** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
N 108,596 108,596 108,596 108,596 108,596 108,596 108,596 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.0982 0.0813 0.0696 0.0634 0.0318 0.0220 0.0254 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
 
The commerce industry is one of the biggest industries in Saudi. Therefore, it is vital to 
include it in the studies of industries. Furthermore, it has been shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 
that negative trends occurred when compared against the agriculture industry indicating that 
it has been more negatively affected. The high share and number of foreigners in this industry 
might be an indicator of the negative trends observed in comparison with the agriculture 
industry. The gender dummy for Saudi females reports high positive growth in hourly wage 
from a negatively significant 0.41% in 2009 to a positive significance of 0.41% after six 
years in 2015. Since the relationship between female Saudis and hourly wage only became 
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positive from 2013 onwards, this might be a result of the policy although cannot be 
confirmed. Meanwhile, the non-Saudi gender dummy was negative throughout the time trend, 
but turned positively significant in 2015.  
The high-skilled Saudi variable is positively significant from 2009 to 2015. However, there is 
a high growth after 2013, which might suggest an increase in productivity level of the highly 
skilled workers to compensate the added costs the private sector has endured after the policy 
implementation. Moreover, although the Saudi high-skilled workers are positive, the foreign 
high-skilled workers show higher growth, which might indicate that the foreign high-skilled 
workers in the commerce industry are more productive than the equivalent Saudi ones. The 
low-skilled variable is interesting; the Saudi low-skilled workers reported a significant 
negative growth between 2013 and 2015, indicating that they were the category that is 
contributing to higher costs of the firm without improving their productivity. The low-skilled 
foreigners were also negatively significant throughout the time trend but become positively 
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The next table uses equation 5-4 on the construction industry. 
Table 5.12: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the Construction Industry 
Log (Wage per 
Hour) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.3970*** 0.4233*** 0.4573*** 0.4923*** 0.4000*** 0.0655* -0.2922*** 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) 
Gender -0.2752*** -0.3209*** -0.3807*** -0.2431*** 0.1001*** 0.0880*** 0.4000*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) 
Marital Status 0.1599** 0.1934*** 0.0847 -0.1656** -0.0293 0.0820 0.3076** 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.055) (0.062) (0.077) (0.082) (0.091) 
High Skilled 0.0300* 0.0143 0.0585*** 0.1108*** 0.1544*** 0.2051*** 0.2735*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) 
Low Skilled 0.0564*** 0.0173 0.0020 -0.0631*** -0.1301*** -0.1519*** -0.1342*** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) 
N 24,426 24,426 24,426 24,426 24,426 24,426 24,426 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.0563 0.0567 0.0546 0.0361 0.0193 0.0080 0.0222 
 
Non-Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.6317*** 0.5368*** 0.4593*** 0.4042*** 0.2956*** 0.0578*** -0.24377 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
Gender -0.1326*** -0.1056*** -0.0983*** -0.1083*** -0.0397* -0.0238 0.0247 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) 
Marital Status (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
       
High Skilled 0.0856*** 0.1186*** 0.1625*** 0.2194*** 0.2672*** 0.3251*** 0.3796*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Low Skilled -0.0269*** -0.0610*** -0.0920*** -0.1296*** -0.0897*** -0.0439*** 0.0280*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
N 213,420 213,420 213,420 213,420 213,420 213,420 213,420 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.0858 0.0669 0.0570 0.0538 0.0295 0.0133 0.0145 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
As mentioned previously, the construction industry is one of the industries most affected by 
the Nitaqat policy, as it has the highest share of foreigners amongst all industries. Therefore it 
was imperative to analyse this in detail. Starting with the impact of the Age variable on Wage 
per Hour, as Age rises there is a significant positive relationship with Wage per Hour for both 
Saudis and foreigners. However as observed in earlier sections, there seems to be a decline in 
2013, continuing to 2014 and turning negative in 2015. The Gender variable is interesting, as 
the construction industry also follows the results of the previous industries. The Saudi 
females have a significant positive relation to Wage per Hour which starts as negative from 
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2009 to 2012, only to turn positive in 2013 at 0.10% and continues to rise reaching 0.40% in 
2015. The Saudi female trend is more of an indicator of how these Saudi women can be 
productive and how the policy was a positive impact for them regarding replacing foreign 
workers and being able to be hired in different industries rather than being constrained to 
either the education or health sectors. The foreign Gender dummy shows insignificance in 
2014 and 2015. 
Moving on to the Skill impact on Wage per Hour, for Saudis, highly skilled Saudis start to 
become significant in 2011, starting with 0.06% in 2012 and continue to increase to 0.27% in 
2015. The foreign highly skilled workers were also positively and significantly related to 
Wage per Hour, there has been a steady increase across all years from 0.08% in 2009 to 
0.38% in 2015. There is no change in the trend during 2011 or 2012. 
Meanwhile, low skilled workers show a significant negative relation with Wage per Hour for 
both Saudis and foreigners. For Saudis, there was a positive relationship before 2012, which 
was then negative between 2013 to 2015. However, foreigners show a slightly different trend 
having a negative significance even prior to the policy implementation, with positive growth 
over the years to reach positive significance in 2015 at 0.02%. This might show the 
importance of the low skilled foreign worker in the construction industry, and how eventually 
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Table 5.13 reports the results of Equation 5-4 for the finance, insurance and business services 
industries. 
Table 5.13: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the Finance, Insurance and Business 
Services Industries 
Log (Wage/ 
Hour)         2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 1.3141*** 1.2877*** 1.1749*** 1.0797*** 0.8525*** 0.5574*** -0.0042 
(0.040)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059) (0.063) (0.072) 
Gender -0.4863*** -0.4618*** -0.4645*** -0.3711*** -0.0105 0.1026* 0.2776*** 
(0.032)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.042) (0.046) 
Marital Status 0.3601*  0.4144** 0.1736 0.2312 -0.0392 0.1553 -0.1232 
(0.156)  (0.157) (0.163) (0.171) (0.195) (0.206) (0.224) 
High Skilled -0.1419***  -0.1030*** -0.0281 0.0588 0.1776*** 0.2329*** 0.3648*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) 
Low Skilled -0.2097***  -0.2240*** -0.3004*** -0.4173*** -0.4564*** -0.4524*** -0.5434*** 
 (0.031)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044) 
N  9,247  9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1233 0.1124 0.0928 0.0796 0.0469 0.0319 0.0316 
 
Non-Saudis        
Log (Age) 0.8215***  0.7911*** 0.7884*** 0.7617*** 0.6106*** 0.2700*** -0.3469*** 
(0.015)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) 
Gender -0.1202**  -0.1367** -0.1698*** -0.1901*** -0.0493 0.0249 0.3176*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.053) (0.058) (0.065) 
Marital Status (omitted)   (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
       
High Skilled 0.2709***  0.2705*** 0.3269*** 0.4640*** 0.5689*** 0.6526*** 0.7660*** 
(0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) 
Low Skilled -0.0727***  -0.1056*** -0.1247*** -0.1791*** -0.1319*** -0.0524*** 0.0655*** 
(0.010)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
N 32,359  32,359 32,359 32,359 32,359 32,359 32,359 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1092 0.1013 0.1054 0.1108 0.0753 0.0444 0.0386 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
 
The financial and service industries have high Saudi employment. Age is highly positively 
significant across all years except for 2015 where it turns into negative insignificance. 
Meanwhile, the Age for non-Saudis remains highly significant but negative in 2015. 
Moreover, Saudi females are negatively significant from 2009 up until 2012, but this shifts to 
high positive significance in 2014 and 2015, following the trend of the other previous 
industries in these two years, also showing the positive influence of Saudi female 
employment on Wage per Hour in individual industries. It is interesting to point out here that 
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during February 2017, the first Saudi female “Sarah Alsuhaimi” became chief of the Saudi 
stock exchange (Tadawal). This was a major advancement for female employment in Saudi 
Arabia. Similarly, non-national females seem to have had a negative relationship from 2009 
until 2014, which turns highly positive and significant in 2015. 
The skill level is interesting here because the high skill is in high demand for this industry. 
However, it is apparent that foreign high skilled workers are positively and significantly 
related to increases in Wage per Hour from 2009 onwards, and this even undergoes a major 
jump in 2012 and continues to grow significantly on an annual basis. Meanwhile, Saudi high 
skilled workers had a significant negative relationship with Wage per Hour between 2009 
and 2011. The relationship turns positive in 2012 yet is still not significant, and only in 2013 
does it become a positive and highly significant relationship which continues rising. This 
could indicate how the Nitaqat policy played a positive role especially in the financial and 
business services industries; the Saudization quota reached 70% to 80% for firm compliance, 
therefore employing more highly skilled nationals could have been the reason for the 
significant positive cause of higher Wage per Hour. Conversely, the Low Skilled variable 
shows negative significance for both Saudis and non-Saudis on Wage per Hour. This might 
be because of the more advanced services this industry provides and requires more highly 
skilled workers as having lower-skilled workers only hinders growth, although it is worth 
noting that the Low Skilled variable for foreign workers did show positive significance in 
2015. Again this might also indicate the importance of low skilled foreign workers even in 
industries that require higher skill level. 
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Table 5.14 below continues using Equation 5-4 on the manufacturing industry. 
Table 5.14: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the Manufacturing Industry 
Log (Wage/ 
Hour) 2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 1.1170***  1.0606*** 0.9369*** 0.9019*** 0.7616*** 0.4936*** 0.1804* 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.057) 
Gender -0.6252***  -0.6094*** -0.6396*** -0.4639*** -0.0639* -0.0242 0.0859* 
 (0.027)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) 
Marital Status 0.3115*  0.3455** 0.2332* -0.0964 0.1300 0.2548 0.2634 
 (0.131)  (0.131) (0.136) (0.143) (0.165) (0.174) (0.190) 
High Skilled 0.1643***  0.1838*** 0.2103*** 0.3004*** 0.3839*** 0.4350*** 0.5553*** 
 (0.034)  (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049) 
Low Skilled  0.1011***  0.0694** 0.0226 -0.0006 -0.0826** -0.1404*** -0.1966*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) 
N 10,040 10,040 10,040 10,040 10,040 10,040 10,040 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1506 0.1334 0.1092 0.0796 0.0411 0.0267 0.0236 
 
Non-Saudis        
Log (Age) 1.0614***  0.9308*** 0.8005*** 0.6833*** 0.4813*** 0.2403*** -0.1031*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) 
Gender -0.3649***  -0.3508*** -0.3059** -0.3059*** -0.0663* -0.0162 0.0220 
 (0.030)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038) 
Marital Status   (omitted)   (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
        
High Skilled 0.3052*** 0.3790*** 0.4612*** 0.5361*** 0.6155*** 0.7216*** 0.7706*** 
 (0.019)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) 
Low Skilled 0.0040  -0.0253** -0.0573*** -0.0917*** -0.0348*** 0.0102 0.0711*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
N 42,427  42,427 42,427 42,427 42,427 42,427 42,427 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1308 0.1082 0.0924 0.0769 0.0454 0.0310 0.0235 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
 
The manufacturing industry is one of the industries with a higher share of foreigners. Age and 
Gender follow a similar trend to the other industries. Meanwhile, lower skilled foreigners 
show a positive relationship in 2015 as opposed to the previous years where they had a 
negative significance. Low skilled Saudi workers show the opposite trend which is 
interesting, having positive significance prior to 2011, becoming negatively significant in 
2013. However, the high skilled workers among both Saudis and non-Saudis show a positive 
and significant trend across all years examined. 
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Table 5.15 also reports the results of Equation 5-4 for the mining and quarrying industry. 
Table 5.15: Cross-sectional analysis over time for the Mining and Quarrying Industry 
Log (Wage/ Hour) 2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudis        
Log (Age) 3.6182***  3.4090*** 3.0374*** 2.5343*** 1.8235*** 1.3473*** 0.7918*** 
 (0.064)  (0.069) (0.073) (0.081) (0.086) (0.094) (0.103) 
Gender -0.9959***  -1.0467*** -0.9228*** -0.8345*** -0.4653** -0.3634* -0.3117* 
 (0.138)  (0.143) (0.147) (0.156) (0.161) (0.171) (0.181) 
Mstat 1.1729  1.2314 1.3045 0.9243 0.3304 -0.1998 -0.1082 
 (0.776)  (0.801) (0.823) (0.878) (0.905) (0.957) (1.017) 
High Skilled -0.5725***  -0.3888*** -0.3369*** -0.1794* 0.0947 0.3377** 0.5674*** 
 (0.085)  (0.087) (0.090) (0.095) (0.098) (0.104) (0.111) 
Low Skilled -0.3436***  -0.4716*** -0.5796*** -0.6269*** -0.6479*** -0.7344*** -0.8290*** 
 (0.062)  (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.072) (0.076) (0.081) 
N 3,798  3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 3,798 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.4588 0.3965 0.3157 0.2118 0.1158 0.0721 0.0493 
 
Non-Saudis        
Log (Age) 1.5481***  1.4135*** 1.2471*** 1.1269*** 0.9539*** 0.6516*** 0.1593 
  (0.068) (0.071) (0.072) (0.78) (0.084) (0.094) (0.105) 
Gender 1.0667***  0.9236*** 0.7688*** 0.8835*** 1.0269*** 0.7101*** 0.6805** 
 (0.156)  (0.157) (0.155) (0.165) (0.171) (0.187) (0.203) 
Mstat (omitted)  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
 
High Skilled 0.2552***  0.2790*** 0.3235*** 0.4331*** 0.5867*** 0.8718*** 0.9924*** 
 (0.065)  (0.065) (0.064) (0.068) (0.071) (0.077) (0.084) 
Low Skilled -0.1742**  -0.2734*** -0.3308*** -0.4616*** -0.3814*** -0.3581*** -0.2450*** 
 (0.045)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.058) 
N 3,927  3,927 3,927 3,927 3,927 3,927 3,927 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1446 0.1246 0.1098 0.1062 0.0903 0.0767 0.0550 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Source: GOSI Dataset, GOSI 
 
This industry is the most critical industry in Saudi Arabia as the economy is highly dependent 
on oil. The coefficients are somewhat higher than other industries, however, the trend of Age 
is similar for both Saudis and non-Saudis. Gender is interesting as it continues to be negative 
across time for Saudis. On the other hand, there is a high positive significance between the 
Gender variable and Wage per Hour in the non-Saudi workers. This might be reflective of the 
foreign female employment, both high and low skilled, in the Saudi oil company as it was an 
American company up until the end of the 1970s. The company therefore had a history of 
employing females already, but although still high it was declining in 2015. This might 
indicate a trend for female foreign workers being replaced by female nationals.  
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The skill level is highly significant for both high and low skilled workers, as well as nationals 
and non-nationals. For nationals, High Skilled is negatively correlated to Wage per Hour 
from 2009 to 2012, and the coefficient becomes highly and significantly positive in 2014-15. 
However, the Low Skilled nationals continue to have a negatively significant relationship 
with Wage per Hour that is increasing over time from 2009 to 2015. As for non-nationals, 
foreign High Skilled workers show a highly positive significance with an increasing trend on 
Wage per Hour. The Low Skilled foreign workers are showing a negatively significant 
relationship across all years. 
Summary of Trend in Individual Industries 
Table 5.16 summarises the results found in the different industries, including the similarities 
and differences between Saudis, foreigners, in terms of Gender, High Skilled, and Low 
Skilled variables’ impact on Hourly Wage. The main interpretation of these results is that 
females showed positive improvement after 2012, which could reflect the impact of Nitaqat 
policy on Saudi female earnings, whereas the foreigner females had more negative 
relationship across time. The distinctive industry here is the Mining and Quarrying that 
includes the oil sector in Saudi. The oil sector had been exempted from regulations against 
female employment. Hence, it follows an opposite trend where Saudi females have a negative 
relationship and foreign females have positive relationship to earning in comparison to the 
male earnings.  
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Table 5.16: Summary of Results in Individual Industries 
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When looking at the high skilled variable’s impact on earning compared to the medium 
skilled category, we found that in most industries, the high skilled Saudis were only 
significantly positive after 2012. Meanwhile, high skilled foreign workers show a high 
significant positive relationship to earnings in all industries. This is mostly due to the wage 
structure in the Saudi labour market, where the pay system is based on the standard of living 
of their country of origin. For example a low skilled worker from Bangladesh is paid one 
third the wage of Saudis, and the Saudis are paid one third of the wage of a high skilled 
western worker.  
The low skilled results show negative results across time for both Saudis and foreigners, 
however, the foreigners in most industries were able to turn the relationship positive in 2015. 
This could indicate how the Saudi low skilled cannot compete with the low skilled foreigner 
as their hourly wages are greatly less than that of the Saudi low skilled. This also shows how 
the private sector is deeply dependent on low skilled foreign workers.      
5.5       Conclusion 
Using the wage equation, four different specifications were studied in this chapter. First we 
conducted an FE panel regression separately for Saudis and non-Saudis. Second, a cross-
sectional analysis over time was studied separately based on nationality, and thirdly, we 
conducted a cross-sectional analysis over time for six different industries also based on 
nationality. One of the limitations of this chapter was that it was descriptive. The data did not 
allow for merging the Nitaqat data therefore although there are changes in trends across most 
of the results around the time of the Nitaqat implementation, we cannot confidently confirm 
that it is caused by the policy. Another limitation was the classification of industries where 
we had to use the aggregated industry level. 
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Although the input of Nitaqat policy variables was not included here due to limitations of the 
data, this chapter gave a picture of the impact of different variables before and after the 
policy on Wage per Hour. The literature suggests that Wage per Hour can be an indicator of 
productivity. The results suggested that growth in Wage per Hour does decline for Saudis 
during 2011 and 2012, while foreigners show a positive trend from 2010 to 2015, with lower 
growth between 2011 to 2012. This might suggest that with the introduction of the Nitaqat 
policy, there is an effect of lower growth and productivity during the initial few years of 
implementation. Following the theory of labour demand, the economy of the private sector 
seems to recover especially for the primary sector of the labour market which consists of 
Saudis. Meanwhile, the results on foreigners are somewhat conflicting, where the FE panel 
results in Table 5.7 showed that foreigners and Saudis had similar movements with higher 
growth rates for 2011-2013 and then significantly higher results in the last two years. The FE 
panel imposed the constraint that these variables cannot be observed over time. Tables 5.8 
through to 5.15 observed the impact of variables such as Age, Gender and Skill on Wage per 
Hour year-on-year on the whole economy and on individual industries. The evidence showed 
how high skills are positively significant to the growth of the economy representing the need 
to invest in human capital. The Low Skill variable has shown negative trends for Saudis, 
whereas, low skilled foreigners’ did suffer in between 2011 and 2013 before recovering in 
2014 and 2015. Furthermore, there is an effect of higher Wage per Hour across time for 
females after 2011, which might be an impact of Nitaqat, although we cannot positively 
confirm causality at this point. It is impressive to see the change happening, as this period 
represents significant improvements that occurred in female employment during that time and 
the doors that were opened to increase their participation rate.  
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In terms of future analysis, it will be interesting to add the estimation of Oaxaca 
decomposition for Saudis and non-Saudis as well as females and males in future work. The 
Oaxaca decomposition is commonly used to examine the differences between the mean 
outcome of log wages. It divides these differentials into two parts; the explained and the 
unexplained. The explained part is the difference between the two groups; such as males and 
females that can be explained by difference in productivity characteristics (i.e. work 
experience or education). On the other hand, the unexplained is the residual that cannot be 
attributed to the common wage determinants, therefore is used as a measure for 
discrimination between the two groups (Jann, 2008). 
The next chapter will bring in some of the impact of Nitaqat on productivity at the industry 
level. 
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Figure 5.1: Framework of Reijnders & de Vries (2007) 
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5.B Appendix 
Table 5.17: A summary table of datasets and variables used in Chapter 5. 
Datasets Level of Data Number of 
Observation 
Variables Used Variable Definition 
1. SAMA Industry Level 
1.Agriculture, 
forestry, fishery 




4. Electricity, oil and 
water 
5. Construction 
6. Wholesale and 
retail, restaurants 
and hotels 
7. Transport, storage 
and communications 
8. Finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business 
services 
9. Public, social and 
personal services 




Real GDP Is a macroeconomic 
measure of the value 
of economic output 
adjusted for price 
changes such as 
inflation or deflation. 
 
2. LFS Industry Level 10 
Industries 
Actual Average Hours 
Worked 
The average hours worked 
per week at the industry 
level. 
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 Total Factor Productivity 
6.1       Introduction 
The previous chapter considered labour productivity. After adjusting for the use of physical 
capital ‘K’, this chapter links the impact of the Nitaqat policy on Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) using both a growth accounting framework and regression analysis. The analysis of 
earnings in Chapter 5 suggests that a change happened in the economy right after the 
implementation of the Nitaqat policy, and this is likely to reflect a change in labour 
productivity. However, there was no definitive link to relate these results to Nitaqat because 
(as previously explained) it was not possible to merge the Nitaqat variables to the GOSI 
dataset. However, this chapter was able to merge the Annual Establishment Survey (AES) 
and the Nitaqat dataset at the industry level which has allowed for analysis of the effect of 
Nitaqat on productivity. 
 Growth Accounting Exercise 
The growth accounting framework is the most commonly used measure internationally to 
measure productivity between countries. It is a specific and useful method that allows for 
observation of change in the economic structure over time (ONS Manual, 2007). It breaks 
down the economic growth into contributions of capital, labour and other inputs, however it 
does not imply a causal relationship (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009; Jorgenson and Timmer, 
2011; ONS Manual, 2007), The remaining residual factor is usually interpreted as the 
contribution of technology and is called the Solow residual, referencing the Solow growth 
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model, or more commonly TFP. Furthermore, growth accounting provides a good benchmark 
for economic performance analysis across countries (Bosworth and Collins, 2007). 
The most basic form of the growth accounting calculation is given by: 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐴 = 𝛥 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑌
𝐿








𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐴 indicates the change in TFP, (𝑌
𝐿
) is the real GDP for the private sector over the number 
of total workers in the private sector and S denotes the share of capital represented by 
equation 6-2. To calculate the capital stock variable, a deflation of the Investment variable 
(from Equation 6-1) was first necessary to obtain an accurate measure of real investment. 
However, with the lack of data available on the deflator for investments, the GDP deflator21 
was used as a substitute. The construction of Capital Stock assumes geometric depreciation 
(𝛿), as used in EU KLEMS (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009), and is given by: 




𝐾𝑡 = (𝐾𝑡−1)(1 − 𝛿) + 𝐼𝑡  6-4) 
  
Where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate,  𝐾𝑡 is Capital Stock, and 𝐼𝑡 is Investment at time ‘t’. 
Following Bosworth & Collins (2008) and Espinoza (2012) we set the depreciation rate at 
0.06. 
                                                 
21 Calculated using the formula:  (𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡/(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃)2010 
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In Equation (6-1) L reflects the labour input, which was taken from the LFS. Although the 
LFS does not have a sectoral division between the public and private sector, the former is 
represented by the public administration industry, as well as education and health sectors 
which are mostly public. An exclusion of those three industries provides a measure of the 
number of workers and hours worked in the private sector. Labour input, L, was measured in 
two ways, first by using total hours worked per year in the private sector and secondly by 
using total number of workers in the private sector taken from the LFS data. The share of 
capital, S, was assumed to be 0.33 which is the world average  (Senhadji, 2000, Weil, 2009, 
Schreyer, 2001) given the lack of reliable data for Saudi Arabia on this variable. However, 
because the share of the oil sector is very high, we also conducted the growth accounting 
using S=0.5, which gave similar trends22.  The main growth accounting results are given in 
Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Decomposition of GDP Per Hour worked (S=0.33) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑌/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) 𝑆∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐴) 
2007 0.24 9.60 3.17 -2.93 
2008 3.23 16.35 5.39 -2.16 
2009 -6.14 -17.27 -5.70 -0.44 
2010 -0.70 13.38 4.42 -5.12 
2011 -7.80 0.08 0.03 -7.83 
2012 -0.55 1.62 0.53 -1.08 
2013 2.49 2.34 0.77 1.72 
2014 7.72 5.18 1.71 6.01 
2015 3.91 -15.47 -5.10 9.02 
  
Table 6.1 presents the results of the growth accounting exercise from 2007 to 2015. As 
                                                 
22 Results of S=0.5 are found in the appendices. 
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discussed in Chapter 3, it is useful to use total hours worked as it captures the fluctuations 
that might appear within firms in response to economic changes (ONS, 2007), in this context, 
the Nitaqat policy. It would be preferable to study a longer period but data prior to this date is 
missing. Column (1) represents the growth in labour productivity calculated through the 
growth of real GDP over total hours worked in the private sector. Although this exercise does 
not infer causality it is very likely that the decline in 2009 was due to the financial crisis. 
However, the negative growth continues to 2012, which is probably a reaction to Nitaqat by 
the private sector as it had to endure sudden higher costs when the policy was introduced in 
2011. Labour productivity recovers to positive growth in 2013 to 2015.  
These results confirm the analysis made in Chapter 5 studying the growth in labour 
productivity before and after the Nitaqat policy. Column (2) shows the growth in capital 
stock over total hours worked in the private sector. It is positive throughout the time period 
except for 2009 and 2015. The negative growth in 2009 is most likely due to the financial 
crisis impact. However, there is also a decline in the growth of capital stock per hour worked 
in 2011 by 13.30%, which might be the direct impact of the Nitaqat policy. The growth 
recovers in 2012 up until 2015 which was the beginning of the drop of oil prices around the 
world. As explained, the Saudi economy relies heavily on the oil revenue, and an increase or 
decrease in oil prices reflects immediately on the rest of the economy. Column (3) represents 
the growth in the share weighted capital-labour ratio, where S=0.33.  Column (4) is the 
residual TFP. TFP shows a negative trend from 2007 to 2012, because it is calculated by 
subtracting column (1) from column (3) - the growth of the share of capital stock is higher 
than the growth in labour productivity which results in the negative trend in those years. The 
growth of labour productivity in column (1) started a positive trend in 2013 and increased by 
over 5% in 2014, which is also reflected in a positive growth in TFP in column (4). 
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Table 6.2 shows the growth accounting results when workers are used as the measure of 
labour input. 
Table 6.2: Decomposition of GDP Per Worker S=0.33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑌/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) 𝑆∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐴) 
2007 -2.45 6.91 2.28 -4.73 
2008 1.70 14.81 4.89 -3.19 
2009 -5.39 -16.53 -5.45 0.06 
2010 -2.64 11.44 3.78 -6.42 
2011 -5.68 2.20 0.73 -6.41 
2012 -0.08 2.09 0.69 -0.77 
2013 1.60 1.45 0.48 1.12 
2014 0.75 -1.78 -0.59 1.34 
2015 -0.76 -20.14 -6.65 5.88 
The rest of this chapter uses number of workers, due to lack of data on hours worked in the 
AES on which the rest of the chapter relies, as well as the merging between the AES and the 
Nitaqat dataset. Therefore, Table 6.2 uses the labour input as number of workers in the 
private sector to have consistency of the labour inputs across different methods. The results 
have similar trends to the data shown in Table 6.1, except that the decline in labour 
productivity here in 2015 in column (1) is slightly more than it is using the per hour worked 
measure, where the growth in labour productivity reaches a negative rate. Moreover, the 
contribution of capital stock per worker also has a similar trend to the previous table. 
However, the negative growth starts to appear in 2014 whereas in Table 6.1, the contribution 
of the growth of capital stock only turns negative in 2015. The negative trend in the 
contribution of capital per worker indicates that firms in the private sector were forced to 
increase their labour productivity whilst reducing their capital per worker, which might 
suggest that this is their way to survive the higher costs imposed by Nitaqat, but it might also 
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be due to the oil price shock. Furthermore, column (4) representing the growth in TFP has the 
same trend as the previous table with a negative growth in 2011 and 2012, and a positive 
increasing trend between 2013 to 2015. These results indicate that productivity increased 
after the implementation of Nitaqat, however we cannot confirm the association of Nitaqat at 
this point and further analysis is necessary in order to do so.  
Welch (1976) suggests that affirmative action policies result in productivity losses as workers 
are hired because of the quota requirement rather than their qualification, which is what is 
observed in the first two years of the application of Nitaqat in 2011 and 2012. However, he 
further suggests that policies such as the affirmative action would continue to reduce 
economic productivity and efficiency overall. However, the growth accounting results 
suggest otherwise. The fall in productivity right after the application of the policy, followed 
by an increased productivity is more in line with the theory of labour demand. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, Riley & Bondibene (2015) suggest that firms raise their productivity through 
increasing their TFP. The labour demand theory suggests that an introduction or a rise in the 
minimum wage causes higher costs on firms, therefore the immediate reaction would be a 
decline in productivity. Subsequently, to maintain profitability and continue operating in the 
market, firms must raise their labour productivity to match the higher costs and stay 
profitable. These results show that the private sector was able to increase its labour 
productivity between 2013 and 2015 per hour worked with a slight decline in 2015 per 
worker. TFP growth increases from 2013 to 2015 regardless of the labour measure.   
6.2       The Dataset 
This chapter uses two datasets. The first is the AES produced by the Saudi General Authority 
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for Statistics. The survey is executed annually exploring characteristics of economic 
establishments from around the Kingdom. It is based on a random sample of 33,000 
establishments across all industries and covers all 13 major regions of Saudi Arabia; cities in 
these regions include around 84% of all establishments around the country as well as 91% of 
workers (https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/64).    
Furthermore, it is an industry level dataset, providing data from 2005-2015; 2005-2009 
includes 55 industries, and from 2010 onwards, industries were classified in more detail 
producing 83 industries. According to the methodology conducted for the survey, the 
classification of industries is based on the International Standard of Industrial Classification 
(ISIC REV.4), yet there are still minor changes that are adopted to fit the nature of 
establishments that operate in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/64). 
Variables in the dataset are all classified by size and industry level23. Size class is based on 
number of employees and is divided into three classes; fewer than five employees, between 
five and nineteen employees, and twenty employees or more. This classification is different 
than the Nitaqat dataset where, as mentioned in the data section of Chapter 4, the sizes are 
divided into five categories. A matching between the different industries was made to enable 
the analysis of trends over time and therefore the industries from 2010 onwards were matched 
with the 2005 to 2009 producing 55 industries to provide consistency across time.  
The variables in the dataset are: Establishments, defined as a legal economic entity that has a 
fixed location, operating in a specific industry (https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/64); Number of 
Workers, representing all individuals who work in the establishment, identified by their 
                                                 
23 Table 6.13 shows the list of 26 industries merged from different datasets in the Appendix.  
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nationality, either Saudi or foreigner; Worker Remuneration, defined as the annual payment 
to workers per year, industry and size and also consisting of benefits and bonuses paid to 
workers; Operating Expenses, covering all establishments’ expenses to operate within a 
specific industry, and perhaps the most important variable, Operating Revenues, defined as 
“All cash revenues earned as a result of providing a service for consumers, trading in goods 
in general, or practicing a main activity or other secondary activities, such as the sale and 
marketing of its products. The operating revenues also include the sales of goods purchased 
for the purpose of reselling them in in the same condition, daily returns received in return for 
operations, total revenues of sales of manufactured products, other operating revenues that 
are not related to the main economic activity of the establishment but other secondary 
activities, such as revenues of industrial services and secondary activities, as well as 
revenues of selling manufacturing wastes and renting buildings, non-agricultural plots and 
machinery” (https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/64). Operating Revenues is used as the output 
variable in the productivity function in this chapter. Lastly, we also use Gross Capital 
Formation made by the establishment each year. This will represent the basis for the capital 
stock calculation in the methodology section. The availability of this data has allowed the 
study of the economy before and after the Nitaqat policy in terms of productivity using 
various econometric techniques.  
However, although the previously mentioned dataset is useful, to more accurately study the 
impact of the Nitaqat policy on productivity, we had to construct a new dataset, merging the 
Nitaqat dataset with the AES. This newly merged dataset includes only 26 industries24, due to 
difficulties matching industry definition, and five years of data between 2011 and 2015. The 
                                                 
24 Industry classification in the three datasets used are in the Appendix.  
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variables included in the merged dataset are; SLED, ILED, KLED, LE, NFE, Lr, Ly, SaudiR, 
SaudiY, ForeignR, ForeignY. The first five variables are taken from the AES, and the 
remaining are from the Nitaqat dataset. SLED is the deflated sales per worker; ILED is the 
investment per worker; KLED is the capital stock per worker; LE is total number of workers; 
and NFE is total number of firms. As for the Nitaqat dataset variables, we were able to 
extract Lr, which is the number of workers that are in Red firms. Similarly Ly is the number 
of workers in Yellow firms. The remaining variables have more detail on nationality - SaudiR 
and ForeignR are number of Saudi and foreign workers in Red firms, whereas SaudiY and 
ForeignY are number of Saudi and foreign workers in Yellow firms.  
 Summary Statistics  
To understand sources of growth of TFP, it is good to measure the sources of growth 
represented by the labour and capital that make up the TFP. First, we calculate the average, 
growth in Sales per worker across all firms: 
Table 6.3: Mean and Standard Deviation of growth in Sales and Capital per Worker 
 Growth in Sales per Worker Growth in Capital Stock Per Worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 
2012 0.44 2.25 6.95 12.31 
2013 6.06 11.08 1.48 11.06 
2014 -6.41 2.75 -1.43 30.78 
2015 2.25 9.03 -3.42 9.61 
Table 6.3 represents the average growth in sales per worker after the introduction of the 
policy, as seen in Chapter 5, growth in labour productivity starts to recover in 2015. The 
growth in capital stock is per worker and indicates a declining trend, suggesting that due to 
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the higher costs of the policy on the private sector, industries were forced to increase labour 
productivity while reducing their capital per worker to survive the higher costs imposed after 
the policy. These results are somewhat consistent with the growth accounting exercise 
conducted earlier in this chapter, with slight differences between the two results attributed to 
the variance in the different datasets used to conduct both methods. Columns (2) and (4) 
report the standard deviation from the mean across the sample of the 26 industries. 
6.3       Methodology 







, 𝑇) 6-5) 
Starting with the variables from AES dataset, 𝑌𝑗 denotes the output variable ‘Sales’ per 
industry and 𝐾𝑗 indicates the capital stock variable per industry. We divide both by 𝐿𝑗, total 
number of workers, since we are interested in labour productivity.  
As mentioned earlier, construction of the capital stock variable was necessary again as now 
the variables are from the AES dataset rather than national accounts in the growth accounting 
exercise. Deflating the Investment variable was necessary to obtain an accurate measure of 
real capital stock – this again used the GDP deflator due to lack of data on investment 
deflators. Similarly, to the calculation above we use geometric depreciation, with the 
depreciation rate equal to 0.06.  
Using the production function as the basic framework, the econometric analysis is divided 
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into two parts; firstly the ‘before and after’ Nitaqat policy analysis in terms of labour 
productivity. The available data for this part is from 2005-2015. The analysis starts with 
the before period 2005-2010, and the after period is 2011-2015. This part will use FE panel 
regression analysis from the AES dataset at the industry level using 55 industries. The second 
part uses the new merged dataset of 26 industries, where the Nitaqat variables were included.  
 Before-After Analysis 
First, a “Before-After” panel data analysis was conducted to study the trends of productivity 
in the economy. According to Gujarati (2009) there are many advantages to using panel data 
such as raising the sample size substantially which is better for small samples. Moreover, 
since it studies the cross-sectional variables across time, it gives a better insight of the 
dynamics of change. To address problems of heterogeneity, the FE specification is useful. 
FE allow the regression specification to vary amongst individuals recognising that each cross-
sectional unit have unique characteristics thereby allowing observation of those changes. One 
of its disadvantages however is that it consumes higher degrees of freedom when the number 
of cross-sectional units is very large. Fortunately, our panel data is considered small and so 
this does not apply. In the following analysis, an FE panel regression will be conducted, using 




















+  𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(
𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
) + 𝛽3  ∑ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐷(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦) + 𝜀𝑗𝑡    6-7) 
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The variables used in these specifications are all taken from the AES dataset, using 55 
industries. Equations 6.6 and 6.7 were conducted twice, before and after the policy. Table 6.4 
in the results section captures the effect before and after the policy from 2005-2015, taking 




as the dependent variable 
representing output per worker. In specification 6-6 a study of output per worker depends on 




, using industries as fixed effects and a base year of 
2005 in the before analysis and 2011 in the after analysis.  Moreover, specification 6-7 adds 
in one more variable, which is the ratio of Saudis working in the private sector to the total 
number of workers in the private sector represented by 𝑙𝑛(
𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
). Specification 6-7 also uses 
industry fixed effects and a before and after analysis. 
 Nitaqat Policy Impact 
This chapter brings in the impact of Nitaqat from Chapter 4 in various ways. Firstly by 
adding employment proportions for affected firms which is achieved by creating the 






 denoting the share of employees in Red and Yellow 
firms over the total number of employees per industry. Secondly, a further division of labour 
from the Nitaqat dataset was taken where a distinction was made between Saudis and 




) representing the Saudi Employment of Red firms over Total Employment per Industry 
“j” and time “t”; (𝑆𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
) Saudi Employment of Yellow firms over Total Employment per 
Industry “j” and time “t”; (𝐹𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
) Foreign Employment of Red firms over Total Employment 
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per Industry “j” and time “t”; and (𝐹𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
)  Foreign Employment of Yellow firms over Total 
Employment per Industry “j” and time “t”. 
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+  𝐵4 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝐹𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
)  +  𝛽5 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝐹𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
)  +  𝜀𝑗𝑡  6-10) 
  
Specifications 6-8, 6-9 and 6-10 are applied using two different methods, the first of which is 
the FE Weighted Least Square (WLS) panel analysis. WLS is a special case of Generlised 
Least Square (GLS) that allows for weights to assign different importance to each industry 
using the size of the industry, based on number of firms. The WLS regression was necessary 
here to represent the different weights of industries due to the nature of the small dataset. 
Therefore, the share of firms per industry was used through probability weights, denoting the 
inverse of the probability that this observation was sampled. The large difference between 
weighted and unweighted regressions suggests that the errors may be correlated with the 
regressors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The second method was cross-sectional analysis to 
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study the impact of the Nitaqat policy across time. 
6.4       Results 
 Before-After Analysis 
The FE panel regression specifications 6-6 and 6-7 for the ‘before-after’ analysis are; 
Table 6.4: Regression results, before and after 
Panel FE (1) (2) 
Ln (𝐾
𝐿





)  0.0723*  (0.030) 
Before   
2006 -0.0346 -0.0434 
 (0.078) (0.077) 
2007 -0.0691 -0.0817 
 (0.078) (0.077) 
2008 -0.2200** -0.2362** 
 (0.078) (0.078) 
2009 -0.0249 -0.0435 
 (0.078) (0.078) 
2010 0.1943* 0.1378* 
 (0.077) (0.080) 
After   
2011 0.0309 -0.0254 
 (0.078) (0.082) 
2012 0.0334 -0.0270 
 (0.078) (0.082) 
2013 0.0857 0.01920 
 (0.079) (0.083) 
2014 0.0612 -0.0187 
 (0.078) (0.085) 
2015 0.2351** 0.1473* 
 (0.078) (0.086) 
FE ✓ ✓ 
N 590 590 
𝑅2 0.391 0.314 
 Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Sources: Annual Establishment Survey, General Authority for Statistics 
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The results in column (1) use Equation 6-6 to show the impact of capital per worker (the 
independent variable) on output per worker (dependent variable), whereas column (2) uses 
Equation 6-7  that includes an addition of the ratio of Saudis in the private sector’s labour 
market, which is another independent variable that was added in specification 6-7 to study the 
effect of the share of labour, Saudis, against the foreigners on output per worker. Both 
specifications are based on 55 industries included as FE using the AES dataset. Results of 
both specifications provide a similar trend with some variations in the actual growth rate. The 
capital per worker is highly significant where a 1% rise in capital per worker increases output 
per worker by around 0.17%. The ratio of Saudi workers in the private sector suggests a 
positively significant impact on productivity with a 1% increase in the ratio of Saudis in the 
private sector increasing productivity by around 0.07%. 
It is apparent in the results that productivity represented by output per worker has a negative 
trend compared to the base year of 2005 in the before period. This is most likely due to the 
2006 stock market crash. In Feburary 2006, the Saudi stock market index (TASI)25 reached 
its highest point, following a three-year high streak. The stock market in Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC countries had risen by almost ten-fold between 2000 and 2005 (SAMA, 2017). 
After the high point in February the market started to collapse, losing 65% of its value by the 
end of 2006. We can confidently assume that the negative growth in output per worker in the 
following years was mainly due to the crash of the stock market as the economy has slowed 
down as a result. Furthermore, 2008 was the year of the global financial crisis which had a 
                                                 
25 Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) www.tadawul.com. 
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higher negative impact on productivity. During the same year, oil prices were at 
unprecedented highs exceeding $100 per barrel for the first time in history. It is assumed that 
these high oil prices started to reflect on the Saudi economy and the negative trend started to 
decline in 2009, before turning into a highly significant positive coefficient in 2010. 
The after period is also very interesting, as specifications 6-6 and 6-7 appear to have different 
trends, with column (1) indicating a positive trend reaching a significant 0.23% in 2015. 
After the ratio of Saudis in the labour market was included to the specification in column (2), 
it appears that 2011 and 2012 indicate a decline in productivity, which is consistent with our 
conclusions from Chapter 5, where we assume the introduction of the Nitaqat policy did have 
an impact. Productivity started to recover in 2013, but with the inclusion of the micro firms in 
2014, this might have negatively impacted the 2014 results, as these firms are likely to have 
had lower productivity.  Productivity does turn back to a highly positively significant 
coefficient in 2015. This in in line with the theory of labour demand as suggested earlier that 
firms need to improve their labour productivity to maintain profitability and remain in the 
market. The negative results in 2011 and 2012 also confirm the results suggested in the 
growth accounting exercise.  
 The Impact of the Nitaqat Policy  
We next consider more directly the impact of the Nitaqat policy by adding information on 
Red and Yellow firms as explained above.  The specifications in this section use the newly 
merged dataset bringing in the implication of the Nitaqat policy at the industry level using 26 
industries. Six new variables were introduced, the first is (𝑳𝒓𝒋𝒕
𝑳𝒋𝒕
) representing the share of 
labour in Red firms and the second is (𝑳𝒚𝒋𝒕
𝑳𝒋𝒕
) indicating the share of labour in Yellow firms. The 
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variables are then further divided into two colours, Red and Yellow, and two nationalities, 
Saudis and foreigners. 
Table 6.5: FE panel model in relations to the Nitaqat policy, weighted and deflated 
Panel FE (1) (2)          (3) 
Ln (𝐾
𝐿
) 0.0051 0.0084 0.0071 




)  -0.0172  




)  -0.0061  




)   -0.0016 




)   0.0046 





  -0.0022 




)   -0.0003 
  (0.026)  
D(Year)      
2012 0.0028 0.0026 0.0024 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.019) 
2013 0.0387* 0.0386* 0.0387 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.038)  
2014 -0.0227 -0.0220 -0.0219 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.047)  
2015 0.0200 0.0212 0.0207 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.052)  
FE  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 125 125 125 
𝑅2 0.5151 0.5306 0.5199 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Sources:Annual Establishment Survey, General Authority for Statistics, Nitaqat 
Dataset, MOL, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
In this section, a WLS specification was used for equations 6-8, 6-9 and 6-10) to allow for 
weighing the variables using firms as weights per industry. Column (1) uses specification 6-8 
to estimate the effect of capital per worker on output per worker over time using FE. Column 
(2) studies specification 6-9 in which the labour shares from the Nitaqat dataset were added 
to the equation. With the dependent variable still being output per worker, the independent 
variables in column (2) are capital per worker, share of labour in Red firms, and share of 
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labour in Yellow firms, measured against Green and Platinum share of labour. Time dummies 
were also included to allow for observation of trend over time. And finally column (3) studies 
specification 6-10, where the dependent variable is still output per worker, independent 
variables are capital per worker, and share of labour. The share of labour here is divided into 
four categories to account for nationality differences in both Red and Yellow firms. the 
labour variables used are Ln(
𝑆𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡




); is the share of Saudis in Yellow firms in the labour market, 𝐿𝑛(
𝐹𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
); is the 
share of foreign workers in Red firms, and Ln(
𝐹𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
); is the share of foreigners in the Yellow 
firms. Column (3) shows a time trend as a result of time dummies included in specification 6-
10. 
The time trend shows insignificant results, which might be due to the small dataset that is 
constructed based on 26 industries. However, there is a positive trend after 2011, confirming 
that Nitaqat was a part of the reason for firms increasing their productivities. There is a 
suggestion that having more Saudis in Yellow firms raises productivity, although the 
coefficient is not significant. The percentage of Saudis in Red firms appears to lower 
productivity and foreign workers also lower productivity in both Red and Yellow firms.   
Table 6.6 shows the results when sales per worker are regressed on capital per worker and the 
proportion of workers in Red and Yellow firms for each year. These results should be treated 
with caution as the sample size is very small in each regression, at only 26 observations. 
Nonetheless they suggest that a high proportion of labour in Yellow firms in an industry 
seems to raise productivity in the later years.  
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Table 6.6: Labour impact of the policy on productivity 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Sources: Annual Establishment Survey, General Authority for Statistics; Nitaqat Dataset, MOL; Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
Table 6.6 studies specification 6-9 using a cross sectional analysis to observe the change of 
variables over time. The dependent variable here is output per worker, regressed on capital 
per worker, and share of labour in Red firms and Yellow firms against the Green and 
Platinum share of labour. Each year is studied separately to observe the change over time. 
These results are consistent with those of Chapter 5, where 2014 and 2015 show positive 
impacts on productivity. Meanwhile, the Red firms show negative relations across all years, 
although these are largely insignificant other than a weakly significant result in 2012. This 
could suggest that since the Yellow firms are immediately under the quota cut-off rate, the 
theory of the labour demand is applicable on these Yellow firms, where they are able to 
improve their productivity and upgrade to the Green category more easily than the Red firms. 
The Red firms need to upgrade twice, from Red to Yellow, and then subsequently from 
Yellow to Green in order to be compliant and start receiving the benefits. This puts high 
pressure on Red firms and, as suggested by the results above, they appear not to be able to 
Specification 
6-9 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ln(𝑲
𝑳
) Coef. 0.8451*** 0.8823***  0.8827*** 0.7931*** 0.7136*** 
 Std. Error (0.160) (0.161)  (0.155) (0.125) (0.132) 





Coef. -0.4867 -0.4662* -0.3158 -0.2630 -0.1922 
Std. Error (0.309) (0.256)  (0.351) (0.216) (0.231) 
t -1.58 -1.82 -1.85 -1.22 -0.83 
Ln (𝑳𝒚𝒋𝒕
𝑳𝒋𝒕
) Coef. 0.0530 0.0029 -0.0375 0.2663* 0.2086* 
Std. Error (0.121) (0.105)  (0.122) (0.105) (0.109) 
t 0.44 0.03 -0.31 2.55 1.91 
N  26 26 26 26 26 
𝑅2  0.5931 0.6234 0.5941 0.5971 0.5345 
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raise productivity to compensate. This is evidence in favour of the theory proposed by Welch 
(1976) who suggested that in an economy-wide quota system with two groups, productivity 
will decline for the lower group, as the quota is simply too high for them to reach. 
Finally we examine the results year-on-year when we divide labour by Saudis and foreigners 
in Red and Yellow firms. Again we caveat that the sample size is relatively small. 








































2012 0.8204*** -0.8932* 0.8286* 0.0375 -1.0583* 26 0.7139 
 (0.125) (0.332) (0.371) (0.230) (0.435) 
 
  
2013 0.8553*** -1.2076** 1.4875** 0.9584* -1.9588** 26 0.7710 
 (0.171) (0.395) (0.466) (0.387) (0.541) 
 
  
2014 0.4939*** -1.0019* 1.3493** 0.5120* -1.5584** 26 0.7507 
 (0.093) (0.388) (0.404) (0.271) (0.442) 
 
  
2015 0.1721 -0.5554 0.7823 -0.0802 -0.7732 26 0.5422 
 (0.195) (0.497) (0.511) (0.522) (0.645)   
        
Notes: ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data Sources: Annual Establishment Survey, General Authority for Statistics; Nitaqat Dataset, MOL; Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
Table 6.7 studies specification 6-10 using a cross sectional analysis. Where the dependent 
variable is output per worker, regressed on capital per worker, and the share of labour is 




representing the share of Saudis in Red firms in the labour market, Ln(
𝑆𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡
); is the share of 
Saudis in Yellow firms in the labour market, 𝐿𝑛(
𝐹𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑗𝑡




); is the share of foreigners in the Yellow firms. Each year is studied 
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separately to observe the change over time. 
This division gives a better insight on the impact of the Nitaqat policy since it distinguishes 
between nationalities in both treated colour groups, which is the main goal of the policy. 
Column (2) and (4) show the results for Red firms; there is a negative significant relationship 
as the share of Saudis increases in Red firms, and an opposite trend for foreigners. The 
foreigners in Red firms show an insignificant impact on labour productivity in three years but 
have a highly significant positive impact in 2013 and 2014, which is most probably due to the 
addition of the micro firms to the policy during that time. As Red firms are far behind the 
quota, the Saudis indicate lower productivity because it might result in hindering their daily 
operation since they are not actually required but rather they are imposed by Nitaqat.  
Column (3) and (5) observe the trend in the Yellow firms for Saudis and foreigners, 
Foreigners in Yellow firms have highly significant negative impacts. Therefore for Yellow 
firms, adding Saudi employees raises productivity and adding foreigners would reduce it. The 
big negative impact of foreign employees in Yellow firms is because Yellow firms are the 
targeted group in this policy, they are immediately below the cutoff to upgrade to the Green 
category. Therefore, the higher the share of the foreigners in Yellow firms, the lower their 
Saudization rate would be. This leads to the continuation of the sanctions and added costs and 
makes the firm more restrictive in the market which explains the significant negative impact. 
6.5       Conclusion 
This chapter studied productivity using three different methods; growth accounting, ‘before-
after’ analysis, and the implication of Nitaqat. The ‘before-after’ analysis used an industry 
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level FE panel regression with 55 industries included using the AES dataset from 2005-2015. 
Meanwhile, the implication of Nitaqat has used the merged dataset of AES and Nitaqat, 
reducing the sample to only 26 industries. Both panel and cross-sectional analysis over time 
were used in this section. The panel regression used was a FE WLS analysis. The WLS was 
used to allow for firm weights to give more accurate results and weights for different 
industries due to the small sample nature of the dataset. The cross-sectional analysis over 
time was used afterwards to bring in the implication of the Nitaqat on productivity 
distinguishing between nationalities and Yellow and Red firms. 
Results are consistent throughout this chapter, demonstrating that productivity has declined in 
the first two years 2011-12, but shows a tendency to increase thereafter. It is suggested by 
labour demand theory and the literature on the impact of minimum wage on productivity, that 
for firms to stay in the market and continue being profitable, they must raise their 
productivity. After adding the Nitaqat labour data to measure the impact of the policy on 
labour productivity, the policy was found to have a positive significant effect on the Yellow 
category for Saudi employees, and a negative effect as the share of foreign employment 
increases. This could indicate that Yellow firms are benefitting from the policy as their labour 
productivity is increasing with the addition of Saudi workers. Meanwhile, the Red category 
displays an opposite effect, where adding Saudis would significantly reduce their labour 
productivity, and an addition of foreigners would raise it. Therefore, with Red firms believed 
to have a higher share of the small and micro firms (which is the bigger size group in the 
economy in the beginning of the policy implementation), it has a greater effect on the 
economy as a negative labour productivity in the first two years. However, because the policy 
has extremely strict rules, most firms were forced to either raise their productivity or exit the 
market, resulting in a productivity increase over time.  
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6.A Appendix 
Growth Accounting Exercise using S=0.5  
S=0.5, L =hour worked 
Table 6.8: Growth Accounting results using S=0.5, L =hour worked 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑌/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) 𝑆∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐴) 
2007 0.24 9.60 4.80 -4.56 
2008 3.23 16.35 8.17 -4.94 
2009 -6.14 -17.27 -8.63 2.50 
2010 -0.70 13.38 6.69 -7.39 
2011 -7.80 0.08 0.04 -7.84 
2012 -0.55 1.62 0.81 -1.36 
2013 2.49 2.34 1.17 1.32 
2014 7.72 5.18 2.59 5.13 
2015 3.91 -15.47 -7.73 11.65 
Growth Accounting Exercise using S=0.5  
S=0.5, L =Number of workers 
Table 6.9: Growth Accounting results using S=0.5, L =Number of workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑌/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) 𝑆∆𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐿) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐴) 
2007 -2.45 6.91 3.46 -5.91 
2008 1.70 14.81 7.41 -5.71 
2009 -5.39 -16.53 -8.26 2.87 
2010 -2.64 11.44 5.72 -8.36 
2011 -5.68 2.20 1.10 -6.78 
2012 -0.08 2.09 1.04 -1.13 
2013 1.60 1.45 0.72 0.88 
2014 0.75 -1.78 -0.89 1.65 
2015 -0.76 -20.14 -10.07 9.31 
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The following table reports the results of specifications 6-6 and 6-9 only for the before 
period, where the regression is against the year 2005. 
Table 6.10: before period, where the regression is against the year 2005. 
      (1)     (2) 
Panel FE  Specification (6-8) Specification (6-9) 
Ln (𝐾
𝐿
) Coef. 0.2188*** 0.2106*** 





Coef.  0.0888* 
Std. Error       - (0.043) 
D(Year)    
2006 Coef. -0.0321 -0.0425 
 Std. Error (0.062) (0.061) 
2007 Coef. -0.0646 -0.0795 
 Std. Error (0.062) (0.062) 
2008 Coef. -0.2125** -0.2316*** 
 Std. Error (0.062) (0.062) 
2009 Coef. -0.0160 -0.0377 
 Std. Error (0.062) (0.062) 
2010 Coef. 0.1676** 0.0957 
 Std. Error (0.063) (0.072) 
FE  ✓ ✓ 
The following table reports the results of specifications 6-8 and 6-9 only for the after period, 
where the regression is against the year 2011. 
Table 6.11: after period, where the regression is against the year 2011. 
      (1)      (2) 
Panel FE  Specification (6-8) Specification (6-9 
Ln (𝐾
𝐿
) Coef. 0.0306 0.0197 





Coef.  0.1912** 
Std. Error      - (0.072) 
D(Year)    
2012 Coef. 0.0176 0.0047 
 Std. Error (0.016) (0.017) 
2013 Coef. 0.0786*** 0.0485* 
 Std. Error (0.017) (0.020) 
2014 Coef. 0.0492** -0.0157 
 Std. Error (0.017) (0.030) 
2015 Coef. 0.2209*** 0.1354 
 Std. Error (0.016) (0.036) 
FE  ✓ ✓ 
Chapter 6 Total Factor Productivity  185 
Table 6.12: Industry classification differences in different datasets. 
New Industry Number Nitaqat Dataset 2012 Establishment Survey Industry 2012 
4. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
1 Wholesale & Retail Trade 
50 Petrol Stations 
7 Pharmacies 
10 Trade Gold & Jewelry 
45 Wholesale & retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles & 
motorcycles 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
47 Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
5. Personal Services 2 Personal Services 
35 General office services 
96 Other personal service activities 
6. Manufacturing 3 Manufacturing 
40 Cement Industry 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
13 Manufacture of textiles 
32 Other manufacturing 
23 Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products 
26 Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 
27 Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 
28 Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 
30 Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
31 Manufacture of furniture 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products 
15 Manufacture of leather and 
related products 
16 Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 
21 Manufacture of products and 
preparations pharmaceutical 
7. Construction 4 Building Materials & 
Construction 
43 Ready-mixed Concrete 
54 Government Construction 
contracting 
25 Construction Maintenance 
& Hygiene, Employment & 
Subsistence 
41 Construction of buildings 
42 Civil engineering 
43 Specialized construction 
activities 
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8. Social & Community 
Services 
87 Social & Community 
Services 
88 Social work activities without 
accommodation 
9. Workshops & 
Maintenance Shops 
8 Workshops & Maintenance 
Shops 
 
33 Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 
95 Repair of computers and personal 
and household goods 
7. Food & Nutrition 
Services 
9 Nutrition Services 
13 Bread and Bakery Trade 
56 Food and beverage service 
activities 
10 Manufacture of food products 
11 Manufacture of beverages 
8.   Accommodation & 
Tourism 
 




87 Residential care activities 
79 Travel agency, tour operator, 
reservation service & related 
activities 
93 Sports activities and amusement 
and recreation activities 
90 Creative, arts and entertainment 
activities 
91 Libraries, archives, museums and 
other cultural activities 
9. Land Transport 49 Road Transport of 
Passengers outside Cities 
38 Road Transport of Goods 
in Cities 
20 Road Transport of 
Passengers in Cities 
51 Road Transport of Goods 
outside Cities 
49 Land transport and transport via 
pipelines 
10. Agriculture, Fishing & 
Horse Grazing 
14 Agriculture, Fishing and 
Horse Grazing 
15 Farmers, Fishermen and 
Shepherds 
3 Fishing and aquaculture 
2 Forestry and logging 
11.   Consulting Services & 
Business 
 
          16   Consulting 
Services & Business 
70 Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy activities 
69 Legal and accounting activities 
71 Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing & 
analysis 
73 Advertising and market research 
74 Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
77 Rental and leasing activities 
12. Health Services 17 Health Services 86 - Human health activities 
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13. Insurance & Business 
Services 
18 Insurance & Business 
Services 
65 Insurance, reinsurance and 
pension funding 
66 Activities auxiliary to financial 
service and insurance activities 
82 Office administrative, office 
support & other business support 
act's 
94 Activities of membership 
organizations 
14. Agriculture & 
Livestock Production 
19 Agriculture & Livestock 
Production 
1 Crop and animal production, 
hunting and related service activities 
75 Veterinary activities 
15. Education 29 Foreign Schools 
33 Private & Public Schools 
for Girls 
36 Private & Public Schools 
for Boys 
41 Kindergarten 
44 Institutes and colleges 
48 Private & Public Schools 
for Girls & Boys 
85 Education 
16. Oil & Gas Extraction 
 
88   Oil & Gas Extraction 06 Extraction of crude petroleum 
and natural gas 
17. Petrochemical, Coal & 
Rubber 
23   Petrochemical, Coal & 
Rubber 
22 - Manufacture of rubber and 
plastics products 
18. Printing, Publishing & 
Media 
 
24   Printing, Publishing & 
Media 
18 Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
58 Publishing activities 
59 Motion picture, video & tv 
programme production, sound 
recording 
60 Programming and broadcasting 
activities 
19. Financial Institutions  26 Financial Institutions 
(Banks) 
 
64 Financial service activities, 
except insurance and pension 
funding 
20. Collection offices & 
Real Estate Services 
27 Collection offices & Real 
Estate Services 
68 Real estate activities 
21. Mines & Quarries 53 Stone, granite and bricks 
28  
05  Mining of coal and lignite 
Mines & Quarries 
05 Mining of coal and lignite 
07 Mining of metal ores 
08 Other mining and quarrying 
09 Mining support service activities 
22. Air Transport 30  Air transport 
 
51 - Air transport 
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23. Electricity, Gas & 
Water 
 
31   Electricity, Gas & Water 
 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
36 Water collection, treatment and 
supply 
37 Sewerage 
39 Remediation activities and other 
waste management services 
38 Waste collection, treatment & 
disposal activities; materials 
recovery 
24. Water Transport 32 Sea Transport 50 Water transport 
25. Storage 34  Storage 52 Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 
26. Communications 37 Communications 61 Telecommunications 
53 Postal and courier activities 
27. Information 
Technology 
42   Information Technology 
 
62 Computer programming, 
consultancy and related activities 
63 Information service activities 
28. Security Guards 45 Security Guards 80 Security and investigation 
activities 
29. Laboratory 46 Laboratory 72 Scientific research and 
development 
30. Employment Activities 40 Agents of Private 
Recruitment 
47 Private Employment 
Offices 
78 Employment activities 
31.  Maintenance and 
operation Contracting 
52   Maintenance and 
operation Contracting 
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 Conclusion 
7.1       Summary and Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia had two main stages of its nationalisation efforts: 1995-2010 and 2011 to date. 
The efforts towards “Saudization” in 1995-2010 were similar to those of other GCC 
countries. Industries were categorised (11 in total) with unreasonable targets requiring around 
30% Saudi workers for almost all industries. These targets were impossible to meet on a large 
economic scale. In 2011, unemployment rates reached 12% among Saudis, with 30% of 
Saudi females being unemployed (SAMA,2016). Meanwhile, the private sector was 
comprised of 90% foreign workers. In the context of a dual labour market and migration 
theories, the government intervened by issuing the Nitaqat policy on the private sector in 
2011 in an attempt to solve the rising problem of unemployment and reduce reliance on 
foreign labour. This policy has categorised the private sector into four colour ratings based on 
compliance; from low to high: Red, Yellow, Green, and Platinum. The minimum cut-off for 
compliance is the Green category. Nitaqat was strictly enforced on the private sector to the 
point that many government services would stop if the firm was not compliant. This instantly 
added high compliance costs on the private sector as they had to hire Saudi workers whose 
wages far exceeded those of foreigners.  
This thesis has analysed the impact of the Nitaqat policy on the labour market and 
productivity, bringing in original analyses of different datasets at the firm, individual and 
industry levels. Most of the existing literature on Saudization is limited to descriptive 
quantitative analysis and qualitative assessment, this is mainly due to the lack of micro data 
in the country. This thesis uses original detailed dataset on the whole population of the 
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private sector at the firm level from the Saudi Ministry of Labor on the Nitaqat program. This 
facilitated an econometric approach to evaluate the program, producing original results and 
conclusions. We were also able to acquire the administrative dataset GOSI for chapter 5, 
which has allowed the study of earnings function allowing for original insights into the wage 
structure between nationals and non-nationals as well as the difference between males and 
females. The third dataset used in chapter 6 was created in this research where a merge 
between the AES and the Nitaqat dataset from chapter 4 to allow for productivity estimation. 
All three datasets are unique and has produced original results in all the empirical chapters. 
To summarise, Chapter 2 gave a brief historical background about the Saudi labour market. It 
also introduced the Nitaqat policy, explaining the difference between the colours, its 
mechanisms, rewards and sanctions, and the different debates in the local literature about the 
impact of the policy to the labour market. Chapter 3 discussed the relevant literature; it 
considered the theory of labour demand on operation of labour markets such as dual labour 
markets and impacts of migration, as well as policies that address labour market issues such 
as affirmative action, and the productivity literature. Chapters 4 through 6 used an 
econometric approach to analyse the impacts of this policy on labour markets and 
productivity.  
 Chapter 4 analysed the effect of Nitaqat on the Saudi private sector labour market. We were 
able to acquire and use the original dataset of Nitaqat from the Ministry of Labor with data 
from 2011 to 2015 and analyse the time-pattern of the impact of the policy. The analysis used 
a difference-in-differences technique, where the treatment groups were the Red and Yellow 
firms, and the control group was the Green firms, and 2011 was a base year. The model was 
used in different specifications to study the policy’s impact on: the Saudization rate; Saudi, 
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foreign, and total employment26; and the exit rate of firms. The results suggested that the 
Saudization rate has improved since the policy implementation by 10%. However, this 
occurred due to the significant decline in foreign labour rather than the increase in Saudi 
employment. The increase in Saudi employment was only significant in 2012, with an 
average increase of one Saudi employee per firm in the affected Red and Yellow firms 
compared to the Green firms. Meanwhile, the fall of foreign employment was significant 
across time to reach 18 fewer employees per firm in the Red category, and nine employees 
fewer per firm in the Yellow category in comparison to the Green category in 2015. These 
results were also reflected in total employment in the private sector declining by an average 
of -42.5% per firm in the Red category and -34% per firm in the Yellow category. As for the 
exit rate, the private sector had significant high exit rates since the implementation of the 
policy, reaching 17% in 2013, the exit rate declines slightly in 2014 and 2015 to around 15%. 
Several robustness checks were used in the chapter, which provide similar results.  
Chapter 5 provided a unique study into the Saudi labour market’s wage structure before and 
after the policy introduction. It used the GOSI dataset from 2009 to 2015. GOSI is one of the 
oldest and most established administrative, individual level datasets in Saudi Arabia. Mincer 
(1947) wage equations were used to study the time pattern of hourly wage change and by 
characteristic, Age, Saudis and non-Saudis, gender and skill. The large sample size also 
allowed an analysis by industry. Although this chapter was not able to bring in the impact of 
Nitaqat, it allowed us to observe the impact of skills, gender, and nationality on growth in 
hourly wage. For Saudis, results suggest that hourly wage had negative growth in 2011 and 
2012, and increased growth thereafter, suggesting similar patterns in labour productivity. 
                                                 
26 Employment was measured by growth rate and growth in number of employees. 
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Non-Saudis had a positive growth throughout the time trend, with smaller growth rates in 
2011 and 2012, which then increased from 2013 to 2015. Furthermore, being a high skilled 
worker from both nationalities had a positive and significant impact on hourly wage across 
time, with a higher increase in 2014 and 2015. In the low skilled category, Saudis showed an 
increasingly significant negative trend in hourly wages across time. Foreigners showed a 
similar trend except for 2015 where the relationship becomes significantly positive which 
suggests a high reliance on foreign low skilled workers in the private sector.  
The Gender variable, representing females against males, was very interesting as the 
relationship was negatively significant in 2012 and before, however, it then turns into 
positive significance from 2013 to 2015. This could be an impact of the Nitaqat policy but 
further studies need to be conducted to confirm causality. However, the policy aims to 
increase female employment in Saudi Arabia since historically, job opportunities for women 
were limited to education or the healthcare sector. Change is happening in Saudi Arabia and 
the policy has opened doors for women especially as an immediate replacement for foreign 
workers at the time of implementation since there were high unemployment rates for Saudi 
women.  
Chapter 6 merged the Nitaqat dataset with the Annual Establishment Survey ‘AES’, allowing 
for the study of total factor productivity in relation to Nitaqat at the industry level. Although 
the merged dataset produced only 26 industries, this chapter is a good starting point for 
productivity analysis as it allows estimation of the impact of Nitaqat on aggregate 
productivity. The chapter starts with a growth accounting exercise as it provides a good 
benchmark for economic performance analysis. Both labour productivity and TFP had 
negative trends from 2009 to 2012 but showed positive growth from 2013 onwards. This is 
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consistent with basic labour demand theory, of initially slow or negative productivity growth, 
followed by an upturn. 
Using the production function framework, the chapter then analyses the trend of output per 
worker ‘before and after’ the policy, from 2005 to 2015 using the AES dataset of 55 
industries, the time trend suggests that from 2006 to 2012, output per worker had negative 
growth, then from 2013 onwards, results seem to be positive. To suggest causality with 
Nitaqat, the merged data was used through different specifications for the production model 
where we first analysed output per worker regressed on the capital labour ratio, the share of 
Red workers and the share of Yellow workers using an FE panel regression. The results 
suggested the addition of the Red and Yellow firms have a negative relationship to TFP, yet 
TFP still had positive growth from 2012 to 2015, excluding 2014 which is affected by the 
introduction of micro firms. The third specification of the FE panel model, differentiated 
between the share of Saudis and foreigners in both Red and Yellow firms.  Results show a 
negative relationship with TFP between all variables in this specification, except for the share 
of Saudis in the Yellow firms. This might suggest that Yellow firms are benefitting from the 
policy and the increase of Saudi workers as opposed to the Red firms who are experiencing a 
negative relationship. The TFP time dummies follow the second specification by having 
positive growth in TFP except for 2014. Furthermore, specifications five and six examined 
the results year-on-year, with specification five dividing by share of Red and Yellow firms, 
and six by adding the share of nationalities in both Red and Yellow firms. With the caveat of 
very small sample sizes, specification five suggests a positive relationship of the share of 
workers in the Yellow category on TFP whereas the share of workers in Red firms shows a 
negative relationship across time. Specification six suggests that the share of Saudis in 
Yellow firms has a positive relationship across time which might suggest that this category is 
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the one that benefits most from the policy and may be able, in time, to raise their productivity 
to stay in the market as they are just below the quota required. Meanwhile, a rise in the share 
of foreign workers in the Yellow firms suggests a decline in TFP. In Red firms, the share of 
Saudis is negatively impacting TFP suggesting that Red firms might not be able to adjust to 
the extra costs of employing Saudis. This is also suggested by the positive relationship Red 
firms show for the share of foreigners, which suggests that having foreign workers improves 
their productivity and the policy is preventing them from realising these benefits. This is 
consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 where Red firms had the higher rate of exits since 
the start of the policy.  
In Conclusion, Nitaqat is suggested to have many implications on the private sector labour 
market in Saudi Arabia. Chapter 4 has found that Saudization has increased since 2011, the 
ratio of Saudis in the private sector has increased to 20% in comparison to the 10% prior to 
Nitaqat. This is mainly due to the vast decline in foreign employment rates rather than the 
increase in Saudi employment. Exit rates of firms from the private sector were increasing 
since 2011 reaching 17% increase in 2013. Chapter 5 analysed the earning function in the 
Saudi labour market, comparing gender, nationality and skill. The main contribution found in 
this chapter is that females show positive earnings when compared to men only after 2012. 
This indicated a positive outlook for females in the Saudi labour market, as female 
unemployment has been very high due to the restrictions on their employment in the private 
sector. Chapter 6 introduces an indication of productivity effect of Nitaqat on the labour 
market, and it was found that productivity has suffered in the first two years after the 
implementation of Nitaqat and then it showed recover, in line with labour demand theory, 
where the most productive were able to allocate their resources to improve productivity to 
raise profitability and continue to exist in the market. Firms who are less productive have 
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exited the market, indicating that in the long run productivity would increase in the private 
sector. Nitaqat has also helped improve statistical analysis on the private sector, as the dataset 
provided a good measurement tool to evaluate and follow the private sector. Prior to Nitaqat, 
the data was scattered between different governmental bodies, such as GOSI, the Ministry of 
Labor, the Ministry of Economy and Planning, and the General Authority for Statistics. 
However, the enforcement of Nitaqat has brought these datasets together.  That said, it would 
have been ideal if the Nitaqat dataset had an output variable to enable the analysis of 
productivity at the firm level. 
Although the policy is somewhat specific to the Saudi labour market, it can provide a good 
case study to other countries with similar labour market characteristics such as the labour 
market duality or significant inward migration. Moreover, similar policies are applied in other 
GCC countries, although to a lesser extent, who are also rentier economies with a dual 
market. The analysis of this thesis might be beneficial to them. This thesis also relates to the 
literature on dual labour market with immigrants being in the secondary market (De Coulon, 
2004). Furthermore, another relevant strand of literature is the literature on the affirmative 
action policy in the US and other similar policies around the world (Holzer and Neumark, 
2000). Nitaqat is the first policy that was applied to the whole economy and therefore, with 
the increased productivity in the labour market, the results from this thesis might benefit 
economies with similar characteristics of duality. 
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7.2       Limitations and Further Work 
Data acquirement was a very big achievement for this research as the policy is unique, and it 
was interesting to study its impact. However, due to the difficulty of data collection and high 
confidentiality in the region, we were not able to receive output data of firms in the Nitaqat 
dataset. Doing so would have allowed us to study the effect of the program on productivity 
on the firm level giving us a more detailed result on firm productivity in relation to different 
colours over time. Instead we had to rely on a small sample analysis of industries which 
limited our scope to investigate impacts on productivity using more sophisticated 
econometric methods. 
Another limitation in the Nitaqat chapter was that the data was only collected after the 
implementation of the policy. Therefore, in the study of before and after using the difference-
in-differences model, we had to rely on the first set of data collected after the policy when the 
majority of firms had not yet adjusted to the policy.  
As for future work, it is interesting to explore the impact of the Nitaqat policy on Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). Since 2011, FDI inflows have been declining and the global 
competitiveness report (2017-2018) lists the most problematic factors of doing business in 
Saudi Arabia as the “restrictive labour regulations”. Could the Nitaqat policy be hindering the 
chances of foreign investors from entering the market? We, especially note that the third most 
problematic factor is the “inadequately educated workforce” which makes the market even 
less attractive if a foreign investor must hire a large percentage of nationals.   
There is a trend of data collaboration across different governmental bodies at a macro level. 
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However, it is still at its initial stages. It is possible that future research can have accessibility 
to better data. There is also availability of individual and firm level administrative datasets 
that are very difficult to acquire, due to confidentiality restrictions. There are possible 
chances that clear laws can be introduced to reduce these restrictions to alleviate the level of 
research that is conducted on the region. Although administrative data is useful at this stage, 
more data collection for research based such as surveys, need to be conducted at both macro 
and micro level to account for different variables that are needed for econometric analysis yet 
are not found in administrative data. For example, the sales variable is not relevant for 
administrative purposes in the Nitaqat dataset. However, its addition into the Nitaqat dataset 
would allow researchers to be able to measure labour productivity per firm.  
The effect of Nitaqat on immigration is also an interesting avenue for future research as  
Saudi Arabia is one of the top five destinations for labour migration. With added costs on 
foreign labour in the country, how has this affected immigration, and what is the future 
economic outlook for the foreign worker in the Saudi labour market? 
Moreover, another research avenue that would be beneficial, is using the matching function 
to match labour market demand, supply and reduce the cost of market frictions. This is to 
match educational outcomes to labour market needs. The research attempted to explore this 
aspect in the early stages of the PhD, however, due to data limitation, it was not possible. 
The research so far has shown initial positive impacts on female employment from 2011 and 
onwards. Future research could focus and shed light on female employment, especially with 
the reduction in restrictions to female employment in the country, such as the removal of the 
female driving ban in 2018. How would this effect female employment? It would be 
interesting to collect data before and after the policy and study the economic effect and 
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outcome. Furthermore, with the transformation programs that are taking place all across the 
kingdom guided by Vision 2030, the question that poses itself is “how does Nitaqat play a 
role in that vision?” What are the economic implications of different avenues of vision 2030 
on economic development of the Kingdom? 
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